Problems of COMMUNISM

The Fruits of De-Stalinization

Jane Degras
Alexander Dallin
G. E. Lynd

Africa and the USSR

Lazar Pistrak
Christopher Bird

"VRANYO"

Ronald Hingley

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The Editors, *Problems of Communism*
United States Information Agency
1776 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington 25, D. C.

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The Fruits of De-Stalinization

EDITORS' NOTE: The articles below continue this journal's survey of the impact of the 22nd CPSU Congress on the Communist parties throughout the world. The first, by Miss Degras, reports on the repercussions felt in the Soviet Union—in "political geography" (Stalingrad—Volgograd), in historiography (Radek did *die), among writers and intellectuals in general, and in the area of propaganda and indoctrination. Mr. Dallin's article deals with the far more serious and significant impact on the international Communist movement—the Sino-Soviet rift, the interesting debate between the Italian and French CP's, the growth of "polycentrism." Finally, Mr. Lynd depicts the ferment in what is probably the largest and most powerful of all the Communist "front organizations"—the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)—as revealed during its Fifth Congress, held in Moscow in December of last year. The next issue of this journal will carry a survey of de-Stalinization in the East European "people's democracies."*

Moscow in Ferment

By Jane Degras

LEAVING ASIDE the break with Albania and its wider implications, the 22nd CPSU Congress has not so far had any startling visible repercussions in the USSR. There was the initial rush to rechristen towns and villages, factories, farms, and children's homes that had once taken pride in bearing Stalin's name, and the road haulers were kept busy removing tons of disgraced statue-concrete. (What does a Soviet visitor to, say, London think about statues of Charles I *and* Oliver Cromwell occupying places of honor?) But now, events seem to be hanging fire, and the present may be as good or bad a time as any to examine the impact to date of the unexpected renewal of the de-Stalinization campaign.

Six years ago the attack on Stalin seemed intended primarily for internal purposes—as a reassurance and pledge to the party itself rather than to the people as a whole (since Khrushchev's 1956 speech denouncing Stalin was never published in the USSR)—although its impact was far more marked outside the Soviet frontiers. The purposes of the second attack are more complex and obscure. Once it was decided to reopen hostilities against the "anti-party group," there was clearly an irresistible temptation to blacken the character of its members by associating them directly and personally with some of the more disgraceful episodes in Stalin's career, but what followed may have gone beyond the original intention. The removal of Stalin's body from the Red Square mausoleum and the proposal to erect a monument to his victims

Miss Degras, whose articles on current Soviet affairs appear frequently in The World Today *(London), is the editor of* Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy 1917-1941 *(three volumes), and* The Communist International 1919-1943: Documents, *Oxford University Press, of which two volumes have so far come out.*

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were not foreshadowed in Mr. Khrushchev's first speech to the 22nd Congress, when he told his audience that the people had been told "the whole truth." A week later, after more truth had been doled out by other speakers, notably Shvernik, Shelepin, Spiridonov, and Lazurkina, he added further revelations. (All the disclosures still do not add up to "the whole truth"; but then, as Céline once said, if a single government were to tell the whole truth, for twenty-four hours, every government would fall.)

Stalin's association with Georgia and the unrest that occurred there following the 1956 Congress gave special interest to the speech of Georgian Prime Minister Dzhavakishvili on the proposal to move Stalin's remains. It was the shortest of the speeches made in approval, and the only one which did not criticize Stalin personally. The version of it published in *Zaria Vostoka* omitted all reference to persons who had suffered under "the personality cult," although Dzhavakishvili's actual statement had confirmed the posthumous rehabilitation of several Caucasian Communists, including Orakhelashvili, Kashiani, and Eliava.

How far the latest revelations came as a surprise to the population as a whole it is impossible to say. No doubt a good deal of what had been said in 1956 had seeped down in the intervening years, and the older generation in any case needed no speech from on high to remind them of what had happened. But there must still have been many among the younger generation to whom this public execration came as a shock. An unnamed district party secretary described his reactions in this fashion:

You know, the night I heard all that about Stalin I didn't sleep . . . When he died I wept, so did my wife and children . . . It seemed that life had stopped. How could one go on without him? . . . And then I, who had advanced against the enemy during the war with Stalin's name on my lips, heard the terrible truth about him. He had been quite different, had betrayed our trust, betrayed the party which had believed in him, betrayed the people.[1]

There is an unconvincing "literary" note in these words. A district secretary stands fairly high in the party hierarchy, and though it would be wrong to assume that all party members (much less, all Soviet citizens) knew the details and full extent of Stalin's "betrayal," it was common knowledge that tens of thousands of innocent people had been executed and a far greater number imprisoned and deported. Certainly, the congress revelations could not have taken a senior party official by surprise. It was only that the truth had now become not only official as in 1956, but also public. For a more radical break with the past we shall have to wait until another generation of leaders takes command. Meanwhile, for the party militants, the whole Stalin era remains what the Germans call *unbewältigte Vergangenheit.*

NEVERTHELESS, the leaders were unquestionably concerned about the possible impact of the Congress and took steps to keep its repercussions under control. To answer the question, Why bring it all up again?, *Pravda* on November 21 devoted a long unsigned article to "liquidating the consequences of the personality cult." The "open and fearless condemnation of the cult" was called immensely important for the building of communism: it opened the way to the initiative and activity of the masses. It was natural, moreover, that in reporting on its work since the 20th Congress the Central Committee should dwell on the "great work done by the party" in liquidating the cult and its consequences and in developing Leninist democracy within the party. Since the decisions of the 20th Congress had been so stubbornly opposed by Molotov and Co., *Pravda* continued, the Central Committee had to do all it could to prevent a repetition of the earlier errors. The 22nd Congress was a demonstration that the cult had been ended, once and for all time.

To those "honest people abroad" who, deceived and misled by the ideologues of imperialism, wondered whether the cult bore witness to some process of degeneration, *Pravda's* answer was that the cult was only a foreign growth on a healthy body. It was "profoundly alien to a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party" and without any roots in the social structure. The best refutation of arguments to the contrary was furnished by the wonderful successes of the Soviet people under CPSU leadership. But neither this article nor any of the others which reasoned on similar lines attempted to explain why "Lenin's healthy party" tolerated this "alien growth" for twenty years and more.

There were later indications that the critics remained unconvinced. *The World Marxist Review* for December 1961 warned in its editorial that "unrelenting struggle against . . . manifestations of the personality cult does not of course imply making concessions to petty-bourgeois liberalism or countenancing any attacks by the revisionists." Also, addressing an "All-Union Conference on Ideological Work" which opened in Moscow on December 25, and which was attended by 2,700 party propagandists, Central Committee Secretary L. F. Ilichev, after condemning dogmatism, turned his fire on the revisionists who, on the pretext of attacking the personality cult, were undermining the very foundations

[1] *Literatura i zhizn,* January 1, 1962.

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of Marxist-Leninist theory. During the conference, Ilichev and other prominent party propagandists mapped out the guidelines for a nationwide campaign to popularize the new CPSU Program and the decisions of the 22nd Congress.[2] (According to later reports, 300,000 party workers have been engaged in the campaign in Moscow alone.) Party propaganda was to be stepped up, to take the offensive; the 22nd Congress proceedings were to give no excuse for any slackening of party discipline; the emergence of anti-Leninist—or even un-Leninist—ideas was to be nipped in the bud.

More details were added a short while later at the plenary session of the Writers' Union, where the majority of those who chose to speak belonged to the conservative wing (most of the talented writers are found elsewhere). The divergent trends among the writers, already apparent at the 22nd Congress, have persisted since. Ehrenburg's recent speeches have been noted in the foreign as well as the Soviet press, particularly the one in which he recognized the complicity of writers in an earlier conspiracy of silence,[3] while Kochetov, who may be taken as typical of the unreformed and unrepentant conservatives, was taken to task in *Literaturnaia gazeta* (December 16) and in *Novyi mir* (January 1962) for having played down the impact of de-Stalinization in his novel *Sekretar obkoma.* Kochetov has had no lack of defenders, however, not only in the Writers' Union but also among party officials, and has since been awarded the Order of Lenin. The argument has filled many pages in Soviet literary journals and even found its way into the Italian Communist daily *l'Unità* (December 30), for—while personal considerations may also be involved—it reflects and focuses, perhaps more accurately than anything else, the confrontation between liberal and conservative forces in Soviety society today.

The latter are not without weighty support. The issue of *Molodoi kommunist* published just after the 22nd Congress (No. 11, 1961) carried an article by a Doctor of Philosophy who wrote that Marx, Engels, and Lenin laid the foundations of "a genuinely scientific theory of art," and that their esthetic tastes and views should be studied and accepted "as a model of genuine, exalted, and noble artistic taste by means of which we should correct our own tastes and views." As an example of Lenin's esthetic judgment, the article quoted some of his remarks about Gorki's *Mother:* it was "a very modern book," "a book which was badly needed," one which the workers could read "with great benefit to themselves."

But the yeast will not stop fermenting. A letter to *Komsomolskaia pravda*—quoted in *The Times* (London) of January 25, 1962—asks for greater freedom for students to express their own opinions instead of having to repeat "truths handed down in a ready-made and decided form," in the traditions of "medieval scholasticism." "Our students," writes the author, "are sufficiently mature for discussions and debates, and the time has come to stop leading them by the hand."

THE ECONOMISTS, on the other hand, have been warned. In *Kommunist* (No. 17, 1961), Professor Gatovski criticized Stalin's last-published writing, *The Economic Problems of Socialism,* particularly his remarks on the prospects of Soviet agriculture; but this was nothing compared to the full-scale assault launched by Professor Leontiev in *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (December 1961) in an article entitled "Hangovers from the Past and the Demands of Life." The progress of science had been impeded by the errors of the past, wrote Leontiev, but now the way ahead "has been paved by the elimination of the abuse of power in theoretical matters caused by the personality cult and consisting, as was noted at the 22nd Congress, of attempts to decide theoretical problems by fiat." The weight of the author's attack was concentrated on Stalin's "main economic law": Could it be possible for any *one* law to determine all the chief aspects and processes of a given mode of production? Wasn't this "novelty" introduced "in order to imitate an actually non-existent contribution to Marxism-Leninism?"

In the present context, Leontiev's argument as such need not be considered: in its own way it, too, was dogmatic, constantly referring back to "our great teachers"—no doubt a necessary precaution—and on one occasion reproving an unnamed author for writing that "Marx and Engels could not have foreseen. . . ." In essence, however, the article was a plea to consider economic questions on their own merits. In the course of it, Leontiev resuscitated the names of three Soviet economists "for whom Lenin had great respect"—Skvortsov-Stepanov, V. Milyutin, and Kritsman—and noted also that a number of younger economists devoted to the party had "perished innocently" in the 1930's. "Would it not be just and proper," he asked, "to rescue their names from oblivion, and to put in a good word for their positive contribution to the effort to uphold, elaborate, and popularize Marxist-Leninist economics?"

Having paid due tribute to the classics and to the action of the 22nd Congress, Professor Leontiev may have felt secure in making his attempt to renovate Soviet economic theory and bring it closer to the questions

[2] Conference discussions reported in *Pravda,* December 26-29, 1961.

[3] See, *e.g., The Times* (London), January 8, 1962.

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actually preoccupying the planners. But revisionists could not be allowed to exploit the campaign against dogmatism for their own purposes; hence, in the next issue of *Kommunist,* Mr. Ilichev rebuked Leontiev for following a path that would "lead to doubting the whole political economy of socialism." For, as he told the December conference on ideological work, the revisionists, under the guise of attacking the personality cult, were striking at the very foundation of Marxism-Leninism. In certain respects, this episode repeats the events of 1956-57 in the literary world—the attempt to translate into action the exhortations of the 20th Congress to write freely, to discard all that was sterile and outworn, followed by a warning rap over the knuckles to indicate that such advice was not to be taken too literally.

HISTORY, which is an even more sensitive field than economics, is clearly going to get some benefit from the 22nd Congress—at least, to be safe, it need no longer be wholly anonymous. But there is little encouragement for the enquiring mind in an article by E. Zhukov in the last issue of *Voprosy istorii* for 1961, dealing with the congress and the tasks of Soviet historians. History, he wrote, is "moving precisely as scientifically foretold by Marx and Lenin"; and while dogmatism is fought, "it must not for a moment be forgotten that revisionism remains the chief danger in the Communist movement today." Again:

The liquidation of the harmful consequences of the Stalin personality cult does not imply an ideological amnesty for every kind of anti-party trend . . . As is known, in 1956 some wavering intellectuals, having misunderstood the correct presentation of the 20th CPSU Congress on questions of the harm done by the personality cult, became confused, and some of them went so far as to question the entire preceding struggle of the party against its ideological enemies.

Confusion, Zhukov continued, had seized the minds of the editorial board of *Voprosy istorii* itself, "and the Central Committee was compelled to take a special decision on this question." This coy reference to the dismissal of Burialov (who appears not to have written, or at any rate published, anything since 1957) for his analysis of Bolshevik-Menshevik relations before the Revolution will no doubt be duly noted by the present board. Perhaps the only moderate passage in Zhukov's article (at least one that is unlikely to appeal to Comrade Ulbricht) is the statement that "among the negative consequences of the personality cult were certain weaknesses of the international Communist movement. It is enough to recall, for example, the dissemination of the sectarian thesis that fascism and social democracy were not antipodes, but twins." Mr. Zhukov also pays a grudging tribute to the historian Pokrovsky (as Ilichev did, less grudgingly, at the 22nd Congress).

Not that there was much revisionism to condemn among the historians dealing with the Soviet period. A book on the Baku Congress of Peoples of the East in 1920, published by the Academy of Sciences in the fall of 1961, does not even mention the two principal Bolsheviks who attended and gave the keynote addresses—Zinoviev and Radek.[4] It is perhaps of some significance that a novel published in the same year, Kazakevich's *Sinaia tetrad,* gave a not totally hostile portrait of Zinoviev, while the historians feared even to mention his name. But there have been signs of change, notably a critical review in *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (No. 6, 1961) of a guide to Soviet historical sources, published by Moscow University last year. The critics, four in number, declared that the work was wholly in the Stalinist tradition, that its authors had disregarded the directives of the 20th Congress (an unfair way of saying that they had not anticipated the directives of the 22nd), and that they had showered praise on Stalin's leadership even past the middle 1930's.

Surreptitiously and obliquely, the process of rehabilitating Stalin's victims continues, if rehabilitation is the right word to apply to the rather elementary act of publishing for the first time the dates of their deaths. We now learn from the new edition of the protocols of the 11th Party Congress (1922), recently issued in Moscow, that Karl Radek, who was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment in 1937, died (how?) in 1939, that Rakovsky (sentenced to twenty years of hard labor in 1938) died in 1941, Sokolnikov (ten years' imprisonment imposed in 1937) in 1939, etc.[5] Of the few who disappeared but still are alive, Shumiatsky is probably the best known; he now receives a state pension.

IN THE NATURAL SCIENCES, it is of course irrelevant to try to identify political trends as such, but scientists are not sheltered from political winds by the nature of their calling. Writing in *Izvestia* (January 3, 1962), Professor Igor Tamm, nuclear physicist and Nobel Prize winner, complained that political and other irrelevant considerations often outweigh the claims of talent in the choice of scientific research workers: "Often it is asserted that the social activity of the student is insufficient, even if the reason for this is not any lack of political consciousness but rather an absorption in scientific work." Professor Tamm regretted that he had not always been successful in securing the appointment of his nominees.

[4] G. Z. Zorkin, *Pervyi sezd narodov vostoka.*

[5] *Otdinatsatyi sezd RKP(B),* Gospolizdat, Moscow, 1961.

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De-Stalinization: The Case of Volgograd

There is a new city in the USSR today, and its name is Volgograd. That is to say, it isn't *really* a new city: in point of fact, it was founded as far back as 1589; until 1925, it was known as Tsaritsyn; from 1925 till 1961, it bore the name of Stalingrad. And as of last November, it has come to be known (in line with a decree of the Supreme Soviet) as Volgograd.

Now according to the decree, the change in name was effected in line "with the wishes and demands" of its citizens. But *unofficial* sources—say, numerous visitors who have been to the city in recent months—tell us that the decree is not to be trusted on this score. And indeed, should the STALINGRAD signs have been dismantled at night, stealthily, hurriedly, and frequently with somewhat embarrassing results (STALIN—gone, GRAD—temporarily—on)? The ironic and even contemptuous remarks by people on the streets, the open displays of tearful emotions, the reports of bitter debates and party meetings—all this somehow does not square with the words of the decree. On the contrary, it all points to the fact that whatever the reaction of the Soviet population to "de-Stalinization" in general, they regard the change of name not so much as a blow against the late dictator as against their own proud and blood-drenched past.

Why, then, did the party leadership decide on this step? Of the reasons that come to mind, perhaps one is the peculiar Communist aversion to half-measures: "There are no fortresses a Bolshevik can't conquer," runs an old slogan, and whatever the fortress at a given moment—be it "Trotskyism," "petty-bourgeois mentality," or the virgin lands in Kazakhstan—it must be stormed and won at all costs and without any qualms. The decision to downgrade Stalin having been taken, no holds were to be barred, however grim or absurd the consequences.

One wonders, however, whether behind this decision there lurk no other, more personal motivations. Ever since Khrushchev came to power, after all, he has been quietly engaged (not unlike his predecessor) in rewriting history. And among the areas that have claimed his attention World War II, and in particular the Battle of Stalingrad, has assumed a very special prominence. Thus while in 1947 and 1948, say, the official Soviet encylopedias limited Khrushchev's role during the war to membership in the Military Council at the front (Khrushchev did not belong to the highest military body, the State Defense Committee, which was peopled almost exclusively with anti-party members such as Molotov, Beria and Malenkov), the recent versions are positively rhapsodic on Khrushchev's wartime accomplishments.

A volume of the 2nd edition of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia published in November 1957, for instance, fails to mention the members of the State Defense Committee at all, and credits the First Secretary with "great work" and "active participation in the defense of Stalingrad and the preparation of the defeat of the German-fascist forces at Stalingrad." In 1959, in line with Zhukov's new status as a "non-person," his role as *the* defendant of Stalingrad was expunged from the records altogether, and all the glory was transferred, retroactively, to First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev.[1] And the third volume of *The History of the Great Fatherland War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945*, published on the eve of the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961, takes this process one step further: there Khrushchev is depicted as one of the most important military planners of the war, and particularly as the one who was responsible for the rout of the German forces at (old style) Stalingrad. Now if Khrushchev wants to go down in history as the liberator *of* Stalingrad and *from* Stalinism, would it not be logical for him not only to remove the hated name from the great city but also—eventually—insert his own name in its place? True, at the present moment the intensity of the anti-personality-cult-campaign makes this somewhat less than likely. But who knows? After all, there already *is* a town by name of Khrushchevsk in the USSR . . . Food for thought, that.

Be it as it may, it seems as if at least one question that has been a source of considerable speculation has now been cleared up. Would the famous Battle of Stalingrad continue to be referred to by the name the city bore at that time, or would the new name be used even in historical accounts? An article by Marshal V. Kazakov in a recent issue of the English weekly *Moscow News* dispels any doubts. Writes the Marshal:

> On November 19, 1942, the thunder of Soviet artillery heralded the beginning of the Soviet counter-offensive at Volgograd,* which culminated in the surrounding and routing of a 330,000-strong army of German fascist invaders, a feat unprecedented in history.

The footnote, in appropriately small print, says:

> * Formerly Stalingrad. The city was renamed by a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation on November 10, 1961, in compliance with requests from collectives of industrial enterprises, construction sites, state farms, collective farms, and institutions, and also from mass organizations of the region (now named Volgograd Region).

SIC TRANSIT GLORIA URBIS.

A.B.

[1] See Lazar Pistrak. *The Grand Tactician*, F. Praeger, New York, 1961, Chapter XVI.

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This, incidentally, is not the professor's first outburst. At a meeting in 1956 to reelect the President of the Academy of Sciences, he proposed postponement of the election on the ground that bureaucracy was rampant in the Academy. The proposal was rejected.

Little was added by Mr. Suslov's speech to members of the social science faculties, even though, in abridged form, it took up one and a half pages of *Pravda* (February 4). According to the speaker, Leninist principles had been restored not only in the party and government, but also in the social sciences where Stalin's pretension to a monopoly of revolutionary theory and his practice of deciding theoretical questions by administrative means had done immense harm. In philosophy his "schematic thinking," lauded at the time as "historic" and the "fruit of genius," had impoverished the work of philosophy teachers; what he wrote on economic questions revealed a divorce from practical problems; history, too, had suffered, particularly Communist Party history. The *Short Course* was designed to do honor to Stalin alone, to attribute all victories to him. New textbooks were required for all the social sciences if the teachers were to do their job properly. But, successful as the party had been in destroying the cult, Mr. Suslov went on, dogmatism, divorce from life, and "quotation-mongering" were not yet completely eliminated from theoretical work and from the thinking of some social science teachers; unless this were done, research into the current theoretical and practical problems of building communism and educating the new Communist man would suffer.

Some weights had to be put on the other side of the scale, although Mr. Suslov, who hitherto has usually been numbered among the conservatives, appeared to find this less congenial; at any rate, he gave little time to it. Even in the realm of theory, he said (echoing Ilichev), there were some services to Stalin's credit; not all his work should be dismissed as erroneous; each part should be examined on its merits. This equivocation reflects the enduring dilemma of the Soviet leaders, torn as they are between the need to disown a hateful past and the equal need to preserve those features of it from which the present structure derives its legitimacy; between the compulsion to make changes that are rapid and radical enough and the fear of letting them get out of hand. The party, Mr. Suslov said, would vigorously repulse any attempt to use the struggle against the personality cult "as a pretext for whitewashing Trotskyism, right opportunism, nationalist deviations, and other anti-Leninist trends" long ago defeated and justly condemned; nor would it tolerate any attempt to "blacken the immense theoretical and practical activity of our party and its Central Committee"—a surprising and suggestive phrase. The most important task on the theoretical front remains the dual exposure of revisionism and of dogmatism, and at the moment the former represents the greater danger. "A few years ago revisionism took on an especially dangerous character"; ideologically, it now has been defeated, but the danger still remains.

Suslov deplored the cases of hooliganism and drunkenness at the universities, the "frivolous attitude to their studies" and the "petty-bourgeois profligacy" displayed by a small part of the student body. In this he rather differed with Konstantin Paustovsky, one of the most respected of the older Russian writers and a professor of literature for many years, who has commented scathingly on another kind of student, the kind "who was told to adapt himself and did his utmost to conform. It was completely uninteresting to work with such students . . . they do not seek truth; their sole aspiration is to have an easy and comfortable life." [6]

IT IS UNLIKELY that these internal tugs of war in the intellectual field will subside before the major political issues are resolved. Khrushchev's opponents at home (whoever they may be, in addition to the named members of the "anti-party group") are probably causing him some concern, as the change of mind over Molotov's position at Vienna indicated. It is also odd that somebody as vigorously berated by his chief as Pervukhin has been should continue to act as his country's ambassador to East Germany. (In the later 1920's Stalin, before he had asserted unchallenged control, often removed opponents from the battlefield by posting them to diplomatic missions abroad; the best known case was the dispatch of Kamenev to Paris.)

The second round of de-Stalinization is, of course, inseparable from the renewed attack on the anti-party group. The *Pravda* article of November 21 attributed the theory advanced by Stalin in 1937, to the effect that the class struggle grows sharper as socialism progresses, to Stalin *and* Molotov. It was this erroneous theory, said the article, that was used to justify the "mass repressions" of the Stalin era. The accusations levelled against the group are more than enough to justify the institution of legal proceedings. But while this would be in accordance with "socialist legality," it would conjure up once more the hated specter of trial and terror, and Khrushchev is right in believing—as he apparently does—that nothing in the situation at home warrants such measures. Simple expulsion from the party, as Pospelov hinted, may be used to wind up the affair.

[6] As reported in *Der Sonntag* (East Berlin), Jan. 14, 1962.

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But if Khrushchev (who enjoys a certain amount of popularity in the country at large) does not fear a palace revolution, however discontented some of the party bureaucrats may be, there is clearly uncertainty and confusion about the future course of de-Stalinization and the correct interpretation of the new and more flexible party line. The operation, both political and doctrinal, in which the Soviet leaders are engaged is extremely delicate; Stalin must be both rejected and retained. He is not remote enough in time to be dismissed—like a medieval Tsar—as a cruel tyrant who nevertheless promoted the greatness of his country. If at times it may seem to Khrushchev—as it did to Professor Keynes twenty-five years ago—that "the difficulty lies not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones," the attempts to escape may also cause concern. No doubt officials accustomed to acting only on orders from above have some difficulty in learning how and in what measure to respond to pressures from below. While the pressures must be contained, de-Stalinization has its own momentum. If it is bound to encounter obstacles, it also may slip the leash and have to be temporarily reversed. Two steps forward and one step back is, after all, a familiar phrase in the USSR.

Long Divisions and Fine Fractions

By Alexander Dallin

WITHIN A FORTNIGHT after the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, Georgio Amendola told the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party that international communism's "fictitious unanimity—decreed by some documents but not corresponding to reality"—had disappeared. A month later, Ajoy Ghosh, Secretary-General of the Indian Communist Party, admitted that members of his party were "dumbfounded and demoralized" by the events at the Congress. These admissions highlight a new stage in the struggle over authority and strategy in the Communist world. They reveal conflicts within the Communist family, the very possibility of which had long been denied by friends and foes alike.

Yet what transpired at the 22nd Congress was neither sudden nor unimaginable. Rather, it was the culmination of a long process—one of erosion of Soviet authority on the one hand, and the diffusion of authority in the movement on the other. In 1953 Soviet leadership of international communism was, in effect, unchallenged. In 1956, following the 20th Party Congress, Moscow began to deal with other parties on a bilateral basis. In November 1957, a joint declaration of principles and policies was issued by the twelve parties that hold state power, meeting in closed session. In November 1960, apparently at Chinese insistence, all 81 Communist parties present at the Moscow Conference participated in several weeks of vigorous debate.

For most Communist parties, the changed relationship with Moscow after 1956 came as something of a shock. Like children admitted into the councils of their elders, they were startled to be wooed instead of told. Overwhelmed by the complexities of issues and arguments unfamiliar to many of them, they were nevertheless challenged by the reportedly hundreds of amendments and motions presented at the 1960 meetings and, at the October 1961 Congress, by the patent importance of publicly endorsing, or abstaining from endorsing, Khrushchev's attack on the Albanian leadership. When the first shock was over, many complained that they were poorly informed and, one may assume, protested that the CPSU had an unfortunate way of "springing" issues on the fraternal parties. Indeed, most of the Communist parties had no advance knowledge of de-

Mr. Dallin is Professor of International Relations and Director of the Russian Institute, Columbia University, New York. He is author of German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945 *(St. Martin's Press, New York, 1957) and of the forthcoming* The Soviet Union at the United Nations *(F. Praeger, New York).*

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Stalinization in 1956, of the bitter exchanges with the Chinese at Bucharest in June 1961, of the long and difficult debates in Moscow four months later, or of the condemnation of the Albanians and the Soviet "anti-party group" at the 22nd Congress. Perhaps, in each case, some of the bloc parties had been informed. Yet the fact remains that most of the non-bloc Communists were manifestly surprised by what they learned, and they evidently found the revelations both painful and traumatic.

The continued lack of candor among the principals makes it difficult to identify the themes underlying the conflict now raging in the Communist world. But behind the guarded language of recent polemics, the controversy appears to revolve around the same two axes of contention that underlay previous intra-party struggles: ideology (left *vs.* right) and organization (control *vs.* autonomy). For a number of parties, the 81-Party Statement adopted on December 2, 1960, represented an uneasy compromise between organizational loyalty to Moscow as the only possible center of the international movement and vague sympathies for the intransigent world view that came to be called Chinese. Khrushchev himself precipitated the new showdown in the fall of 1961 by what may prove to be the costliest of his many acts of overconfidence.

Left *vs.* Right

In extreme form, "left" and "right" communism represent outlooks, temperaments, and strategies so far apart as to make their effective coexistence in one totalitarian movement well-nigh impossible. They divide on virtually all the issues raised in the recent disputes: the "cult of personality," contacts abroad, disarmament, the need for terror, shortcuts to communism, allocation of more funds for consumer goods, agricultural communes, the nature of imperialism, the reliability of "national bourgeois" leaders, peaceful accession to power, and the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Since Communist China embarked on its "Great Leap Forward" and became clearly identified with an extreme "leftist" position, the ideological and strategic conflict between left and right has tended to be identified with the struggle of Peking *vs.* Moscow. Thus one of the major Soviet critiques of the Chinese position came in the form of a *Pravda* review (June 12, 1960) of Lenin's "Left Communism—An Infantile Disorder." Since October 1959 Moscow and other "right" Communists have at times sought to attach the label of Trotskyism to their Chinese and Albanian opponents. Historical impropriety has not prevented them from drawing telling parallels between Trotsky's ideas and the alleged commitment of the Chinese Communist leadership to a "no war, no peace" policy and to an assumption of "permanent revolution" at home and abroad. In turn the Chinese have used the name of Bukharin to "smear" their Titoist opponents, and the Indonesian Communists have cited Lenin's victory over the Mensheviks to suggest a continuing pattern of victory for radical organization and orthodoxy over challengers from the moribund right.

It is also interesting that B. T. Ranadive, who in 1949-51 was labeled a "Trotskyite" for his advocacy of direct revolutionary action in India, and who was then emphatically opposed to the Chinese Communists, is now their major friend and protégé in the Communist Party of India: the key lies of course in the shift from "right" to "left" executed by the Chinese party in 1957-58. Similarly, the charges brought against Molotov at the 22nd Party Congress—in response to his accusations that the CPSU Program reflects a petty-bourgeois outlook and dilutes the pre-eminent role of the Leninist party—link him unmistakably with the "Chinese" position in world affairs: "Molotov and others . . . cannot or do not wish to understand the most profound shifts which have taken place in world affairs, and they seek to push the party onto an adventurist path." [1]

Labels such as "adventurist," "sectarian," and "dogmatist" have been applied broadly by Soviet spokesmen to both domestic and foreign leftists—the "anti-party group" (Molotov), the Albanian leadership (Hoxha), and "some comrades" who are not otherwise named (Mao *et al.*). These opponents in turn join in charging Khrushchev with "revisionism" and "opportunism."

All Communist parties have in the past had their left and right wings, fighting over alternative strategies at home and abroad. The divergence between the two approaches has been accentuated by the problems of war and peace which, in the words of Jean Terfve, a leading Belgian Communist, "put our Chinese comrades in fundamental opposition to our Soviet comrades and to the overwhelming majority of Communist parties."

[1] T. Timofeev, "XXII sezd KPSS i mirovoe razvitie," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, 1961, no. 11, p. 5. The same article rebuts Molotov's complaint that the Khrushchev program concentrates on the domestic development in the USSR at the expense of the revolutionary movement abroad by arguing that "hopeless dogmatists like Molotov recognize in essence only one kind of tie [to foreign communism]: armed intervention from the outside into the developing class struggle in capitalist countries . . . [which] amounts to an appeal for unleashing a world war."

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What compromise can there be between those who insist (as Moscow does) that disarmament is the prime need of the present era, and those who argue (as Liu Nin-yi did at the World Peace Council meeting in Stockholm on December 18, 1961) that what the "oppressed peoples" need is more arms, not fewer arms? How can one reconcile the conflicts of value and temperament which lead Palmiro Togliatti to say (and Moscow to repeat) that in nuclear war "human civilization itself . . . would disappear," [2] and on the other hand lead the Indonesian Communists to insist (in a Politburo resolution of December 15, 1961) that "the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism be given priority" over peaceful coexistence?

In actual practice, Communists have not always taken consistent positions on most of the issues in dispute between what might be labeled "welfare communism" and "barricade communism." The absence of a clear-cut left-right realignment within the Communist world is due, in part, to the presence of several criteria of alignment which cut across the ideological-strategic field.

Autonomy *vs.* Control

Prior to the diffusion of authority among "equal and independent" Communist parties, the Comintern—*i.e.*, Moscow—was recognized to be the "general staff of the world revolution," and Communist interests everywhere were equated with those of the Soviet state. For over a generation party members were told that they must sacrifice their "narrow" national interests to those of the international cause—that of the USSR. Since World War II communism has had no international institution reflecting formal subordination or transmitting coordinated directives to its legions of followers throughout the world. But for a time the combination of rigid discipline, inertia, and Soviet authority provided a substitute, which was so much taken for granted that Palmiro Togliatti's very mention of "polycentrism" in 1956 was considered shocking and heretical. Suppressed for years, the demand for polycentrism reemerged after the 22nd Congress. Several parties obedient to Moscow promptly pointed out that polycentrism would amount to a step back from the principles of autonomy and equality of all Communist parties. Not without malice the French Communists told the Italians that polycentrism would mean sanctioning "factions" on an international scale—and factionalism, of course, remains taboo.

[2] *L'Unità* (Rome), January 22, 1962.

How then were a unitary world view and a single Communist strategy to be mapped out? The emergence of several centers of Communist power, and hence of authority, almost inescapably presaged a rivalry among them for support by other Communists. "Factionalism" was now the charge which the majority in control of the world movement could hurl against the rival minority: there are good grounds for believing the Italian Communist assertion that the Chinese party refused to include a condemnation of factionalism in the much fought-over 81-Party Statement of December 1960.

Since Stalin's death, the international Communist movement has witnessed a number of reformulations regarding the "leading" role of the CPSU, its position as "center" or "vanguard" of the international movement, and the meaning of "multiple paths" and "national roads" to communism. It is now clear that these formulations were invariably negotiated compromises or postures assumed in response to changing events.

Impelled by a combination of choice and necessity (which Khrushchev recognized in his speech of January 6, 1961), the Soviet party explicitly abdicated its monopoly on interpreting doctrine and deciding matters of common policy. *Kompetenz-kompetenz* (authority to decide who *has* the authority) now resided in the collective judgment of the several "sovereign" parties. To reach binding agreement, unanimity among them was required. It is both ironic and understandable, in retrospect, that the Poles should have held out (in November 1957) for unanimous decisions: nothing could be imposed on an unwilling party! [3] By 1960 it was bound to be the Chinese Communists and their supporters who, as a minority "faction" in another international conclave of Communists, felt impelled to defend the principle of unanimity. Soviet charges of Trotskyism were, once again, not amiss in the sense that that earlier spokesman of militant authoritarianism also became the advocate of intra-party democracy once he and his remaining supporters were being deprived of the right to be heard.[4]

ON THIS AS on virtually all other issues, the 1961 debate seems to have followed the lines of the 1960 confrontation. The Italian party has now revealed that the CPSU did indeed try, in 1960, to push through

[3] See Wolfgang Leonhard, in *St. Antony's Papers*, Oxford University Press, No. IX (1960), p. 142.

[4] Leonard Schapiro (*The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, New York, 1960, p. 294) recalls Mikoyan's comment: "When Zinoviev is in the majority, he is for iron discipline. . . . When he is in the minority . . . he is against it."

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a formula in favor of majority decisions among Communist parties—but failed. (No doubt their realization that they no longer commanded the unanimous support required kept them from submitting the Albanian issue to an international conclave in 1961 much as Stalin had had the Cominform formalize the excommunication of Tito twelve years earlier.) Peking had no reason to change its mind: *Jen-min jih-pao* reiterated editorially (December 1, 1961) that the formula, "Reach unanimity through consultation," provided the "most effective method of solving questions of mutual concern to the fraternal parties." The Chinese Communists (and every other party) could thus claim the right to veto fundamental policies and doctrinal positions taken by the CPSU.[5]

Which came first—loyalty to Moscow's "leadership" or freedom to assert divergent assessments and strategies? Here was the old dilemma between party discipline and the pursuit of independent truth. Once the unquestioned equation of the two breaks down (as it did, for many Communists, in 1956), or once it is admitted that communism may, under different circumstances, permit of multiple, "polycentric" truths, priority between the two becomes a crucial concern. Every principled defector from communism faces the dilemma at some point; every Communist scientist faces it when he encounters party dictates which are in conflict with empirical evidence.

Now the international movement experienced it, too. After the November 1960 meetings, Walter Ulbricht admitted that "some comrades" had inquired "who determines what is truth." The Italian Communists were among those much bothered by the problem—more indeed than was suggested by the facile formula that "revolutionary action coincides with the demonstration of truth."[6] Those who put discipline first would not break with the CPSU.

The lumping together, by the moderates, of historical "stage-jumpers" à la Liu Shao-ch'i and "conservatives" à la Molotov has a sound basis in the common intransigence and fundamentalism of the two views. However, the left must itself be divided further: there is a profound difference between the bureaucratic left and the revolutionary left. The "bureaucratic" parties have often been led by Comintern veterans—old Stalinists like Maurice Thorez in France, Carlos Luis Prestes in Brazil, Paul de Groot in the Netherlands. They also include the "émigré" parties—such as the West German, Greek, and Spanish—whose leaders have taken refuge in Communist countries. The contrast between them and the "true" revolutionary left is too obvious to require elaboration: the latter group, itching for "direct action," impatient and young, is likely to be impressed or inspired by the example of China and perhaps Cuba, and to be scornful of vested interests, diplomacy and delays. While the allegiance of these revolutionary elements may be in doubt, the bureaucratic parties can be counted upon normally to side with the CPSU.

Thus, on the left, the French, Czechoslovak, and Dutch Communist leaderships exemplify those who will stick with Moscow even when they disagree with it. The Albanians occupy the opposite pole, while the Chinese are clearly far more concerned to square their independent pursuits with a posture of "unity." Between the two groups, the Indonesian and Japanese parties have increasingly moved toward the "Chinese" camp.

A similar distinction can be made on the right. The British, United States, and Iraqi parties were among those which put loyalty to Moscow first, while the Italian and Indian included sizable elements for whom the search for truth (and, incidentally, political advantage!) took precedence. The Polish and Hungarian parties had of course shifted positions between 1956 and 1961.

Alliances and Alignments

Each party is still trying to find its bearings. Not all the quests and queries are visible on the outside. Behind the facades of some rubber-stamp parties there is soul-searching and strife. As for their public positions, they can best be traced by a close analysis of symbols and themes whose manipulation has been shown to be

[5] The Japanese Communists, engaged in bitter factional strife, sought to provide a more systematic formula by distinguishing between intra-party contradictions, which are to be settled by majority rule, and inter-party contradictions, which require unanimity to resolve. (*Akahata,* Tokyo, editorial, December 29, 1961.)

[6] Press conference of Giancarlo Pajetta and Mario Alicatta, December 1, 1961. Togliatti restated this point a few weeks later (*L'Unità,* January 21, 1962) to clear the air with the reassertion of spurious orthodoxy: "In the last few weeks the relationship between truth and revolution has come to the fore. . . . To say that revolution 'coincides with the higher domain' of truth is to substitute an elastic formula for our precise position. Also, to say that between revolution and truth the former is always to be preferred . . . is to imply the possibility of a conflict between the two. The only true and correct position is to affirm that there can be no choice between revolution and truth because they are identical and their identity is a general principle on which our world view rests firmly."

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a subtle and reasonably reliable code of communication among Communist élites.[7]

Different alignments of parties over different issues illustrate the extent to which the reality of politics has entered the Communist world.[8] With regard to Khrushchev's attack on Hoxha, for instance, the parties could be assigned positions on a scale ranging from the overt "reservations" voiced by Chou En-lai in Moscow, through the parties which abstained from all mention of Albania at the 22nd Congress, to those who followed the Soviet lead in condemning the Tirana regime. In turn, some of the abstainers later expressed distinct, though again varying, sympathies for the Albanian and Chinese positions,[9] whereas some others proved to have withheld endorsement of the Soviet party's attack because their spokesmen at the Congress feared to act on their own, or else because they wished to intimate tacit disapproval of the Soviet *handling* of the dispute even when they agreed with the Soviet charges.[10]

The same line-up does not obtain on other issues. With regard to a "tough" foreign policy, for instance on Berlin or the resumption of nuclear testing, the Chinese and Albanians gave the Soviets enthusiastic support—and so did the SED, whose chief Walter Ulbricht was the first (on December 18, 1960) publicly to attack the Albanian heresy. On the rehabilitation of former victims of Stalinism, the Czech and French Communists incline toward the independent left in opposing the Khrushchev policy. Yet, on recognition of the "leading" role of the CPSU, the same parties are among the first to express their support, whereas the Italian and Polish—while in full agreement with Khrushchev on "exposing" at least some of the crimes of the Stalin era—are loath to acknowledge intrinsic Soviet prerogatives over the world movement. (Similar variations in alignment could be documented on a wide range of issues, including coexistence, the relevance of Soviet experience for other countries, the binding nature of CPSU decisions for other parties, polycentrism, and whether the Stalin and Molotov issues are matters of domestic or international Communist concern.)

By and large, the position of each party has been consistent with its past policy and performance. The French and Czechoslovak Communists' "toughness" was formally—though purely verbally—asserted in their joint declaration of January 1957. The "activist" Indonesian, North Korean, and North Vietnamese positions were apparent in their pronouncements in Tirana in February 1961.[11] The Finnish, Spanish, and Brazilian Communist leaders, on the other hand, have long been loyal followers of the Moscow line, whatever its twists.

There are numerous and often divergent reasons why individual parties line up with Moscow. The Italian CP backs the CPSU because it *agrees* with Moscow's rightist strategy, even though it denies Soviet authority to interfere in other parties' affairs (as Togliatti made clear with regard to Albania, in an article in the April 1961 issue of *Rinascita*). The French Communists, on the other hand, side with Moscow because they *obey* out of respect for the CPSU's "vanguard" role, even if Thorez and his associates have qualms about the elements of "revisionism" in Khrushchev's new course.

There is a natural tendency among like-minded parties to engage in informal alliances. The "hard" left tends to find a common language—until obedience to Moscow overrides ideological affinities over specific issues. The French leaders had some sympathies and contacts with the Albanians until early 1961, when they decided it was imprudent or wrong to cultivate them further. The East German SED similarly had contacts and agreements with the Chinese in 1958-59, until caution suggested a stop. The Czechoslovak party moved to back the Chinese Communists in their border dispute with India, but desisted when Moscow failed to give Peking similar support.

IN THE KALEIDOSCOPIC developments that followed the 22nd Congress, special attention should be given to the exchanges between the PCI and PCF, for they indicate how far some Communists have drifted and to what extent inhibitions against public dispute among individual Communist parties have disappeared. Deeply perturbed by the revelations in Moscow, the

[7] The use of epithets and adjectives (*e.g.*, who provides "correct Marxist-Leninist" leadership to his party?), the avoidance of themes (*e.g.*, praise for the CPSU but silence on de-Stalinization), and balancing acts (*e.g.*, condemnation of the Albanian leadership along with equal strictures directed at the Yugoslavs) are but three in a complex network of esoteric devices.

[8] For an interesting effort to systematize such varying alignments, see George Modelski, *The Communist International System* (Research Monograph, No. 9, Princeton, 1960), p. 65.

[9] For instance, the Indonesian, Burmese, Thai, Malayan, North Vietnamese, and North Korean parties.

[10] For instance, the Japanese, Canadian, British, and Indian parties. Some parties, such as the Belgian, Danish, and Canadian, later came out clearly on the Soviet side. Others, such as the Norwegian, Icelandic, and Swiss, were apparently unable to reach agreement. The British and Austrian parties, it seems, had some internal dissension to contend with over this issue, but wound up condemning the Albanian course.

[11] See, *e.g.*, Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc* (rev. ed., Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1961), p. 432.

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Italian Communists plunged into a quest for answers that would smack neither of ritualistic banality nor of suspect originality. The French leadership—one of the dullest and most rigid in the world—once again charged the PCI with "revisionism," "opportunism" and "bourgeois" aberrations. *L'Unità* promptly printed the French accusations and proceeded to make explanatory statements in reply—to which the PCF failed to give publicity. Among the issues in dispute are the Italians' demands for polycentrism and efforts to improve relations with Tito's Yugoslavia, their sharp attacks against "conservative" elements in the Communist fold, and the demands of individual Italian Communist leaders for a reexamination of the Trotsky case and tolerance of minority opinions within the party.[12]

Moscow need not be worried by the French comrades: they are as unwilling to rebel against the CPSU as they are to revolt against their own government. The Italian Communists, on the other hand, constitute a challenge from the right which, in the long run, may be as critical as that from the left. Their discussions indicate that it is possible to move step by step, as in the case of Imre Nagy, into positions and policies that lead away from or even out of communism. If to the Communist left Khrushchev is a revisionist, Togliatti is a revisionist in Khrushchev's eyes and, in turn, is confronted within his own party by a revisionist right which opposes *his* moderation.

While other Communists have been apprehensive about the PCI, the Yugoslavs have frankly applauded the Italian comrades as representative of an anti-doctrinaire spirit of independence and as concerned with a "moral, humanitarian" basis of socialism rather than merely with "statistics."[13] They hail the Italian Communists' public rebuttal of Soviet explanations (for example, on the meaning of Stalinism) and their retorts to the Czechoslovak and East German left. As Togliatti acknowledged in his report to the Central Committee on November 10, 1961, the Italian party has stood for better relations with the Yugoslav party and has in fact maintained closer contact with it than any other Communist party. The PCI delegation's letter to the CPSU during the November 1960 conference (published early in 1962) reveals that the Italians proposed an amendment to the 81-Party Statement which would have made the reference to the Yugoslavs "less bitter and offensive." Parties with more or less similar outlook, whether in the bloc or outside, tend to grope for a common stand. By contrast with the left parties, where the crisis has been effectively constricted to the élite, in the Italian, Polish, and Indian parties the debate has opened up within party ranks, and vigorous polemics and discussions are underway.

On no single issue have Communists been so intensely exercised as over Stalin and Stalinism. Some, it is true, have been content to ape publicly Moscow's *volte face;* others, however, have rallied to Stalin's posthumous defense, while a few have found it possible to discuss the "personality cult" much as a physician at an inquest would seek to reconsider causes, symptoms, and remedies.

Old Methods in a New Setting

. . . It is our duty . . . to point out that the attacks [by Maurice Thorez] against the Italian Communist Party (expressed through several hints) are not acceptable since they misrepresent the actual position of our party.

This comment is particularly necessary and to the point in regard to the thesis of polycentrism, which, in several statements released by the Italian Communist Party . . . is expressed in completely different terms from the ones used by Comrade Thorez in his attacks. Also our comment concerns the criticism made by the Secretary General of the French Communist Party about a magazine of a "national organization of Communist youth." The magazine is apparently *Nuova Generazione* and the topic which motivated the hint was Trotsky.

In this connection, it is proper to point out that *Nuova Generazione,* in the caption under a picture . . . simply asked for "a more objective analysis, without any moral evaluation, of Trotsky's contribution," which is not quite the same thing as asking that Trotsky be *reinstated in his rightful* place, that is, asking for Trotsky's rehabilitation. In fact, in the next issue of the same weekly, the correct meaning of the sentence was explained as an answer to the unwarranted deductions of certain bourgeois papers. Similar considerations also apply to other attacks by the Secretary General of the French Communist Party.

Our main purpose in bringing to the attention of the public the incorrect and ill-founded criticism of Thorez is—and it is necessary to clarify this point—to state once more that a debate can be useful, constructive, and well founded only when it is based on unambiguous references and on accurate information and quotations (while to the best of our knowledge, *l'Humanité* never published any information concerning our Central Committee and the statements issued by it).

—Saverio Tutino, in Unita (Rome), Dec. 1, 1961, p. 9.

[12] For a summary, see the article by Serge Mallet in *France Observateur,* November 30, 1961, which needs to be updated.
[13] *Politika* (Belgrade), January 7, 1962; and *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), January 15, 1962.

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The Khrushchev leadership ranges Stalinism with the "conservative" left; but the problem of "overcoming" it has gone well beyond left and right. With many Communists, Stalinism has proven to be a matter, not of errors and crimes, but of personal identification with a man who for years was *the* positive symbol and incarnation of whatever it was that made them Communists. For others, the shock of Khrushchev's revelations—in 1956 and again in 1961—was deeper than Moscow had intended. While recognizing it as a constructive necessity, Ajoy Ghosh felt de-Stalinization to be the greatest liability of the Communist movement.

Many Communists asked questions which Moscow failed to answer to their satisfaction. These questions related to: (1) the causes of Stalin's crimes (How could such monstrosities have occurred under Communist rule?); (2) "guarantees" which would prevent a recurrence of such terror in the future; and (3) the "extremes" of de-Stalinization, such as the renaming of Stalingrad, which some Communist leaders (for instance, Ghosh and Togliatti) publicly deplored, and the removal of Stalin's body from the Red Square mausoleum, which evoked particular revulsion in a number of Asian parties.

The shock of de-Stalinization was felt more intensely on the right, where the Polish, Italian and Indian parties once again raised virtually identical questions, than on the left, which either refused (as in the case of the Albanians) to go along with it or else (as in the case of the French Communists) went through perfunctory motions of compliance. Ajoy Ghosh argued that de-Stalinization had shattered once and for all "the belief in the infallibility of any party or any leader." [14]

The Dutch Communist leader, Paul de Groot, was eager to demonstrate that Stalinism was a uniquely Russian phenomenon which had occurred in a country "scarcely freed from feudalism, without democratic traditions . . . surrounded only by enemies." (*De Waarheid,* Amsterdam, January 5, 1962.) Presumably this meant that he and others like him were not subject to similar reassessment. Moscow, on the other hand, was eager to deny the argument that the Chinese, precisely because of their backwardness, were now entitled to a Stalinist phase, or that "the objective difficulties encountered in the building of socialism in other countries—such as economic backwardness, the need for accelerated industrialization, the presence of numerous petty-bourgeois strata, etc.—make the cult of the individual inevitable." [15] Just how deep the insecurity in the Communist movement over Stalinism is, and how far doubts about the lingering ambiguities in explaining it go, only the future can tell.

Socialist Competition

The rift between Moscow and Peking has stimulated competition for control of the international movement. This rivalry requires both major contenders to try to win supporters in each "third" party they can reach. Whatever the cautions and circumlocutions, this contest is bound to involve lobbying, propagandizing, and encouragement of the formation of rival factions, perhaps even splits into separate party organizations.

Soviet manipulations wiithin other parties are a matter of record. During and even before the Stalin era, leaders of foreign Communist parties—from Germany to China, from Poland to the United States—were removed on Moscow's orders. The Politburos of many foreign parties were infiltrated by Soviet agents. Tito exposed two such men at the time of his break with Stalin in 1948. Hoxha, half a generation later, purged his own party's ranks of real and imaginary Soviet sympathizers and agents, and in 1956 resisted Suslov's urging to rehabilitate earlier victims of Stalinism.

The linking of domestic and foreign enemies in the imagery of the 22nd Congress is conspicuous enough. Molotov was accused (by Ignatov) of "double-dealing" while in Ulan-Bator and (by Kuusinen) of trying to "fish in foreign waters." In turn, Zhivkov informed the Bulgarian party's Central Committee of foreign (Chinese?) protectors of the Soviet "anti-party group." True or contrived, such amalgams would readily be accepted by Communist leaders as a time-honored device. Nor was the game limited to Moscow. If Hoxha suspected Lira Belishova, Koci Tashko, and Admiral Sejko of being Soviet agents, Mao and Liu knew beyond a doubt that Marshal P'eng Teh-huai had written to the Soviet party after giving vent to vigorous but futile protests within the Chinese Communist Politburo against the "Great Leap" and all that it implied.[16]

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[14] *New Age* (New Delhi), December 10, 1961. Ghosh also asked, "What role did leaders other than those who have been condemned play in the building or combatting of the cult of personality?"

[15] Editorial, *World Marxist Review,* December 1961, p. 8. The range of attitudes toward Stalin can be examined in terms of those Communist organs which published laudatory articles on his birthday, on December 21, 1961 (*e.g.,* "J. V. Stalin—Ivory with Flaws, but Ivory," in the PKI's daily, *Harian Rakjat,* Djakarta; and the editorial in the West Bengal CP daily, *Swadhinata,* Calcutta.)

[16] David A. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai," *The China Quarterly* (London), No. 8, October-December 1961.

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Competition for support *inside* other parties—if necessary, in opposition to the existing leadership—became manifest when Peking began to distribute a pamphlet entitled *Long Live Leninism!* (April 1960) in considerable quantities and numerous translations among Communists in Europe, Asia, and America. The CPSU soon applied pressure to stop the distribution. Indeed, the fate of the Chinese materials may be taken as one indicator of Moscow's and Peking's relative influence within a given party. Even since the 81-Party Statement, Chinese diplomatic and semi-official personnel abroad have been engaged in wooing Communists in the West. The Chinese Communist embassy in Berne has repeatedly been identified as a center for the dissemination of materials aimed at Communist parties in Europe. There have been reports of extensive correspondence between, for instance, PCF functionaries and Peking officials, who seek to gain friends among their Western comrades.

It is likely that both the Soviet and Chinese Communists pressured smaller parties (for instance, in Latin America and Africa) to select individuals particularly suitable to Moscow's and Peking's respective purposes as representatives to the 22nd Congress in Moscow. Since then the CPSU has urged other parties to declare themselves openly on the issues in dispute, and it probably sought to deter others from sending the Albanian party greetings on the customary anniversaries. Yugoslav sources have alleged, in turn, that the Chinese advised Tirana to circulate among all parties the contents of the documents exchanged between the Soviet and Albanian parties during the preceding year—and even to send these materials to provincial leaders in the USSR! [17]

Sino-Soviet competition for influence is, of course, an old story for the Indian, Japanese, and Indonesian parties. While much of the picture is obscure for the latter two, the fascinating factional alignments in the Indian party (CPI) are a matter of public knowledge. Since Peking's sharp turn to the left some four years ago, the CPI has seen its most radical elements embrace a "pro-Chinese" orientation. With bases in the Punjab, Andhra, and West Bengal party organizations, the "left" has been able to operate fairly freely despite its minority position within the national CPI. In turn, the Chinese Communists have evidently worked to foster factionalism, encourage their Indian supporters, and gain adherents for their arguments against cooperation with Nehru, against faith in non-violent tactics, and against the official Indian position on the Sino-Indian border dispute—all without overtly challenging Soviet influence in the central organs of the CPI. Things reached a point in 1960, and again in late 1961, where individual provincial party organizations adopted formal resolutions siding with the Chinese or condemning the Russians on a wide variety of issues, in defiance of the CPI's central bodies. Meanwhile the right wing openly exchanged insults with Peking, but also criticized the CPSU.

[17] Frane Barbieri, in *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), December 14, 1961.

East *vs.* West

One might expect all left Communist forces to line up together and all rightists to take up opposite positions. Actually, such a restructuring of Communist loyalties is not likely to take place. On the right, it is deterred by the position of the Italian party, which objects to strict international Communist organization and commitment. By its nature, the right tends to be centrifugal, variegated, and pragmatic: note the failure to forge a "Titoist" international. The East European parties, of course, are limited by their geographic and military position in relation to the Soviet Union. On the left, a united front is impeded not only by some parties' stronger sense of discipline, by ignorance and inertia, but also by a scarcely recognized sense of ethnic and racial solidarity.

What is at issue is not merely the Chinese model for developing countries—a problem which has often been discussed—but more generally the question of whether or not there is a "Chinese" form of communism. Liu Shao-ch'i once told Anna Louise Strong that Mao had created "a Chinese or Asiatic form of Marxism," the great accomplishment of which was "to change Marxism from a European to an Asiatic form." [18] Pro-Soviet Communists have generally taken particular pains to deny this proposition.

After the 81-party conference, Ulbricht assailed those who held that there exists a German, an American, or a Chinese communism. A year later, a Soviet party spokesman insisted that "Marxism-Leninism is an integral international teaching. . . . It does not come in European or Asian, African or American varieties." [19] In the same vein Rodney Arismendi, the Uruguayan theoretician of Latin American communism, warned (in *World Marxist Review,* November 1961) against "nationalistic tendencies cropping up in the ranks of the 'left-wing" anti-imperialist movement in the form

[18] Allen S. Whiting, "Moscow and Peking: Suspended Dialogue?," *Current Scene* (Hong Kong), Vol. I, No. 4, p. 3.
[19] Viktor Rudin, "Triumph of the Leninist Principles of Party Life," *World Marxist Review,* February 1962, p. 8.

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of a curious interpretation of our historical epoch, according to which the chief contradiction of our time is not the contradiction between the socialist and capitalist systems, but the contradiction between the 'underdeveloped' and 'highly developed' countries."

On the other hand, those who argue for a polycentric universe point to the great diversity of social, political, and economic bases of the Communist parties. In a recent speech Togliatti differentiated among countries at varying stages of economic and political development and asked: "This being the situation, how can we achieve unity? By acknowledging a difference in the various tasks, within the framework of mutual help and solidarity."[20] Chinese experience is indeed more relevant to countries having similar "semi-colonial" or "pre-capitalist" councerns. Problems of land reform, shortage of capital, and early stages of intensive industrialization are bound to mean more in Indonesia and Brazil than in the Netherlands or Canada.

There are both rational and irrational elements in the opposition of Western Communists to their Chinese colleagues. Even the most "radical" groups in the European parties are loath to accept Peking as the center of the Communist universe. Togliatti and de Groot —so far apart on other issues—unite in condemning Peking's failure to see how fatal a thermonuclear war would be to Western Europe. Some Western Communists hardly conceal their feeling that not only must true communism be the product of a modern industrial (hence Western) society, but that Western civilization has something qualitatively unique to contribute to European communism—something the non-Western world does not possess.

In this regard the USSR has more and more frequently been identified with the West rather than the East. Major General Talensky, on the eve of the 81-Party Conference, reminded his readers that a thermonuclear war would wipe out a large part of mankind —its "most active, capable and civilized portion."[21] Though Khrushchev, for reasons of amity with his Oriental comrades, slapped down in 1959 a Soviet philosopher who had spoken of the transition to communism in successive European and Asian zones, he himself proudly reverted to the universality of the Soviet model when, at the 22nd Congress, he pointed to *his* party's program as the answer whenever anyone wanted to know what was communism.

There is, in short, a gulf between "have" and "have not" parties which tend to be identified with "West" and "East"—between one communism that is increasingly "post-capitalist" and another that is largely "pre-capitalist." Unlike Moscow's global appeal, Peking's is essentially limited to the non-Western world, though it may be of greater potency there. The Chinese Communists can appeal to those whose problems, they argue, are similar to theirs; the Soviets must point to accomplishments which, in some measure, lie in the past. A similar gap exists between Soviet promises of worldwide victory-without-war and Chinese appeals for victory-without-waiting. It is significant that, except for "underdeveloped" Albania, Communist China's support in its debates with the CPSU has come entirely from other Asian groups. The past year has for the first time seen *all* the East and Southeast Asian Communist parties—from Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia to Japan and North Korea—side with the Chinese CP. A reverse development has occurred in the "white" Australian and New Zealand parties, which in 1960-61 were under Chinese Communist influence[22] but now appear to have swung back under Soviet pressure into the "moderate" camp.[23]

While a total schism in the Communist movement would probably, in the course of time, bring Russia closer to Europe, perhaps the greatest long-range danger lies in permitting the identification of the most virulent revolutionary forces with not only an anti-Western but also an anti-white cause. In this reading, the Chinese commitment to have "the East wind prevail over the West wind" bodes an ugly storm.

Can the Circle Be Squared?

If events in international communism strike Khrushchev as a nightmarish surprise, he may take comfort in the thought that, under the best of circumstances, the forces at work were beyond his control. The very success of communism in spreading from a single power to a "world system" provided the basis for multiple centers of power and authority. The very maturation of Communist parties and leaders invited greater independence of thought and strategy.

Communism is full of ambiguities. These are indeed essential to its whole approach and bring both strength and weakness to the movement. The contrary pulls of voluntarist and determinist elements, of optimistic and pessimistic strains, of impulses toward struggle and harmony, of necessary stages and "great leaps," of left and right, of center and periphery—all

[20] *L'Unità*, January 22, 1962.

[21] *International Affairs* (Moscow), October 1960, p. 25.

[22] Ian Turner, "In Peking's Orbit," *Nation* (Canberra), February 11, 1961.

[23] See the Australian CP's resolution condemning the Albanian leadership, in *The Tribune* (Sydney), December 20, 1961.

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have been implicit in communism from the start. Now the positions have polarized, as if the triad of "unity —contradiction—unity" (which the Chinese Communists are particularly fond of invoking to explain the progressive nature of fraternal debate) had been arrested at its second link, the dialectic frustrated from consummation, the conflicts frozen and laid bare.

Communists may seek in vain for a formula to combine struggle with non-violence, unity with diversity, compulsion with autonomy, central authority with sovereign equality of all parts. Khrushchev has not been adept at squaring the circle. In 1961 as in 1956, he vacillated between permissiveness, hoping for voluntary assent, and compulsion when these hopes were dashed. His alternatives are symptomatic of the post-Stalin era: they illustrate the impossibility of liberalizing totalitarianism without making a sham of either part. Khrushchev's insistence on peaceful coexistence and peaceful transition to power was most meaningful, and politically most astute, in the context of Western Communist parties—precisely those which have the least chance of gaining power. He himself had, ever since 1955, diagnosed the non-Western areas as the locus of greatest revolutionary opportunity. Yet his own strategy of working with the national movements there tended to "disarm" the Communist parties and thus lent greater plausibility to the Chinese alternative for the underdeveloped world.

Unwilling and unable as yet to turn his back on international communism as a drain and a failure, Khrushchev is again given the choice between two contrary impulses in coping with dissension in the movement. He can strive to maintain a fictitious unity in the Communist world, conceal the differences and (with Gomulka after 1956 as a prototype) seek to "work over" his opponents behind the scenes. To succeed, this would require effective Soviet control over the heretics. Or else he can revert to classical Bolshevik principles of organization: a determination to preserve a pure nucleus at all cost, breaking with factions and deviations, as the party has done at all times. Lenin's *Better Fewer but Better* provides the formula for this approach.[24]

Neither "solution" can make Khrushchev happy. Nor are other Communist leaders elsewhere content with either the prospects or the alternatives.[25] Whatever the formal outcome, the discrepancy between universal ideology and fragmented authority points toward more, rather than less, tension and conflict within international communism.

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[24] The Chinese Communists referred to Leninist experience before 1912 to show the legitimacy of factions (such as the Bolshevik) when one was right, whatever the "formal arithmetic" of majority rule. Moscow, through the director of the Marx-Lenin Institute, Piotr Pospelov, replied that 1912 marked precisely the exclusion of those who, by being non-Leninists, had put themselves outside the party—an experience which, he suggested, had instructive international lessons to teach. (*Pravda,* January 18, 1962.)

[25] See, for instance, the articles by Mieczyslaw Rakowski, in *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), 1962, No. 1, pp. 104-11; and by P. Togliatti, in *Rinascita* (Rome), 1961, No. 12, pp. 909-16.

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Workers Disunite

By G. E. Lynd

STAGED WITH great fanfare in Moscow from December 4 to 16, 1961, the Fifth Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions, the labor arm of the international Communist movement, appears to have been a definite disappointment to the hopes of its Soviet sponsors. As host to the world assembly, the Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) had expended large sums of money and considerable organizing ingenuity in order to draw as many delegates as possible to Moscow, and there was a strenuous effort to make the congress proceedings an impressive demonstration of the strength and unity of the WFTU and of the decisive role of the Soviet Union and the AUCCTU. In terms of numerical attendance the gathering was indeed imposing: a total of 958 delegates and observers from 97 countries participated,[1] including a conspicuously large number from non-affiliated and "neutralist" organizations, and even some from organizations maintaining affiliation with the rival International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). But as a demonstration of unity—the primary objective—the proceedings proved something of a boomerang.

As of this writing, neither a complete record of the discussions nor the texts of the resolutions adopted by the congress have yet been published. However, partial accounts that have appeared in the Soviet, Italian, Yugoslav, and Polish press suffice to point up the divergences of view which came to the fore during the proceedings, and which neatly reflect the larger problems of political and ideological guidance confronting the international Communist movement as a whole.

[1] These officially announced figures were claimed to represent increases of 152 delegates and 17 countries, respectively, compared to the Fourth World Congress of the WFTU, held at Leipzig in 1957.

G. E. Lynd is the nom de plume *of an American specialist on international labor organizations. This is his first contribution to* Problems of Communism.

Preparatory meetings held in February and June of 1961 had optimistically proclaimed that the Fifth Congress would iron out all problems and restore unity on the basis of a new program. Not only did it singularly fail to do so, but if anything it exacerbated the differences. Not surprisingly, resistance to Soviet efforts to put over the proposed program as the cornerstone of a reunified public posture for the WFTU emanated chiefly—but for quite different reasons—from the Italians and the Chinese.

The two main reports made to the congress—one by Secretary-General Louis Saillant and the other by Secretary Ibrahim Zakaria * (the latter dealing particularly with WFTU policy in "colonial" areas)—were both primarily appeals for support of the draft program. The text of this document had been circulated among the member organizations following its adoption by the Executive Committee last June. The draft leaned heavily on the new program of the CPSU endorsed by the 22nd Party Congress, a fact which lent the controversy over its terms at the WFTU assembly implications extending considerably beyond the normal sphere of trade union policy and intra-WFTU relations.

The Draft Program

The draft which the congress was urged to approve clearly represented an effort to lay down a program that would achieve minimum Soviet policy objectives and yet avoid controversy. Thus, the program reiterated primacy of Soviet leadership but at the same time gave credit to all segments of the working-class movement under the WFTU banner for contributing their share to the progress of the common struggle. Again, while

* The organizational structure of the WFTU is similar to that of the Soviet Communist Party, with a ten-man Secretariat headed by a Secretary-General, and an Executive Bureau, composed of 12 Vice-Presidents headed by a President—*Ed.*

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calling for united support of Soviet foreign policy goals and reaffirming the principle of "peaceful coexistence," the draft steered clear of irritating polemics and counterbalanced the coexistence formula by a more militant posture in other parts of the program.

The program outlined the tasks and policies of the WFTU in the framework of an optimistic reassessment of the world situation which pictured the socialist camp as rapidly overtaking the capitalist countries in all spheres—social, political, economic, technical, and military—thanks to the leadership of the Soviet Union, seconded by Communist China. The Soviet Union in particular was stated to be forging ahead with the building of a fully Communist society promising abundance for all. At the same time, the growing might of the socialist camp, founded upon the strength of its working-class movements, had proven a decisive factor in furthering the victory of national liberation struggles in the colonial areas without leading to major armed conflicts with the mortally decaying, yet increasingly war-like capitalist-imperialist powers headed by the United States. In the light of these trends, the program designated the struggle for "peace and unity" as the main task of the WFTU, its affiliates, and collaborating labor organizations; and this involved general support of Soviet foreign policy, including the "peaceful coexistence" campaign and especially Moscow's stand on the issue of Germany.

Regarding tactics in colonial and newly developing countries, both the draft program and Secretary Zakaria's report stressed the importance of strengthening WFTU guidance and assistance to indigenous labor movements under a general policy of unity of action against imperialism. The most important immediate task in these countries, the program indicated, is to mobilize the workers' organizations in support of all measures calculated to bolster "national independence" (*i.e.*, independence from Western capitalist influence) —especially the expropriation and nationalization of foreign capital investments and action to block acceptance of Western aid. But while this signified the continuation of temporary inter-class collaboration in achieving national-revolutionary goals, the program served notice that the workers and peasants in the colonial and emergent countries must prepare for the eventual seizure of leadership of the national struggle because only the working class can be relied upon to carry the struggle through to the ultimate establishment of socialism.

It was in its policy formulations relating to the advanced capitalist countries, however, that the draft program struck its most militant note. Gone was all evidence of an effort, such as the Fourth Congress had made, to put forward a "minimum program" on which all trade union internationals might agree. Labor organizations supporting the capitalist system were henceforth to be treated as enemies of the working class and as accomplices in the aggressive designs of the imperialists. Accordingly, the program called upon workers' organizations to undermine trade unions friendly to capitalism by means of unity of action from below; to resist progressive impoverishment by asserting their political and economic rights; and to combat all warlike or militaristic measures (including NATO and West German rearmament), as well as the European Common Market. Labor's struggle in the "crisis-ridden" capitalist countries was termed another important adjunct to the efforts of colonial and ex-colonial peoples to free themselves from imperialist bonds as it weakens the ability of the imperialist powers to resist elimination of their control.

The authors of the draft program were hopeful that their formulations would satisfy everybody. But as the opening of general debate on the draft soon demonstrated, their ingenuity was unavailing. Instead of producing the hoped-for display of unity, the discussions brought forth a sharp confrontation of conflicting viewpoints.

Italian Opposition

It was the Italians, rather than the Chinese, who emerged as the foremost critics of the draft program. On the floor of the congress as well as in committee meetings, the representatives of both the Socialist and Communist wings of the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) voiced dissatisfaction with the draft and jointly proposed a series of amendments. Briefly stated, their objections were on three main counts: 1) an excessively dogmatic and unrealistic approach to trade union problems in the advanced capitalist countries; 2) failure to allow national and regional trade union organizations adequate autonomy to act according to their own needs and interests rather than in rigid subservience to Soviet international policy; and 3) an insufficiently realistic policy towards "autonomous" trade union movements in underdeveloped areas, especially in Africa.

Of these three counts, the first two formed the core of the Italian opposition. While paying homage to Soviet leadership and the strength of the socialist camp, the CGIL representatives strenuously criticized the draft program for taking the line that advancement of the international working-class cause rested primarily on

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these factors, and that the success of trade union movements outside the Communist orbit depended upon close identification with the Soviet Union. To adopt this line, the Italian spokesmen argued, was not only to underrate the role of the labor movements in capitalist countries in the overall struggle against monopoly capitalism and imperialism, but also to handicap rather than help efforts by the national trade union organizations affiliated with the WFTU to build alliances with other socialist-oriented labor groups. The Italians further demanded a more realistic analysis of the crisis of capitalism, less strident criticism of non-Communist trade union leaders, and a greater detachment of trade union policies from Soviet diplomatic drives.

CGIL Secretary General Agostino Novella, still occupying the seat of WFTU President, was the chief spokesman for the Italian viewpoint. He not only contended that WFTU policy with respect to working-class movements in the advanced capitalist countries "must be more consequential and courageous," but also charged that the draft program showed a lack of candor even in regard to labor problems in the socialist countries themselves.[2] Ferdinando Santi, Deputy Secretary General of the CGIL and spokesman for its Socialist (PSI) wing, seconded these criticisms.

One of the two major factors which prompted the Italian opposition, particularly on the issue of subservience to Moscow, was the shifting political situation in Italy. The likely success of the Christian Democratic Party's effort to achieve "an opening to the Left" by drawing the PSI into a parliamentary coalition confronted the Italian Communists with the imminent prospect of political isolation as well as the danger that the end of PCI-PSI political relations might disrupt Socialist-Communist collaboration in the CGIL. In these circumstances, the Communists estimated that greater detachment from Soviet-dictated policies and propaganda lines was vitally necessary if the PCI was to retain the ability to exert any influence on the Italian Left outside its own ranks, and they deemed this particularly essential in the trade union sphere from the standpoint of preserving the unity of the CGIL and thus keeping it as a tactical instrument for avoiding isolation in the eventuality of a PCI-PSI political break. All this was implicit in the Italian demand for modification of the WFTU draft program in the direction of greater autonomy or "polycentrization," as well as in Novella's advocacy of "separating the trade union movements from the parties, even if friendship between the two is both in the nature of things and necessary." [3]

[2] *L'Unità* (Rome), December 7, 1961.
[3] *Ibid.*

Do You Wish to Get *Problems of Communism?*

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The second major reason for the Italians' dissent lay in the fact that they considered the draft program to be based on a faulty estimate of the international situation, especially in Europe. They were particularly disgruntled over the tactical downgrading of Communist political and trade union activity in Europe and over the apparent intent of the majority to make the WFTU simply an instrument for overseeing the execution of Communist international policy and for purveying funds, propaganda, and guidance to nationalist and neutralist-oriented labor movements in the developing countries. As against these policies, the Italians favored a much more positive effort in Europe and urged that the WFTU's national affiliates be allowed greater tactical flexibility in order to exploit possibilities for alliances with disaffected non-Communist trade union elements throughout the European Economic Community. According to the optimistic Italian estimate, such possibilities existed in Italy, France, and other West European countries because many elements in the non-Communist unions had become fearful both of economic dislocation resulting from the removal of tariff barriers within the Community and of a strengthening of "reactionary" forces through political integration.

Soviet Maneuvers—Chinese Switch

Conflicting considerations, both ideological and tactical, led the Russians to adopt an outwardly ambivalent attitude toward the Italian demands. On the one hand, they did not wish either to encourage polycentrism or to assign greater weight to the European labor movements at the expense of what they considered tactically more profitable operations in the underdeveloped and emergent countries. On the other, they were equally reluctant to antagonize the Italians by an outright repudiation of their claims, especially since this would

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involve them in an open fight against a firm ally in their ideological battle with the Chinese. To resolve this dilemma, the Russians resorted to a characteristic stratagem: they refrained from becoming engaged in controversy on the floor of the congress and left it to others to carry the burden of defending the draft program against the Italian assault.

The Soviet desire to conciliate the Italians—while not yielding to their demands—was made manifest by V. V. Grishin, Chairman of the AUCCTU, when he conspicuously applauded Novella's outspoken criticisms of the draft program, which were received in disapproving silence by many of the delegates. Subsequently Grishin also defended the Italians' right of criticism by taking the position that their proposed amendments to the program should be fully discussed. Privately, however, the Russians worked hard to pressure the Italians into voting for the program even though only minor concessions to the Italian views were incorporated in the final version. In the end, only one Italian delegate still held out and cast the lone negative vote.

In the congress debate, the majority of speakers paid dutiful obeisance to the draft program as originally presented. Of the delegations from the Soviet East European orbit, only the Poles gave any substantial support to the Italian contentions, declaring themselves also dissatisfied with the draft program's prescriptions against collaboration with non-affiliated trade union organizations in Western capitalist countries and presenting their own amendments.[4] The East Germans and Hungarians, while conceding the desirability of promoting increased contacts with such non-affiliated organizations (especially in West Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the Scandinavian countries), gave no endorsement to the Italian arguments.

Outside the Communist orbit, the Italian case for polycentrism reportedly received support from the Indian, Austrian, and Cypriot representatives, as well as from the observer-delegates from Japan and Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the delegation from the French CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail) bluntly rejected the Italian thesis, evidently reflecting the preference of the French Communists to continue playing a limited role in political isolation until such time as the crisis in France might set the stage for a realignment of the forces of the Left in a popular front.

Although the French and others thus played minor roles in combatting the Italian case, it was the Chinese who, in spite of their own vested interest in polycentrism, pulled a tactical switch and rallied most vigorously to the defense of the draft program. Demanding rigid unity and full loyalty to the WFTU and its policies, they categorically rejected the Italian objections and moved in favor of barring all amendments to the draft text. Surprisingly, they even refrained from posing any new challenge to the Russians on the score of the "peaceful coexistence" formula (reaffirmed in the program) and likewise abstained from resurrecting the Albanian issue. It should be noted, however, that the very insistence of the Chinese on unqualified acceptance of the original program was, in a way perhaps, as distasteful to the Russians as were the Italian amendments; for the Russians, however opposed to polycentrism, are neither able nor disposed to impose rigid programmatic commitments on the entire Communist camp or on the worldwide affiliates of its front organizations.

Be that as it may, the closest the Chinese came to taking open issue with Soviet international policy was in presenting a "Written Statement on the Second Item of the World Trade Union Congress" (the Zakaria report). In this document the Chinese explicitly placed on record their reservations about relying upon the national bourgeoisie to lead colonial liberation struggles and urged that such struggles be actively aided wherever they have assumed the form of armed revolt.

Yugoslavs in the Middle

With the Italians and Chinese thus ranged at opposite extremes, the Yugoslav delegates—though only invited to the congress as observers, at the instance of the Italians and Poles—attempted to play a pivotal role. They applauded the Italians' stand in favor of polycentrism, while disagreeing with them on other points such as the detachment of trade union organizations from the Communist parties[5] and devaluation of the strategic importance of cultivating nationalist-neutralist movements outside of Europe. They conversely applauded the proposed WFTU program for its emphasis on developing collaboration with these movements. And finally, by opposing the pressure from the Chinese in favor of a harder, more sectarian line vis-à-vis the nationalist movements and leaderships in colonial and ex-colonial countries, they sought to offset any Soviet annoyance at them for lending their support to the Italians on polycentrism.

In siding with the Italians on this issue, the Yugoslavs were motivated by the belief that polycentrism might, first of all, promote smoother relations between themselves and the Soviet bloc; secondly, that it would

[4] *Glos Pracy* (Warsaw), December 7, 1961 and January 2, 1962.

[5] *Tanjug* (Belgrade), December 11, 1961.

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help break down old barriers of mistrust between Communists and left-wing European socialist and labor groups; and finally that it would facilitate the development of Communist ties with neutralist countries and movements. Their efforts, however, were not greatly appreciated. They were generally treated with great reserve and returned home from the Moscow meeting in a rather dissatisfied mood.[6]

The Yugoslavs naturally were disappointed at the rejection of polycentrism, but they were even more concerned about certain tendencies which had come to the fore in the discussions of tactical policy in the newly developing countries. So far as the new program was concerned, they had no complaint since it called for continued Communist collaboration with nationalist movements in a united front against imperialism. But there had been signs that the Chinese insistence upon a harder, more aggressive line was receiving serious attention. Stressing the importance of developing "national democracy," the Chinese argued for an expansion of the Communist presence in the African and Latin American labor movements, signifying the establishment either of separate Communist unions or of clearly identified Communist sections within the nationalist labor movements. Thus, they sought, in effect, greater freedom of action to break up existing national united fronts.[7]

[6] *Kommunist* (Belgrade), December 21, 1961.

[7] See Peking press report of speech by Liu Chang-sheng at the WFTU Congress, translated in *Survey of the China Mainland Press* (US Consulate-General, Hong Kong), No. 2640. See *ibid.*, No. 2642 for another Peking report on the Congress.

Moreover, a pre-congress statement by Zakaria had already hinted at possible shifts in WFTU tactical policy to cope with such contingencies as a deterioration of Soviet relations with African countries or a collapse of WFTU's alliance with the All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF). Zakaria urged greater flexibility in tactics in response to "the different aspects of colonialism," [8] and such hints might well foreshadow a modification of WFTU policy paralleling the reported plans for setting up separate Communist parties in Africa below the Sahara. The Yugoslavs, aspiring to expand their own influence among the emergent and neutralist countries, viewed this prospect with distaste and complained during their stay in Moscow that the WFTU leadership seemed to be downgrading the importance of the neutralist regional trade union organizations in Africa and Latin America. As a counterpoise, the Yugoslav observers, jointly with several of the Japanese delegates, did some lobbying among the representatives of non-affiliated labor organizations in favor of a neutralist trade union international, a move not likely to have endeared them to their hosts.

Changes in Leadership

In addition to the debate on the new program, some of the changes in the composition of the WFTU Presidium as newly elected by the congress were noteworthy either as a reflection of the conflicts which

[8] *World Trade Union Movement*, No. 11/12, November-December 1961.

Plus C'est La Même Chose

***Caption upper right:* "Nurslings." *Upper left:* "Right socialists are sustained by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States." *Sow is labeled:* "American Intelligence." *Men are labeled:* "Right socialists."**

—From* Krokodil *(Moscow), Jan. 10, 1962



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marred the proceedings or as guideposts to the present orientation of WFTU policy. The most important was Novella's replacement as President of the WFTU by another Italian, Renato Bitossi, a member of the CGIL Executive Committee and of the PCI Central Committee. The CGIL delegation, disgruntled over the rejection of its proposals, unanimously refused to consent to the reelection of Novella and at first also rejected the proposed nomination of Bitossi as Novella's successor. Finally, however, the Italians yielded to heavy pressure and agreed to Bitossi's election for the sake of avoiding an impression of CGIL "disengagement" from the WFTU. Nevertheless, the fact that such considerations forced the choice of a president of only secondary stature was indicative of the seriousness of the crisis of unity facing the WFTU.

Another significant change was the elevation of Lazaro Peña Gonzalez, of Cuba, from the WFTU Secretariat to the Presidium—a clear indication of the increased importance assigned to that country, although the Cuban CGT (General Confederation of Workers) has not yet formally joined the WFTU. Other shifts in the Presidium membership appeared to have no particular relevance to the internal crisis or to the orientation of WFTU policy. However, mention should be made of two reelections, both of which encountered some opposition. One was the continuation in office of Secretary-General Saillant (France) in spite of criticism by the Italians and others; the second was the reelection to one of the WFTU vice-presidencies of the veteran Indian Communist S. A. Dange, reported by the Italian Socialist organ *Avanti* to have been opposed by the Chinese. Vincente Lombardo Toledano, of Mexico, Chairman of the CTAL (Labor Confederation of Latin America), the regional organization of the WFTU, was also reelected to the Presidium despite pre-congress rumors that he might be ousted.

The Congress in Perspective

Notwithstanding the attempt to make the Fifth Congress a grandiose demonstration of unity, confidence, and power, the proceedings were singularly unsuccessful in covering up the fact that the WFTU was beset by a serious internal crisis of confidence in its leadership and purpose. Open dissent is, of course, no longer sensational at international Communist conferences, but the increasing frankness of debate on these occasions is seriously corroding the efficacy of the hitherto sacrosanct litanies which formerly sufficed to invoke unity.

To a large extent, the polycentric tendencies manifesting themselves both in the WFTU and in the overall international Communist movement are symptomatic of the general diffusion of power and influence in the world as a whole. As a consequence of this diffusion, the WFTU now faces the necessity of reconciling the once imperative claims of its Soviet overlords with such divergent interests as those of the Chinese, Poles, East Germans, Italian and French Communists, etc., making a show of unity and decisiveness well-nigh impossible.

The problem of preserving unity is further complicated by the alliances which the WFTU has built up since the 20th Soviet Party Congress, and especially since its own 1957 congress, with national and regional labor movements in the "neutralist" or uncommitted sectors of the world. Although these originally were relatively uncomplicated and successful relationships based on a community of anti-Western sentiment and the attraction of Marxist symbolism, they have since become increasingly complex as a result of the development of divergencies between the interests of the Communist camp and those of the national or regional organizations concerned, with the result that these alliances can no longer be taken for granted. The WFTU has, in fact, already suffered a setback in this area, in the form of the 1959 breakdown of its relations with the Egyptian-controlled Pan-Arab Confederation of Trade Unions (CATU), and similarly WFTU collaboration with the African regional AATUF can by no means be regarded as assured.

Neither the Soviet Union, committed as it is to the competitive race with the United States, nor the Communist movement as a whole, increasingly involved in a struggle for primacy of influence in the unaligned and emergent countries, can remain unconcerned over these difficult problems and developments. The conflicting views which were brought into the open at the Moscow congress of the WFTU testified to this concern and were part and parcel of the urgent general debate now going on in the Communist world over strategic principles and tactical approaches—a debate centering around such basic issues as the relative emphasis to be placed on underdeveloped versus advanced capitalist countries, and on the role of movements within the Communist bloc as against those outside; the attitude to be taken toward the national bourgeoisie in emergent countries; and the whole question of political alliances or united fronts with non-Communist groups, especially whether to participate in united nationalist movements or set up separate Communist organizations in the emergent countries.

One effect of the Communist internecine controversy over strategy and tactics seems likely to be a stimulation

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of apprehensions among the neutralist and emergent countries, possibly producing defensive reactions which will adversely affect the Communist impact on these countries. So far as the WFTU in particular is concerned, such fears may impel the nationalist labor movements in these countries to become more wary and selective in their relations with the Communist trade union international and its affiliates, thereby diminishing its effectiveness as a propagator of Communist influence and at the same time, perhaps, paving the way for an intensification of its internal conflict over policy.

This does not mean, of course, that the WFTU will cease to be a powerful rival to the ICFTU in the neutralist, emergent, and underdeveloped countries—or elsewhere. Since it is centrally run by its secretariat with Soviet direction and support, the WFTU can be expected to go on functioning with reasonable effectiveness in dispensing guidance and funds, in propaganda and training activities, and in maintaining contacts with African and Latin American trade union organizations. However, its efficacy in unifying and coordinating Communist international trade union policy seems likely to continue on the decline. The crisis of unity and of confidence in the WFTU has not been resolved and in all probability will re-erupt at future international meetings.

IN FUTURE ISSUES

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Communism in Africa: II

EDITORS' NOTE: The nexus between scholar and policy maker—the latter inspiring the former and the former supporting the latter—has always been very close in the Soviet Union. This intimate, if lopsided, relationship has of late been particularly striking in the African field, and the following two articles illustrate the case in point. In the first piece Mr. Pistrak traces the ideological evolution of Soviet policy towards Africa from Lenin's time on, and shows how the gradual discovery of African facts of life eroded at least some of the doctrinaire Marxist stereotypes. The need to base Soviet policy on sounder foundations and to train personnel capable of implementing it has brought in its wake a rapid expansion of Soviet Africanist institutions. Mr. Bird's article, which ought to be read in conjunction with Mr. Pistrak's piece, gives the particulars of this development. The two contributions represent the second part of our series on Soviet and Communist activity in Africa (see the issue for November-December, 1961).

Soviet Views on Africa

By Lazar Pistrak

DURING THE LAST DECADE Soviet interest in African affairs has rapidly increased in scope and intensity. There is hardly an aspect of African life today which is not the subject of study by scores of Soviet scientists. Lately, problems of African history seem to be gaining particular attention. At a special session of historians of the USSR Academy of Sciences, held in June 1961, I. I. Potekhin, Director of the African Institute, reported that a number of important questions of African history were under study and that no less than 20 monographs would be published in the next few years. "The urgent and noble task" of preparing "Marxist studies" of African history, he continued, can only be fulfilled with the help of "the entire historical front of Soviet science." [1]

Needless to say, these Soviet studies are not motivated by a pure urge for knowledge (although there are many Soviet scientists who possess that urge), but by very practical considerations. Potekhin himself expressed them recently clearly enough:

> **The study of the history of Africa is not only a scientific, but also a political task . . . [It] is an organic part of the struggle against the threat of neo-colonialism impending over the African peoples, of the struggle for genuine**

A frequent contributor to these pages, Mr. Pistrak is the author of The Grand Tactician (*F. Praeger, New York, 1961*), *a biography of Khrushchev.*

[1] *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR,* No. 9, 1961, p. 117. The Soviet studies on African history are to show, *inter alia,* that "during the pre-capitalistic epoch Africa was not a backward continent." *Ibid.,* p. 115.

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independence and free choice in the methods of further development.[2]

The same idea was expressed in even less equivocal terms by N. Pigulevskaia, a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences:

Only on the basis of exact philologic and historical knowledge can our concepts become convincing to all and find their way to the minds of the peoples who fight for their freedom and of the progressive scientists of the West.[3]

Apart from these longer-range considerations, the more immediate reason for the Soviet "scientific" offensive on the African front undoubtedly lies in the difficulties Communist penetration has encountered in Africa, particularly in the tropical regions where only an insignificant part of the numerically small African intelligentsia has adopted the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The main barriers impeding the Communist political offensive are the traditional African institutions and the unique features of the awakening African nationalism which are difficult to reconcile with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and its exclusive goal of a world revolution.

Perhaps in no other part of the world has the Soviet attitude toward national liberation movements shown such inconsistencies as in Africa. Carrying out their assignment to adapt Marxism-Leninism to African reality, Soviet Africanists often resemble dangerously wobbling tightrope walkers. Particularly interesting in this respect are the writings of the leading Soviet Africanist, I. I. Potekhin, and especially his latest work, *Afrika smotrit v budushchee* (Africa Looks to the Future).[4] In the pages that follow the three principal stages marking the evolution of Soviet policies towards Africa will be taken up chronologically.

Assault with a Rusty Weapon

It would be fruitless to look into Lenin's works for any specific reference to Black Africa. Africa, particularly the areas south of the Sahara, played no part in his political calculations. In his time, the African continent was considered a political "hinterland," a factor which could hardly have any influence on the development of the revolution in Europe—Lenin's main hope and goal. In 1923, shortly before his death, when this hope began to vanish and he realized that the West European countries "consummate their development toward socialism" not in the way he had formerly expected, Lenin began to stake his hopes on the East which, he wrote, "has been definitely drawn into the general maelstrom of the world revolutionary movement."[5] But speaking about the East, Lenin had in mind mainly the Asian continent and partly the Near East.

It should be recalled, with the above limitations in mind, that in 1920 Lenin had worked out the "fundamental premises" of the colonial question, thus laying the basis for Communist strategy in this field. He rejected the "narrow-minded nationalistic illusion that under capitalism the peaceful living-together of nations and their equality is possible,"[6] and asserted that the "national-liberation movements in the colonies . . . are being taught by bitter experience that their only salvation lies in the victory of Soviet power over world imperialism."[7] With regard to the "more backward states and nations in which feudal or patriarchal and patriarchal-tribal relations predominate," Lenin prescribed the following strategy:

The Communist International must support the bourgeois-democratic national movements in the colonies and backward countries only on condition that the elements of future proletarian parties in these countries, which will be Communist not only in name, will be brought together and educated to understand their special task—the task to fight the bourgeois-democratic movements within their own nation.[8]

This strategy found its way into the more elaborate Theses of the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies adopted at the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern in 1928. The 1928 Theses also repeated Lenin's recommendations to "exert every effort to apply the fundamental principles of the Soviet system in countries where pre-capitalistic relations predominate by setting up 'Soviets of the Toilers,'" to carry on a "struggle against the clergy and other influential reactionary and medieval elements," and, in the Moslem countries, "to combat Pan-Islamism and similar trends."[9]

Moreover, the Theses directed local Communists to:

. . . learn how to utilize each and every conflict [between the nationalist bourgeoisie and imperialism], to develop such conflicts and to broaden their significance, to connect them with the agitation for revolutionary slogans, to spread the news of these conflicts among the broad masses, to awaken these masses to independent open manifestations in support of their own demands.[10]

[2] *Kommunist,* No. 12, 1961, p. 51.
[3] *Azia i Afrika sevodnia,* No. 8, 1961, p. 51.
[4] Moscow, 1960.
[5] V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia,* 4th ed., Vol. 33, p. 457.
[6] *Ibid.,* Vol. 31, p. 123.
[7] *Ibid.,* p. 124.
[8] *Ibid.,* p. 127.
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] *The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies* (Theses Adopted by the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International), Workers' Library Publishers, New York, 1929, p. 32.

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This, according to the Theses, is necessary to achieve the "basic strategic aim of the Communist movement in the bourgeois-democratic revolution—*the hegemony of the proletariat.*" [11] And to reach this aim the Communists were instructed to fight such movements as Ghandhism in India and Sun-Yat-senism in China.

THE 1928 THESES remained unchanged throughout the Stalin era, and even in the last years of the late dictator's rule when Soviet interest in African affairs had became definitely visible, the future of Africa did not yet preoccupy the minds of the Kremlin. It was the "colonial revolution" that was the order of the day.

In 1950, at a session of the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences, I. I. Potekhin read a paper on the topic "The Stalinist Theory of the Colonial Revolution and the National-Liberation Movement in Tropical and South Africa," in which he emphasized that

the Stalinist theory of the colonial revolution proceeds from the premise that the solution of the colonial problem and the liberation of the oppressed peoples from colonial slavery is impossible without a proletarian revolution and the overthrow of imperialism.[12]

Although this premise was ascribed by Potekhin to the "great master of materialist dialectics, the coriphaeus of science, J. V. Stalin," it was actually a repetition of Lenin's proposition that the liquidation of the colonial rule must be preceded by a "proletarian revolution" in the metropolises. Thus, as late as 1950, the Kremlin policy makers did not believe in the ability of the colonial peoples to liberate themselves while "imperialism" still existed. Indeed, Potekhin himself then reiterated Lenin's prognosis that colonialism could not be abolished without the "liquidation of capitalism and the establishment of a Soviet system."

In consonance with this view, Potekhin assailed such representatives of the African intelligentsia as Dr. Abyssinia Akweke Nafor Orizu, a widely known Nigerian author, who "demands independence for Nigeria and at the same time stands for preservation of the fundamentals of capitalism." He criticized Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the founder of the National Council of Nigeria and currently Governor-General of Nigeria for his "universal philosophy . . . which is actually a colonial edition of the reactionary American philosophy of pragmatism" and scornfully described Azikiwe's political program as an "ideology and policy of petty-bourgeois national reformism." Called the "African Gandhi" (until 1955 Soviet propaganda still pictured Gandhi as a "servant of imperialism"), Dr. Azikiwe was also charged with being a partisan of peaceful methods in the fight for independence.

Another representative of the African intelligentsia, Dr. Joseph B. Danquah, who together with Kwame Nkrumah headed the United Gold Coast Convention, was criticized for "groveling before British imperialism" and for "shelving the slogan, 'independence in the shortest possible time,' " which the Convention had adopted in 1947.

Potekhin felt free to criticize the nationalist African leaders since "full and final victory of the colonial revolution can be achieved only if and when the proletariat plays a leading role," this in spite of the fact that "at a certain stage and during a certain period" the "national bourgeoisie" might support the revolutionary movement. "The petty-bourgeois nationalist organizations and parties," he added somewhat prematurely, "already proved their incapability of pursuing the course of national liberation." On the other hand, Potekhin emphasized, quoting Stalin, that:

The era of revolutions for liberation in the colonies and dependent countries, the era of awakening of the *proletariat* of these countries, the era of its *hegemony* in the revolution has begun. This is, in general terms, the theory of the colonial revolution worked out by Stalin. For a Soviet ethnographer who studies the people of the colonies and dependent countries this theory is guidance for action.

Potekhin then hastened to make full application of the guidance. The "native (African) society is no longer monolithic," he asserted, but is divided into classes that occupy "special positions in the struggle against imperialism." Moreover, while admitting that the extent of the workers' participation in the anti-imperialist movement varied in different countries of tropical Africa, he reported that "the working class shows everywhere examples of unity and organizing ability, and its leading and organizing role is increasing everywhere."

In 1954, Potekhin and D. D. Olderogge (another noted ethnographer who leads the Leningrad group of Soviet Africanists) edited and wrote major contributions for a 732-page monograph, entitled *Narody Afriki* (Peoples of Africa), in which no changes from the 1950 position can be detected. In the chapter, "East Tropical Africa," written by Potekhin, the "splitting" of African society into classes and the disintegration of the tribal organization is stressed.[13] A national bourgeoisie has already arisen, Potekhin then wrote, and

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[12] *Sovetskaia etnografia* (Moscow), No. 1, 1950, p. 24 ff.

[13] *Narody Afriki*, Moscow, 1954, p. 441 ff. The quotations that follow are from the same source.

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"although statistics about the class differentiation of the peasantry is lacking, there are grounds to believe that it has proceeded very far."

The political views and policy of Dr. Azikiwe, who on this occasion was called "a big capitalist banker and plantation and newspaper-concern owner," were pictured as a striking example of the "inconsistency of the national bourgeoisie." The book assailed also the Convention People's Party led by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah because it allegedly "reflected the interests of the big national bourgeoisie and did not justify the confidence of the people."

After having achieved power, it [the Convention's People Party] rejected those of its slogans which it had promoted earlier and which ensured the support of the working class and generally of the broad popular masses.

In the concluding chapter of the monograph Potekhin asserted that "the working class of Africa indisputably amounts now [1954] to millions and represents the decisive social force"; "the tribal cleavage, not so long ago characteristic of most African peoples, is passing away." Potekhin also noted a "considerable regrouping of the class forces in the anti-militarist camp." New organizations, he claimed, were arising, including Communist parties which have "opened the era of the struggle for the hegemony of the proletariat in the national liberation movement."

Thus, as late as 1954, one year after Stalin's death, Soviet Africanists continued to cling to the Stalinist theory that colonial revolutions everywhere must and will be dominated by the proletariat, *i.e.,* by Communist parties.

Admission of Ignorance

It was not until 1955, when a number of historical facts had made themselves felt, that the Leninist-Stalinist analysis was "amended." The Communist parties in India and other Southeast Asian countries played an insignificant role in the struggle for independence; the revolution in Egypt, which ended in complete elimination of foreign rule, was staged by the military caste and the native Communists had no part in it at all; a number of African states won or approached independence not through a colonial revolution (in the Communist sense of the word), but by peaceful means in which the United Nations played a major role. It became apparent that a continuation of a militant policy in the emancipated countries would further isolate the local Communist parties and groups and eventually turn them into political sects devoid of any influence. Moreover, Khrushchev's foreign policy line of "peaceful coexistence" (which was another new turn in Kremlin strategy) needed supporters, and he hoped to find them among the young neutralist countries. A revision of the Soviet attitude toward the "national bourgeoisie" thus became strongly advisable and it was Khrushchev himself who took the first real step in this direction: during his trip to India in 1955 he graciously "rehabilitated" Gandhi.[14]

In view of this change in Soviet strategy Soviet Africanists were alerted to intensify their research work in the "light of the Marxist-Leninist teaching." (Stalin's theoretical contributions on the colonial question were thus thrown into oblivion.) A conference of Soviet Africanists was convened in Moscow in February 1957, to discuss various research projects on African history, economic life, ethnography and geography, and in the course of the discussion Potekhin urged Soviet historians and economists to study all aspects of the life of African peoples and of the socio-economic processes taking place in African society. He complained that "we haven't even one work which deals with the question of how the working class, the national bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia appeared on the [African] political scene." Finally, he urged Soviet historians to "study deeply the domestic and foreign policy of the national bourgeoisie in the newly emerging African countries." [15]

In December 1958 Potekhin participated as an observer in the Accra Conference of African Peoples. After his return he published two articles—in *International Affairs* and in the party theoretical journal, *Kommunist*—which reflected the new orientation in Soviet African policy. Potekhin described the conference as an "unquestionably great historical event," [16] and although he criticized Pan-Africanism for "many things foreign to our world outlook," he declared that as an anti-imperialist movement it deserved "the support of all people of good will advocating the ideas of progress and democracy." While he refused, furthermore, to "sympathize with the spirit of non-resistance to violence which permeates the speeches of many

[14] At the 20th Party Congress (February 1956) O. V. Kuusinen, a leading spokesman on international communism and a member of the Presidium and Secretariat of the CPSU, praised Khrushchev and Bulganin for "actually taking the initiative in correcting the sectarian errors" contained in the "well-known Theses of the Sixth Congress on the colonial question." (*XX sezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskovo Soiuza,* stenographic report, Moscow, 1956, p. 503). For understandable reasons, Kuusinen omitted mentioning that he himself had drafted the "well-known" Theses and urged the Congress to adopt them. *Problemy vostokovedeniia* (Moscow), No. 2, 1959, p. 66.

[15] *Sovetskaia etnografia,* No. 3, 1957, p. 185.

[16] *International Affairs,* No. 2, 1959, p. 90.

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Socialism in Africa

Soviet Marxists have been frustrated in Africa by the uniqueness of African society which, in addition to developing its own views of "socialism," also aspires to African unity and brotherhood. These ideas are anathema to Communist ideologists and have recently come under attack, as in the following passage:

These pro-imperialist circles, hiding behind talk about "real African socialism," are attempting to castrate the class content of the proletarian struggle and to force the African working class to betray the principles of proletarian internationalism as well as to drag into the African working-class movement the narrow nationalist slogan that "all Africans are brothers." However, this false bourgeois thesis will become less and less popular on the African continent. . . . The day is not far off when the all-conquering teachings of scientific socialism will triumph on the African continent.

—*Yu. Popov in* **Aziia i Afrika sevodnia, Dec. 1961, p. 11.**

leaders of this movement," [17] he did not insist that Africans take the initiative in using violent methods.

Writing in *Kommunist* (No. 17, 1958, p. 101), Potekhin admitted that the national liberation movement in Africa had acquired a "nationwide character" and that "all the social strata are engaged in the struggle for the liquidation of colonialism, including even a certain number of feudal and semi-feudal lords and the so-called tribal chieftains." No longer were members of the "national bourgeoisie" denounced as traitors to the cause of liberation. What is more, contrary to his previous insistence that only the "working class" possessed the organizing ability to lead the struggle for independence, Potekhin now blandly reported that while the African "working class is still young and lacks political consciousness," "the movement is being led by the national bourgeoisie and the national intelligentsia which is connected with that bourgeoisie."

This change in the Soviet attitude towards the national liberation movement in Africa was in large part the result of firsthand information acquired by Soviet Africanists at the Accra Conference and during other visits to Africa. There they became aware of all the ethnic, social, economic and religious obstacles to Communist penetration in tropical Africa, and of the necessity for a more cautious approach and additional "scientific" research. Henceforth, wrote Potekhin, Soviet Africanists should concentrate on three problems: (1) tribalism; (2) religion; and (3) the question of political and ethnic borders.

The studies of tribalism would have to show "more clearly" that the tribal form of organization, which is being artificially supported by the "imperialists," has outlived itself, and that the tribal chieftains are nothing but feudal lords who exploit their tribesmen.[19]

Religion, or "religious separatism," as Potekhin put it, is another "hindrance on the road to the establishment of a united national front of the [African] peoples." The mere fact that the Christian religion, "forced upon them" by the European colonizers, is represented in all possible denominations is a sufficient factor to "sow seeds of mischief," Potekhin wrote. But this is not all—the missions also "participate in political life, supporting the most right-wing parties, or contribute to the creation of new parties." In addition to the numerous European religious missions, Potekhin complained, there are also numerous African Christian sects. Islam, too, has found its way "beyond the borders of Arabic Africa," and its cultural and political organizations "supported the most reactionary forces during the intense political fight around problems connected with Ghana's constitution." Finally, Potekhin wrote, ancient African cults and creeds still exist south of the Sahara Desert. He called the situation "particularly complicated" in East Africa, where considerable numbers of Arabs and Indian immigrants are settled and where the "colonizers . . . very skillfully utilize religious separatism for their purposes." [20]

Potekhin's criticism of "religious separatism" is nothing but a camouflaged form of the struggle against religion as carried on for over four decades in the Soviet Union itself. In this respect Lenin's insistence that Communists wage a "struggle against the clergy" in the colonial countries remains the order of the day. Accordingly, Potekhin had the following advice for Soviet Africanists:

The struggle against the exploitation of religious separatism is even more difficult than the overcoming of tribalism, and the progressive forces of Africa will need help from the scientists. . . . A series of special research studies on the status of religion on the African continent is necessary. This series must include studies of local African beliefs and cults, the spreading of Christianity and Islam, and the activity of European religious missions.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 88.

[18] *Sovetskaia etnografia*, No. 2, 1959, pp. 14-15.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

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It is necessary to show the actual role of the missionaries . . . whose . . . work in the sphere of public education and health is subordinate to the main task of the missions—*i.e.* to strengthen the rule of the imperialist powers who are sending them to Africa and from whom they receive subsidies and guidance.[21]

As to the question of reconciliation of ethnic and political borders, Potekhin remained cryptic. He said that "this difficult task . . . belongs to the sphere of international relations," but intimated that the solution of the problem was impossible while the "bourgeoisie" remained in power in Africa. In the meantime, he urged Soviet scientists to compile "a precise ethnic map" of Africa (to replace the preliminary map already completed) and to prepare special studies on the ethnic composition of each state or colony. "All these studies, which are of great significance, should be considered a preparatory stage to the solution of the more complicated problem of forming nations." [22]

Attempt to Face Reality

Thus after a decade of closer physical contact with Black Africa Soviet Africanists began to realize that their standard Marxist formulas were inapplicable to the complex social and political problems of African life: that it was necessary, in short, to reconcile Marxist-Leninist doctrine with African reality. This new awareness is reflected in Potekhin's 86-page pamphlet, *Afrika smotrit v budushchee,* where for the first time concepts such as "negritude" and "African personality" are discussed by a Soviet writer.

These concepts, developed by African intellectuals, have grown out of the feeling of racial dignity that has been sweeping Africa. Benevolently Potekhin first explains them as a "legitimate reaction" to the former colonial rulers' discriminatory policies. Nevertheless, he rejects them as "not too felicitous" because they "refer not to all peoples of Africa, but only to the peoples of the negroid race," [23] and thus contradict Moscow's current policy which calls for unity of all African peoples regardless of their racial affiliation. What is more, the idea of "negritude" is "sometimes interpreted as meaning that "all Negroes, regardless of where and under what conditions they live, have a common psychology, a common world outlook, and a similar ideology."

Only *all-African* unity then—including the peoples of the Mahgreb countries and the U.A.F.—is, in Potekhin's words, "in the interest of the struggle against colonialism and imperialism." And, even more important, in this "noble cause . . . the working class is called upon to play a special role." In conjunction the two statements throw some light on Moscow's policy of promoting all-African unity. The Communist movement ("working class") in tropical Africa has yet to be put on an organized basis; functioning Communist organizations of any consequence can be found today only in North Africa and the Republic of South Africa. The Soviets may thus depend to a large extent on North Africans to organize party activity in the sub-Saharan regions. Obviously, nothing less than an all-African movement would allow a serious political engagement of North African Communists in Black Africa.

Potekhin's second reason for rejecting the idea of "negritude"—based on his argument that there is a lack of "common psychology and common world outlook" among Negroes—is in agreement with Moscow's present view disclaiming any political affinity between the African negroes and their descendants living in the United States.[24]

Afrika smotrit v budushchee deals with yet other problems which had never before been taken up in Soviet writings. For example, Potekhin discusses in some detail the fact that a large part of the African intelligentsia does not accept Soviet-type socialism and rather prefers the Yugoslav version, the democratic socialist ideas of Leon Blum, Nasser's "cooperative socialism," or even "Israeli socialism." [25] While he found it "easy" to dismiss all these "utopian" or "pro-capitalistic" types of socialism by quoting from Marx, Engels and Lenin, Potekhin took great pains to deny the validity of African socialism, which, to use Kwame

[21] *Ibid.,* p. 16.

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 16. As of April 1959, Soviet ethnographers had completed special ethnic studies of the following African countries and territories: Kenya, Tanganyika, Republic of the Congo, Southwest Africa. Studies on Angola, Mozambique and Nigeria were in process.

[23] *Afrika smotrit v budushchee,* p. 77 ff.

[24] There was, however, a period in the international Communist movement when American Negroes were considered the vanguard in the struggle for the liberation of the negroid peoples in Africa. The 4th Congress of the Communist International, held in Moscow in 1923, stated that "the history of the Negro in America fits him for an important role in the struggle for the liberation of the entire African race." (*Thesen und Resolutionen des IV. Weltkongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale,* Moscow, 1923, p. 52.)

[25] In 1961, Potekhin added to this list British "Laborite democratic socialism" and complained: The ideas of socialism are widely disseminated [in Africa], but essentially they are not the ideas of scientific socialism . . . [which] to a certain extent have been disseminated among the advanced intelligentsia and a part of the workers." (*Azia i Afrika sevodnia,* No. 10, October 1961, p. 15.)

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Nkrumah's words, "corresponds to the traditions, history, milieu and communal foundations of African society." [26] African socialism, according to Potekhin, must be rejected because it "underestimates the degree of class differentiation in African society." In other words, Africa cannot in the long run avoid "the class struggle" between the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat, with all the consequences prescribed by Communist doctrine. "Like the rest of the world," Potekhin writes, "Africa is subject to the fixed laws of historical development." [27] Potekhin's rejection of African socialism, as well as any other "national type" of socialism, was authoritatively confirmed in the new CPSU Program adopted by the 22nd Party Congress. The Program states:

The anti-popular circles of . . . [countries which have gained freedom from colonial tyranny] seek to tone down the general democratic content of nationalism, to play up its reactionary aspect, to push aside the democratic forces of the nation, to prevent social progress, and to hinder the spread of scientific socialism. At the same time they advance theories of "socialism of the national type," propagate socio-philosophical doctrines that are, as a rule, variations of the petty-bourgeois illusion of socialism, an illusion which rules out the class struggle. These theories mislead the popular masses, hamper the development of the national-liberation movement and imperil its gains.[28]

Another topic taken up by Potekhin, again one largely neglected by Soviet writers in the past, is the question of African communal land ownership, on whose preservation the theory of African socialism is partly based. Potekhin's views on this subject have undergone a rather rapid change in the past few years. As late as 1957 he had emphasized the disintegration of the African village:

We continue to talk about African peasantry in general although such "peasantry in general" has ceased to exist. The process of disintegration of the peasantry is proceeding fast. The African village is being torn by class contradictions.[29]

Three years later, Potekhin modified his position. He not only admitted that communal land-holding is still a major factor in Africa, but made the special point that its abolition is not an absolute prerequisite for a direct transition to "socialism." He wrote:

The viewpoint of the founders of Marxism is clear: the village community [*obshchina*] can, under certain conditions, become a starting point for the non-capitalist development of a country and for the building of socialism. The decisive factor is the availability of internal forces that would be able to lead the movement along this path, *i.e.*, forces into whose hands power would ultimately devolve. . . .[30]

The New Formulae

Potekhin touches here of course on the more general, and to the Communists very urgent, problem of devising an intermediate political system which would make possible in the underdeveloped countries a transition to communism "avoiding the capitalist stage of development."

This problem was discussed at the Moscow Conference of the 81 Communist parties in November 1960 —shortly after the appearance of Potekhin's pamphlet— and it was on that occasion that the concept of an "independent national-democratic state" was born. Khrushchev himself, in his speech of January 6, 1961, stressed the significance of the "idea of forming national-democratic states" and of "the tasks which they are called upon to accomplish." "The Communists are revolutionaries," he explained, "and it would be bad if they failed to see the new opportunities that are arising and did not find new methods and forms that lead most surely to the achievement of the established goal." [31]

The most elaborate commentary on the new "Marxist-Leninist theoretical concept" was offered later in the year by B. Ponomarev, the well-known Soviet theoretician on international communism and newly elected secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The "national-democratic state," Ponomarev wrote, arises "in the course of the development and deepening of the national-liberation revolution" and serves to "strengthen and develop its victory." Its main tasks are to fight against "imperialism" and its military blocs, to "sweep away feudalism and mediaeval conditions," and to "combine national independence with democracy." He then continued:

[26] *Afrika smotrit v budushchee,* p. 10.
[27] *Ibid.,* p. 27.
[28] *Pravda,* November 2, 1961.
[29] *Sovetskaia etnografia,* No. 3, 1957, p. 185.
[30] *Afrika smotrit v budushchee,* pp. 24-25. To support his revised position, Potekhin quoted from Lenin (*ibid.,* p. 25), and quoted out of context (*cf.* V. I. Lenin, *Sochinenia,* 4th Russian edition, Moscow 1950, Vol. 31, pp. 219-220). The authoritative Soviet Political Encyclopedia describes Lenin's position on the village community (*obshchina*) as follows: "In his works . . . Lenin showed that whatever the peculiarities of land ownership, they cannot hinder the development of capitalism and the disintegration of the village community. . . . Consequently the appeal of the *narodniki* [*Populists*] to preserve the village community is a reactionary utopia." (*Politicheskii slovar,* Moscow, 1958, p. 396.)
[31] *Kommunist,* No. 1, 1961, p. 27.

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Such a state is headed by representatives of the progressive forces of the nation. They take into their hands the banner of national independence and ensure the development of the country along the path of social progress. And in those emancipated countries where the peoples are still deprived of democratic liberties, the struggle for creation of a national-democratic state enables the progressive forces to sweep away the remnants of the colonial administration, to take away the power from national traitors in the service of imperialism, and to take the fate of their countries into their own hands.[32]

In other words, where "progressive forces" (*i.e.*, Marxist-Leninist or pro-Communist parties) are in power, they should proceed to "socialism" along the well-known Soviet path. In those countries, however, where the "progressive forces" are not yet at the helm of the state, the struggle against the "treacherous national bourgeoisie" must continue until it is utterly defeated.

But to carry on this struggle it is necessary to establish a legal basis for the existence of these forces. That is why Ponomarev insists that "national freedom" of the former colonial peoples can be strengthened only through "granting broad democratic rights to the people."

The granting to the people of democratic rights and freedoms—freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and demonstrations, the right to form political parties and public organizations and to participate in shaping state policy—is a decisive factor in the development of the national-democratic revolution, in consolidating its successes and in raising it to a higher stage.

Thus political liberties, which have been denied for over 40 years to the Soviet people and since World War II to peoples of other "socialist" countries and "peoples' democracies," are now presented as urgent essentials for countries whose populations have had little or no experience in political self-government and who are still plagued with widespread illiteracy! It is obvious that the *immediate* purpose of these ultra-democratic slogans is to create in the former colonial countries conditions which would allow the formation of legal Communist parties. Their *ultimate* purpose is to prepare the ground for Communist seizure of political power in these new states.

The injunction against "dictatorial and despotic methods of ruling" in "independent national-democratic states" is explained by Ponomarev himself when he attacks the "top circles of the indigenous bourgeoisie" who, after having achieved national independence, "strive to establish reactionary, anti-democratic regimes." He then criticizes specifically the "administrative authorities" of the United Arab Republic and Iraq for applying "terroristic repressive methods against worthy anti-imperialist fighters" (*i.e.* Communists) and concludes:

Communists have always been in the first ranks of fighters for national independence. Thousands of them died as heroes in the struggle against colonialism. However, even now Communist parties in the most emancipated countries are in the underground. Is that proper? Not at all. Communists represent the interests of the working class, of the peasantry, the supreme interests of the nation.

The operative clause of Ponomarev's statement was subsequently sanctioned and repeated almost verbatim in the new CPSU Program: "The Communists' aims are in keeping with the supreme interests of the nation." [33] The meaning is almost as clear as the words, and so is now the focus of "national-democratic" liberties. They are designed to assure not only the Communists' participation in public life, but also to sanction their role as arbiters of "the supreme interests of the nation." All other political forces, if they do not want to be denounced as stooges of "the treacherous national bourgeoisie," are to accept the Communist road. This will admittedly "require concessions" on their part, but if they do submit, they are told in consolation, "their energies" can "find application." [34] The pitiful role of the satellite non-Communist "parties" in the countries of Eastern Europe offers a perfect example of the nature of this "application." The formula is little more than a soft invitation to total surrender.

* * *

Despite all the permutations through which Soviet strategy in Africa and other areas of the world has passed during the last 40 years, "the established goal," to use Khrushchev's phrase, is still immutable. In 1920, Lenin anticipated "bourgeois-democratic revolutions" in colonial and independent countries and envisaged a temporary alliance between Communists and the nationalistically-minded bourgeoisie, but only under the condition that the Communists wage a struggle against the latter and keep the identity of their organizations and final aims clearly separate. Today the Kremlin, still the most powerful leader of the international Communist movement, follows in substance Lenin's strategy. The world revolution Lenin envisaged has not materialized, and the hard edges of reality have engendered new approaches and new concepts in Communist policy. But the pursuit of the ultimate aim goes on.

[32] *Kommunist*, No. 8, May 1961, p. 41 ff.

[33] *Kommunist*, No. 17, 1961, p. 47.

[34] *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4, 1961, p. 6.

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Scholarship and Propaganda

By Christopher Bird

IN 1959 HAILE SELASSIE visited the Soviet Union. From the moment he stepped from the plane in Moscow until the time of his departure, there was available to him one of several guides who could speak the Emperor's native language, Amharic. No doubt the Negus was impressed.

Equally impressed was the well-known Africanist Thomas Hodgkin who, during a visit to Leningrad University in 1958, met Soviet scholars engrossed in translating mediaeval Arabic and Hausa texts into Russian.[1] Not only had these materials never been translated into a Western language, but the documents, relating to the early history of Sudanese Africa, were not available in London or Paris.

Examples such as these are clear evidence of the effectiveness and the serious nature of the training programs developed in recent years by the Soviets in the field of African studies. For three decades after the Bolshevik Revolution the USSR showed little interest in Africa, from which it remained almost completely isolated until after World War II. Since the emergence of the post-war African independence movements, however, and especially since the first grants of independence to former British and French possessions in the 1950's, Moscow has sought actively to exert its influence on the African continent, and its political and economic commitments there have been growing at a rapid rate. With these new extensive engagements there arose the need for a great variety of specialists in African languages, culture, economics, and other related fields.

The development of a system of modern training institutions for specialists in an area as vast and heterogeneous as Africa requires a body of knowledge founded on a long tradition of study and the effort of several generations. It is a task that cannot be accomplished overnight or even in a few years. The Soviets may still be far from having established such a training base, especially one that would be adequate to their political ambitions in Africa, but they have already shown considerable progress. For this success they owe a large debt of gratitude to the old tradition of Russian interest and exploration in Africa, which began long before the advent of Soviet power, and on which contemporary Soviet Africanists have been able to draw.

An American student of Soviet affairs, Mr. Bird has for the past two years been engaged in the study of Russo-African relations. The present article is based on his research.

Early Contacts

In the almost five hundred years since the dawn of the modern era, a very respectable number of Russian explorers, adventurers, priests, merchants, and diplomats have travelled to Africa and established political and cultural connections there. An early manuscript, *The Wanderings of the Holy Monk Varsonofii to the Holy City of Jerusalem in 1456 and 1461-62* (reprinted in Moscow in 1896), contains an account of a trip by Varsonofii and the merchant Vassily to Egypt, where the two Russians stayed over a month.[2] Both set down their impressions of Cairo, one concentrating on the city's churches and the other on its commercial life. Not long thereafter another Russian, Nikitin, visited West Africa, landing in the 1470's on the Somalian peninsula.

It was mainly Egypt and North Africa, however, that continued to draw Russian adventurers. Even their earliest diaries and travel notes contain a wide variety of observations on subjects such as animal husbandry, farming methods, and political affairs. One unusually enterprising 18th-century Russian traveller, Vasilly Gri-

[1] Thomas Hodgkin, "Soviet Africanists," *West Africa,* October 3, 10 and 17, 1959.

[2] Unless otherwise indicated, the following historical account is drawn from M. V. Rait, "Russkie puteshestvenniki i uchenie v Afrike 15-nachale 20 vv." (Russian Travellers and Scientists in Africa in the 15th to early 20th centuries), *Vestnik istorii mirovoi kultury,* No. 2, 1960, pp. 98-109. For Russian political involvement in Africa during Tsarist times, see also Sergius Yakobson, "Russia and Africa," II, *Slavonic and East European Review,* Vol. XIX, 1939-40, pp. 158-174.

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gorevich Barskii-Plaka-Albov, wandered over Europe and the Near East for almost twenty-five years, visiting Egypt for several extended periods. After his return, he wrote a large volume of commentaries on the geography, economics and ethnography of the areas he had visited. His book was published in 1778 in Saint Petersburg under the title *Travel on Foot to the Holy Places of Europe, Asia and Africa, Undertaken in 1723 and Terminated in 1747*. About a generation later, in 1776-77, a Russian naval officer named Kokovtsev explored the Atlas Mountains of North Africa, and later published two valuable books on the Algeria and Tunisia of his time.

In the 19th and 20th centuries the numbers of Russians visiting Africa increased rapidly. The orientalist O. I. Senkovsky went up the Nile to Nubia in 1820. He was followed in 1834-35 by A. S. Norov, who later was to become Russian Minister of Education. In the 1840's Russian medical doctors were sent to Egypt to study typhus epidemics. In 1847, a team of Russian engineers, invited by the Egyptian ruler Mohammed Ali, traveled to Upper Egypt to survey possibilities for gold mining operations there. One group, under the leadership of the engineer E. P. Kovalevskii penetrated as far as the Ethiopian border, exploring the course of the Tumat River on the left bank of the Blue Nile. In his books Kovalevskii later defended the equality of the black and white races and made interesting proposals for Russian trade with Egypt and Ethiopia. By the middle of the century the stream of visitors from Russia widened further. Supported by the Russian Geographical Society, scientists and explorers made studies of the geological formations of the Little Atlas mountains and of the ethnography and the fauna and flora of Algeria. N. N. Miklukho-Maklai, who later became famous as a descriptive ethnologist of Melanesia and for whom the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Ethnography is named, visited Morocco and the Canary Islands.

But most significant among these Russian exploits, and certainly most important to an understanding of Soviet activity in Africa today, are the Russians' early contacts with Ethiopia. Their interest in that country was stimulated by two considerations: (1) the desire to prevent the extension of Italian, French and British power into Ethiopia—a region considered by the Russians as part of the Near East, and (2) an eagerness to establish relations between the Ethiopian clergy and the Russian Orthodox Church. (In the 1850's the Archimandrite Porfiry Uspensky and Bishop Kiril of the Russian church had proposed sending a religious mission to Ethiopia, but nothing came of this. By the 1880's, however, contact between the two churches was well established.)

The first major attempt to bring Russian influence to Ethiopia was made by the Cossack Ashinov, acting, apparently, on behalf of certain mercantile circles in Nizhny Novgorod who were interested in developing trade with Ethiopia and other African countries. He made several journeys to Ethiopia between 1886 and 1889, the last one of which ended disastrously. Ashinov had put his party of 174 people, including representatives of the Russian clergy, into the abandoned Italian Fort Sagallo, which he renamed New Moscow. Shortly thereafter the French government, worried lest a Russian settlement be permanently installed in an area of major interest to France, instructed French naval authorities to demand evacuation of the fort. Ashinov refused to comply with the request, and on February 18, 1889, the fort was shelled by a French cruiser. Several women and children were killed and many persons wounded. Ashinov and the survivors were then taken by the French to Cairo and returned to Russia.[3]

One member of Ashinov's group, however, a certain Mashkov, evaded capture and penetrated into the interior of Ethiopia. There, at Entoto, the old Ethiopian capital near Addis Ababa, he met the Negus Menelik. On his second trip to Ethiopia, in 1891, Mashkov was again received by the Negus, who this time gave him a letter to the Tsar requesting that a Russian artillery officer be sent to the African kingdom to "train Ethiopians in the use of arms." The Tsar sent his man, and the first precedent for Russian military and technical aid to Africa was established.

Several years later a geographical expedition was organized. The group, lead by the Russian explorer Alexander Eliseev, arrived in Ethiopia in 1895, and included a retired Tsarist officer, Nikolai Leontiev. One of the important results of this mission was the establishment that year of diplomatic relations between Russia and Ethiopia. After the outbreak of the Italian-Ethiopian war a year later, Leontiev became a military advisor to the Negus and subsequently served for a while as a provincial governor in Ethiopia.

The mounting contacts between the two countries stimulated an awareness of Ethiopian affairs in Russia and, especially after the Ethiopian victory at Adua in March 1896, a sympathy for their struggle against the Italians. The product of this sentiment was the dispatch in 1898 of a Russian field hospital to Addis Ababa which,

[3] M. V. Rait, "Russkie expeditsii v Efiopii v seredine XIX-nachale XX vv. i ikh etnograficheskie materialy" (Russian Expeditions to Ethiopia from the middle of the 19th to the start of the 20th centuries and their ethnographic materials), *Afrikanskii etnograficheskii shornik*, Trudy Instituta Etnografii Akademii Nauk SSSR, Moscow 1956, pp. 220-281.

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again with Russian aid, was later built up into a permanent institution. The hospital was abandoned in 1918, but in 1947, on the invitation of Emperor Haile Selassie, the Soviets rebuilt it into a modern 200-bed medical facility. It is run and staffed by the Soviet Red Cross and Red Crescent Society to this day.

With the arrival of the 20th century, Russian explorations in Ethiopia—as well as elsewhere in Africa—expanded in scope and numbers. Russian geologists, ethnographers, zoologists and botanists now ventured farther afield, and every time an expedition returned home, new ethnographic material was added to museums in St. Petersburg and in Moscow, and new volumes of diaries and scientific observation appeared in print. A tradition of interest in Africa as well as a body of knowledge about the continent was thus built up in Russia, which after the revolution served the Soviets as an indispensable springboard for the launching of their own African studies program.

Africanist Training and Research Centers

The earliest attempts to organize African studies in the Soviet Union began in 1929 when a special African section was established at the Orientological Institute of Leningrad University. This small section has since grown into an independent Department of African Studies and one of the two principal Africanist centers in the USSR. The other, newer center, is the African Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences in Moscow, established in 1960 under the direction of I. I. Potekhin, the top Soviet specialist on Africa. A brief account of the history of these two organizations will help illustrate the Soviet effort to develop a corps of Marxist Africanists.

Before World War II, instruction in the African field was confined to the Orientological Institute at Leningrad where in 1929 the first course in an African language—Swahili—was introduced by Professor D. A. Olderogge.[4] Unfortunately, however, the major effort of his African studies section was concentrated on the political scene, with rather ineffective results. In the early 1930's the section was closed and only some of its activities were transferred to the Leningrad Institute of History, Philosophy and Linguistics (LIFLI) where a Department of Semitic Languages and Literatures had been opened under A. P. Riftin.

Meanwhile, Olderogge, Riftin and N. V. Yushmanov, an Africanist specializing in Semitic-Hamitic languages, had written a study explaining the need for better training facilities in the field of African languages. As a result, two cycles of study were organized at Leningrad University in 1934/35: one in Bantu languages, in which Swahili, Zulu and several other disciplines were offered, and the other in Semitic-Hamitic languages, offering courses in Hausa, Arabic and Amharic, as well as a general course in comparative African linguistics. Of the first student group to graduate under this program in 1939, three men and two women completed the Bantu cycle and one man and two women finished the Hamitic cycle. These were the first Africanists trained in the Soviet Union.

DURING WORLD WAR II Leningrad University was shut down, but rebuilding of the program began again in 1945. At the present time about 35 courses in Africanistics are being offered at Leningrad. The program is divided into four areas of specialization: (1) Bantu Languages and Literature, (2) Amharic Language, (3) Hausa Language, and (4) History of Africa.[5]

The expansion of the African studies program has been accomplished in the main during the past seven years.[6] It was stimulated primarily by the Soviet leadership itself which, having decided on massive political and economic engagement in the newly rising countries of Black Africa, realized that it lacked adequately trained personnel to put the program into effect. In May 1955 the complaint was voiced in a leading editorial of the party's authoritative journal, *Kommunist:*

One should note that on the whole studies of African countries are thus far quite inadequately organized. The small cadres of Africanists are scattered. The countries of the African continent are being studied basically only in the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences. . . . The study of the history, economics and culture of the African peoples . . . and the unmasking of colonial policies of the imperialists in Africa is one of the most important tasks of Soviet orientology.[7]

[4] The data on the development of Africanist studies at Leningrad University are based on *Uchenye zapiski Leningradskovo Gosudarstvennovo Universiteta* (Scholarly Communications of Leningrad State University), No. 296, 1960, p. 123 ff.

[5] In addition to Leningrad University, several other Soviet institutions of higher learning now offer course work in African studies. These include the universities of Moscow, Odessa, Kiev, Kharkov, Tbilisi and Simferopol. See T. P. Melady & John A. Bekler, "The Soviet Cultural Offensive in Africa," *American Mercury,* February, 1960.

[6] For additional information on the Soviet training program in the African field, see Mary Holdsworth, *African Studies in the USSR,* St. Anthony's Papers, No. 10, Southern Illinois University Press, 1961, pp. 89-101. Needless to say, the Soviets still have far to go to catch up with the academic resources of Western Africanist institutions. Indeed, it would not be very surprising if in the near future the Soviets tried to exploit them for the training of their own students.

[7] *Kommunist,* No. 8, May 1955, p. 77.

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The following year a conference was called by the Institute of Ethnography to develop a coordinated program of scientific research in the African field, in which the Institute of World Economics and International Relations was to take a prominent role. Nevertheless, this plan proved unsatisfactory, and in 1960 an African Institute was organized in the Academy under the direction of I. I. Potekhin. The Institute is divided into four departments—history, linguistics, culture, and contemporary problems—but the six-year plan of study (1960-65), adopted at the first session of the Institute's Learned Council, makes it plain that most of the work will be devoted to historical studies.[8] Special attention is to be paid to the history of the nations of the Congo basin, the Arab connection with East Africa from the 10th to the 18th century, the history of the Sudan Republic, and contemporary African history.

Other special themes will be taken up in the course of the six-year plan. A large group of workers will be studying colonialism and its history from the 19th century to the present, with particular attention paid to the Africans' "struggle against imperialistic expansion." The Zulu wars will be studied and African resistance to French colonial penetration in the 19th century. Other study projects will concentrate on economic development in the new African states and the socio-economic processes in African society; the peasant traditions, the agrarian question, the town populations of tropical Africa, the condition of the workers, and the working class movement. Finally, a special effort will be made to study the ethnic problems of Africa, so as to lay the basis for a "correct nationality policy" for that continent.

The Institute plans to maintain close links with other Soviet institutions conducting related work in the fields of the social sciences, biology, geology and agriculture. But, most important of all, it intends to support all phases of its work by sponsoring field trips to Africa by individual scholars as well as complex scientific expeditions. Already candidates for advanced degrees are given the opportunity to make short survey trips to Africa. Soviet Africanists are evidently well aware that only through first-hand observations can they avoid the many errors of judgment to which they had been led in the past by ideological assumptions unsupported by the facts of African life.

[8] N. R. Ismagilova, "Obsuzhdenie plana nauchno-issledovatelskoi raboty Instituta Afriki AN SSSR" (Evaluation of the Scientific Research Work Plan of the African Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences), *Voprosy istorii*, No. 10, 1960, pp. 144-46.

> *. . . many institutes and scholars do not participate in solving the most important practical problems of the building of communism and occupy themselves with abstract themes and, in fact, separate themselves from life. . . . The work of Soviet Orientologists is still far from satisfying the demands which present-day life sets before them. . . . It is a matter of honor for our orientalists that they should produce works . . . which would promote a further creative elaboration of questions connected with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in relation to the countries of the East. . . . Orientologists-Africanists in Moscow, Leningrad and the union republics are to intensify their activities in the study of the varied and complicated problems relating to African history, ethnography, economics and philology. . . .*
>
> **—Editorial, Problemy vostokovedeniia, No. 1, 1959.**

Soviet Approach to African History

The stress put on historical studies at the African Institute is in consonance with the specific political orientation of Soviet Africanology. Its main task is to attack Western colonialism, to denounce "neo-colonialism" (*i.e.*, any economic and political relationships between the West and the newly independent African states), and to show the past of African nations in a new and more glamorous light by rewriting the work of Western "bourgeois" historians.

The first theme is developed by emphasizing that African progress was extremely slow during the period of Western tutelage. Under the heading "neo-colonialism," any form of Western economic aid and technical assistance,[9] as well as all military and political ties with the West, are attacked as imperialist schemes detrimental to African interests. Unlike the first two themes, which underlie Soviet propaganda in all parts of the underdeveloped world, the third theme is being applied only to Africa.

Soviet Africanists maintain that Western scholarship on Africa has been downgrading African history by virtually limiting it to the period beginning with the establishment of colonial rule and ignoring such seats of early civilization in Africa as the Not River valley in Northern Nigeria (during the first millenium B.C.), as well as the history of Nubia, Maroe, Axum, Ghana, Mali, Imverena, Angola, Songhai, Monomopatar, Bornu,

[9] See statement by V. A. Sergeev, representative of the USSR at the first session of the United Nations Committee for Industrial Development (March 29, 1961), USSR Mission to the U.N., Document No. 15/16.

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Kanem, Kongo, Benin, and the Hausa and Yoruba governments. Soviet historiography is to bring back to light the accomplishments of the African past and thus give the Africans a new sense of pride in their countries and a new faith in their future.

Few will, of course, dispute that early African history has suffered from neglect—in the West, in the USSR and in Africa itself.[10] But the Soviet allegation that Western historiographers have been "trying to hide" the African past is obviously contrived, and nowhere else is this falsehood more clearly exposed than in the work of the Soviet Africanists themselves, who even in their more recent articles on pre-colonial African history feel invariably obliged to refer to sources published by Western scholars.[11] By imputing to Western writers a willful black-out of Africa's early history, the Soviet propagandists are merely trying to turn to their own political advantage the legitimate dismay of many thoughtful Africans over the ignorance of much of Africa's pre-colonial history.[12]

What is more, the products of Soviet research are unlikely to reflect in an unbiased manner the complexities of African social, cultural and economic conditions, which under the best of circumstances are so extraordinarily difficult to express in the vocabulary related to Western (and Soviet) experience. The African Institute's six-year plan makes explicit the tendentious nature of Soviet Africanology, and it is difficult to see how the Moscow Africanists can avoid dissolving their findings in the deceiving simplicities of Marxian dialectics. This conclusion is further reinforced by an interview given recently to an American reporter, Marvin L. Kalb, by I. I. Potekhin, the head of the Institute. Said Dr. Potekhin:

People thought Africa had no history before the imperialists arrived merely because Africa had no written language south of the Sahara. They thought Africa was inhabited by primitive, bloodthirsty savages. . . . This was the view of Africa propagated by your bourgeois historians. This is not our view. We are going to uncover the truth.

"Will this truth be explained in terms of Marxism-Leninism?" he was asked.

There is no other truth . . . and I can assure you that no one working in this Institute has any other truth. . . . There is no other truth, and it is within this framework that we shall write the history of Africa. The falsifiers and distorters are finished. Their work is over; now the time has come for the only truth.[13]

Publishing Activity

One of the basic means used by newly developing countries to forge ahead quickly in science and technology is the "leapfrog" method—*i.e.*, a quick acquisition and assimilation of knowledge developed over a long period of time elsewhere. The Soviets have thus successfully leapfrogged over several decades of development in a number of fields, and they are now using the same method, implemented through an intensive translation program, in the African field.

As early as 1941, they published in Russian W. Fitzgerald's handbook, *Africa, A Social, Economic and Political Geography of its Major Regions*. Later, by translating such classic works as *Afrique Septentrionale et Occidentale* by Professor A. Bernard, and *Afrique Equatoriale, Orientale et Australe* by Professor F. Maurette, they supplied their Africanist students with basic materials otherwise unavailable in the USSR.

This kind of work has become even more intensive in recent years. In 1959, for instance, R. J. Harrison Church's *West Africa, A Study of the Environment and Man's Use of It* and Robert Capot-Rey's *Le Sahara Français* were published in Russian. Several works on individual countries were also selected for translation. *Le Maroc, Bilan d'une Colonization,* by A. Ayche, which appeared in Paris in 1956, was available to Russian readers in 1958, as was Charles Issawi's *Egypt at Mid-Century,* which had been published in English in 1954.[14]

A number of strictly technical Western publications relating to Africa have also been translated into Russian. The publishing house of the Soviet shipping industry, to cite one example, brought out a Russian edition of the African section of *Ports of the World,* a mariners' friend of long standing published in England. If anyone had any doubts in 1957 whether Soviet ships would soon be

[10] The political reawakening of Africa in the postwar period dramatically revitalized African scholarship in the West. This is attested not only by the many new books about Africa published in recent years but also by the appearance of new scholarly periodicals in the field. The latest addition is the *Journal of African History,* published quarterly by Cambridge University Press.

[11] See, *e.g.,* G. G. Diligenskii, "Severo afrikanskie goroda v IV veke" (North African Towns in the Fourth Century), *Vestnik drevnei istorii,* No. 3, 1959, pp. 74-100.

[12] *Cf.* the speeches before the United Nations General Assembly by the delegate from Mali, Mr. Aw, and the delegate from Liberia, Mr. Dosamu-Johnson (United Nations General Assembly, Provisional Document A/pv. 931, Dec. 1, 1960).

[13] *The Reporter,* April 13, 1961, p. 37.

[14] It will be interesting to see whether such other fundamental works as *Portuguese Africa* by James Duffy, *Nigeria-Background to Nationalism* by James S. Coleman, *Tropical Africa* by George Kimble, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* by Thomas Hodgkin, *French West Africa* by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, and *The Politics of Inequality* by Gwendolyn Carter will also be included in the Soviet translation program.

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visiting tropical African ports in quantity, he could have well asked himself why such a specialized handbook would need to be published in 4,000 copies.

Similarly, translations of Western travelogues are now being offered in increasing numbers to the Soviet public. In 1957, for instance, the book *Zwischen Rif und Draa,* written in 1955 by the German geographer Horst Mensching, came out in Russian, despite the complaint in the Russian preface that "the author . . . avoids making any critical comments about the French and Spanish colonialists who at that time still ruled in Morocco."

This year the translation process will be partially reversed, for the Soviets will be translating into English what they consider their capital work on Africa and the first Marxist treatment of the subject: *Narody Afriki* (Peoples of Africa), a volume edited by I. I. Potekhin and Professor Olderogge. The translation will undoubtedly become a basic text for the several hundred African students studying in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.[15]

Increased publishing activity is notable also in the fields of poetry, fiction and popular informative literature. Translations into Russian of the works of African writers and poets are appearing with increasing frequency, and lately African themes have found their way into several works of Soviet fiction. Popular pamphlets on various parts of Africa are proliferating rapidly.

Within the same context mention should be made of specialized periodical literature. Here, too, the ever-widening Soviet interest in Africa is evident. A review of Soviet periodicals received in the U. S. Library of Congress for 1950 reveals that less than 100 articles about Africa appeared during that year in not more than 40 journals. By 1956, some 400 such articles were published in about 80 journals. In 1960, approximately 140 periodicals carried more than two-and-one-half times the number of titles published in 1956. It is significant that in the category of academic and professional journals, articles relating to Africa are no longer limited to periodicals in the social science fields and international relations. For the first time, articles devoted to African problems have begun to appear also in magazines specializing in the natural sciences and engineering. Thus, *Ekonomika Selskovo Khoziaistva* has published a piece on Tunisian agriculture.[16] The soils of Central Africa are treated in *Poch ovedenie.*[17] Oceanological investigations, undertaken in 1958 near the mouths of the Niger and Congo rivers, have been reported in detail in the bulletin of the Baltic Oceanographic Institute.[18] Similar examples can be found in journals specializing in mining, geology, construction, microbiology, health, nutrition and others.

Organs of Popular Agitation

In addition to scholarly and professional publications, magazines of a more popular nature also give increasing attention to African reporting. Chief among these is *Afrika i Azia Sevodnia,* a didactic and propagandistic journal put out by the Academy of Sciences. In this manner the results of basic Soviet research in the African field receive supplementary use in political agitation programs.

Much of this kind of material finds an outlet in the Association for Friendship with African Peoples, a propaganda organization set up in Moscow in 1959. The membership of the Association includes a wide spectrum of personalities, from the Rector of Turkmen State University and many prominent writers and artists to Soviet Heroes of Socialist Labor, and even institutional members such as the Armenian University, the Georgian Geographical Society, the Institute of Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences, the Moscow Agricultural Academy and a number of factories and collective farms. The association has been active in organizing lectures on African subjects; there has been a lecture by I. I. Potekhin, an evening devoted to African poetry, and evenings given to such themes as "Soviet-Ethiopian friendship" and "friendship with the peoples of Uganda." It also endeavors to indoctrinate Africans about the virtues of Soviet life and culture, with special emphasis on such traditional Communist propaganda subjects as the condition of non-Russian nationalities and Soviet industrialization.

In short, the Association (together with the Soviet-African Solidarity Committee, a sister organization somewhat more limited in scope) is an integral part of the widely-based, centrally directed Soviet program to develop close relations between the USSR and the newly emerging states of Africa, and to open as wide as possible the doors to Soviet influence on that continent. If one may make a parallel in military terms, then the Association in its cultural and agitational activities in Soviet cities—corresponding to the activities of the Soviet cultural missions in Africa—represents the foot soldiers in this African campaign; the training programs at Leningrad University and other institutions are the war colleges; the Moscow African Institute is the general staff; and I. I. Potekhin is its chief. It is a seriously conceived campaign, and no one need doubt its political goal.

[15] According to reliable estimates, some 1500 students from about 25 different African countries studied in the Soviet bloc during 1960-61.

[16] No. 31, July 1960, pp. 120-22.

[17] No. 6, June 1961, pp. 19-25.

[18] No. 5, 1958, pp. 91-99.

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An End to Concentration Camps?

By Paul Barton

SINCE STALIN'S DEATH the Soviet leadership has made no attempt to deny the existence of an enormous network of concentration camps in the USSR during his rule. On the contrary, the leadership has itself implicitly admitted that the so-called "corrective labor" camps should be removed. When it comes to hard facts, however, very little official information has been given out either about the past infamies of the camp system or about the alleged reform efforts of the last decade.

The recent 22nd CPSU Congress was illustrative in this respect. In the sweeping tide of Khrushchev's renewed attack on Stalin and Stalinism, dozens of top party officials and lesser delegates took the floor to denounce the terroristic excesses of their late master and to call some of his crimes by their right names. Yet while numerous references were made to Stalin's methods of arbitrary arrest and condemnation, and lurid details revealed concerning the execution of certain better-known victims, virtually nothing was said in all of these tirades about the fate of the millions who ended up in the concentration camps. Perhaps epitomizing this "blind spot" at the Congress was a rather pathetic speech by an old woman who had spent some 19 years in prison and in the camps: while she roused tumultuous applause by describing her daily "conversations" with the spirit of Lenin, she said never a word about the lot of the human beings in the camps.[1]

Throughout the lengthy Congress, moreover, not so much as a hint was heard of what had become of the concentration camps. Among the speakers were regional party secretaries in whose jurisdictions vast camp complexes have been located (such as Karaganda in Kazakhstan and Kolyma in the Far East); while these men could have revealed the present situation of the camps, they preferred to censure the "consequences of the cult of personality" *in abstracto*.[2]

The general policy of silence concerning the camps is perhaps not so surprising if one bears in mind the major role they were assigned in Stalinist society. Never were they conceived of simply as prisons for recalcitrant individuals. Stalin made them part of his effort to remold the Soviet social structure by eliminating whole categories of people from the general community. At the same time, the exploitation of the huge camp populace through forced labor—officially termed "socially useful" work—became an important economic function in the building of Soviet society: under conditions of indescribable hardship, prisoners were forced to participate in the construction of navigable canals, power stations, roads, and railways; in the development of mines; and in various types of industrial production. Still other purposes at which the camps were aimed were the colonization of distant regions and the Russification of national minorities deported from their home areas *en masse*.

In short, the concentration camp system was made a permanent institutional feature of Soviet society. It would be hard for Stalin's successors to dispense with it even if that were their intent. Still, it is fair to inquire whether progress has been made toward the declared aim of eliminating the "corrective labor" camps, and to question just how sincere this aim is in view of various contradictory developments that have come to light.

Despite the relative dearth of official information in this area, certain avenues of investigation have been possible. In the first four years after Stalin's death, a valuable source of information was the testimony of a number of foreign prisoners released from Soviet camps and permitted to return to their own countries. These repatriates

[1] Speech by D. A. Lazurkina, reported in *Pravda*, Oct. 31, 1961.

[2] Speeches in *ibid.*, Oct. 25 and 31, 1961.

Mr. Barton is a Czech sociologist and economist now residing in France. The present article supplements his full-length study, L'Institution concentrationnaire en Russie (*Libraire Plon, Paris, 1959*).

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brought news that the forced labor system had been deeply shaken by the combined effects of a demographic situation in the USSR that made it impossible to continue mass deportations, an outbreak of prisoners' strikes and insurrectionary movements that began as early as the end of 1952, and the much broader crisis of authority brought on by the death of Stalin. The repatriates also testified that successive measures had been taken first to cut down the death rate among prisoners (1950), then to make forced labor more rational economically (1951-54), and finally to meet the problems both of overcrowding and of unrest in the camps by reducing the number of prisoners and by modifying camp regulations (1953-57).

After 1956 the release and repatriation of foreigners virtually came to a halt, and it became much harder to get reliable information on the progress, if any, in the transformation of the camps. As we shall see, what little official information was given out became increasingly tendentious in tone, as well as highly questionable in substance. Thus a welcome contrast was afforded by the appearance in 1960 of two comparatively useful Soviet studies on forced labor—one a manual published in Moscow for the use of the Faculties of Law,[3] and the other an essay produced under the auspices of the University of Leningrad.[4] Since no work of this kind had been issued since 1936, these studies are a valuable source of information despite their tendency to distort embarrassing facts.

The present paper attempts to assess the current role and situation of the Soviet concentration camp system, supplementing and updating a full-length study by the writer published in 1959.[5] Information on developments over the past decade has come from the various sources noted above and others.

The Prison Population

Estimates of the size of the prison population in Soviet concentration camps have always varied considerably: the only thing that is certain is that the number of persons incarcerated in camps during the Stalin era ran to the millions.[6] While it is known that large numbers of prisoners were released between 1953 and 1957, the lack of official statistics and of an initial basis of measurement makes it impossible to say whether the present camp population should still be counted in millions or in hundreds of thousands. The only specific figure on record was that given in a personal interview by P. I. Kudriavtsev, Assistant Prosecutor General of the USSR, to Professor Harold Berman of the Harvard Law School, in May 1957.[7] According to Berman, Kudriavtsev "apparently wanted to convey the impression" that there were three million camp inmates at the time of Stalin's death, almost half of whom were political prisoners, but that only 800 to 900 thousand remained under detention in 1957, less than 18,000 of whom were "politicals." However, it is hard to give credence to these figures, since they were never confirmed by official sources, since they conflict with the testimony of various repatriates and since other statements Kudriavtsev made to Mr. Berman were highly questionable.[8]

According to former prisoners, some concentration complexes lost most of their inmates in the period 1953-57, while in others the decrease was much smaller and in some the count remained about the same. These changes were not all due to the release of prisoners but in many cases to their transfer to other penitentiary establishments. Ex-inmates have testified that riots and uprisings resulted in the shift of a number of prisoners, usually to camps farther east. For example, Ukrainians involved in the disturbances in Karaganda in 1952 were transferred to Norilsk. In turn, numerous participants in the rising at Norilsk in the spring of 1953 were sent to Taichet, where prisoners involved in the strike at Vorkuta also arrived.[9] Again, following the 1954 revolt at Kingir in Kazakhstan, a large group of prisoners was sent to Kolyma.[10]

Reports of ex-prisoners also indicate that releases tapered off the farther camps were located eastward. Japanese repatriates released from Kolyma at the end of 1956—that is, when operations to reduce the prison population were about at an end—estimated that the total number of prisoners in that enormous concentration-camp complex in northeastern Siberia had not changed to any significant degree.[11] One repatriate who was at Taichet

[3] B. S. Utevski, ed., *Sovetskoe ispravitelno-trudovoe pravo* (Soviet Corrective Labor Law), Gosyurizdat, Moscow, 1960.
[4] N. A. Beliaev, *Predmet sovetskovo ispravitelno-trudovovo prava* (The Purpose of Soviet Corrective Labor Law), Izdatelstvo Leningradskovo universiteta, Leningrad, 1960.
[5] Paul Barton, *L'institution concentrationnaire en Russie 1930-57*, Plon, Paris, 1959.
[6] See *ibid.*, pp. 52-54.
[7] Harold J. Berman, "Soviet Law Reform—Dateline Moscow 1957," *The Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 66, No. 8.
[8] See footnote 11; on the Kudriavtsev interview, see further in text.
[9] Testimony of Japanese ex-prisoners collected by Professor Herbert Passin and quoted in Barton, *op. cit.*, pp. 312-14; also testimony of German ex-prisoners in *ibid.*, pp. 467-83, and of a French repatriate (cited as witness No. 55).
[10] See "The Heroic 500 Ukrainian Women of Kingir Concentration Camp," *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, March 1-15, 1956.
[11] Associated Press dispatch from Maizuru, Japan, Dec. 27, 1956: according to estimates of repatriates interviewed, some 1.3 million prisoners still remained in the Kolyma camps.

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from 1953 to 1956 had the impression that the penitentiary administration was endeavoring to stabilize manpower at Kolyma by means of an "exchange" system with the Taichet camps: frequently, contingents of healthier prisoners were sent from Taichet to Kolyma, while a considerable number of exhausted, sick or disabled men were sent in the opposite direction, from Kolyma to Taichet.[12]

Political Prisoners and Soviet Semantics

The claims of Mr. Kudriavtsev and other Soviet officials concerning political prisoners in the Soviet Union are particularly subject to question. According to Kudriavtsev's figures, political prisons constituted only about two percent of all prisoners by 1957. Victor N. Kalinin, an official of the Soviet Ministry of the Interior, went further, telling Mr. Berman the figure was less than one percent. Kudriavtsev claimed that most of the remaining political prisoners had been collaborators with the punitive sections of the German police and army during the war, adding that if these prisoners were released, "the people who remember their crimes would not treat them nearly as well as they are being treated in the labor colonies." [13] These allegations are contradicted by the testimony of later repatriates who reported the presence, for instance, of Polish prisoners in several concentration camp complexes.[14] A Frenchman released in early 1958 reported that prisoners from the Caucasus and the Ukraine who had been partisan fighters against the Nazis continued to languish in Vladimir Prison because they had refused to renounce publicly their ideas of national independence. This testimony was corroborated by a Swiss prisoner released from Vladimir in August 1958.[15]

In January 1959 Nikita Khrushchev went beyond his subordinate officials in declaring categorically, at the 21st CPSU Congress, that "there are no political prisoners in the prisons of our country at present." [16] Yet only one month before he made this statement, a new law was promulgated concerning criminal liability for "crimes against the state"—specifically including, among other offenses, high treason, terrorism, sabotage, anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, participation in any anti-Soviet organization, riots, and illegal departure for a foreign country—and setting penalties of from 10 years' imprisonment to death for most of these obviously political offenses.[17] Similar provisions were included in the new penal code adopted in October 1960 in the principal union republic, the RSFSR, more than 20 months after Khrushchev's statement.[18]

What the Soviet authorities have done is to avoid any overall designation for "political prisoners" and to use instead such specific, time-tried slogans as "enemies of the state," "traitors," "saboteurs," "counterrevolutionaries," *etc.*, as defined anew in the 1958 criminal legislation. In this light, the claim that there are no longer any political prisoners in the USSR falls apart. The semantic "double-talk" in which the regime has engaged in this respect is illustrated in contradictory statements made by the former chairman of the KGB, A. Shelepin, both at the 21st and 22nd party congresses. At the former, Shelepin parroted Khrushchev's claim that political prisoners were a thing of the past, but turned right around to announce: "We shall continue to punish mercilessly all the enemies of our people." [19] At the 22nd Congress, Shelepin was given a major role (after Khrushchev) in revealing and deploring the terrorism of the Stalin era. Yet while in one breath he stressed that the reform of state-security organs had eliminated the excesses of Stalin and of "Beria and his subordinates," he hastened to add: "The activities of spies and other enemies of the Soviet state will, of course, continue to be punished with the full severity of our laws." And while many of the cases of past injustice bared at the Congress involved false charges and extorted confessions of spying, Shelepin's speech could leave no doubt that the regime was still resorting to the practice of attributing any manifestations of opposition to the machinations of foreign powers working through traitorous spies. "Since they [imperialist intelligence services] have no social basis among the Soviet people for their undermining activities, they try to influence in an anti-Soviet spirit certain politically and morally unstable citizens of our country and to recruit them as their agents. . . ." [20] Though Khrushchev specifically disavowed this tactic as it was used under Stalin, referring with distaste to prisoners who

[12] Testimony of the French ex-prisoner referred to in footnote 9.
[13] Figures and statements quoted in Berman, *op. cit.*
[14] See Barton, *op. cit.*, p. 183.
[15] See Jean-Paul Serbet, *Polit-isolator* (Political Isolator), Robert Laffont, Paris, 1961, p. 417; and Emil Brugger, *Ein Schweizer erlebt die Sowjetunion* (A Swiss Experiences the Soviet Union), Veritas-Verlag, Sollothurn, 1961, p. 22.
[16] Stenographic report of the 21st Congress of the CPSU (in Russian), Gospolizdat, Moscow 1959, Vol. 1, p. 105.
[17] *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Sovieta SSSR* (Bulletin of the USSR Supreme Soviet), 1959, No. 1. English translation appears in *Law in Eastern Europe* (Leyden). No. 3, 1959.
[18] Record of laws and ordinances adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, Fifth Assembly, Third Session, Oct. 25-27, 1960 (in Russian), Moscow, 1960.
[19] Stenographic report of the 21st Congress, *supra*, pp. 251, 253.
[20] Shelepin's speech reported in *Pravda*, Oct. 27, 1961.

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had been "'persuaded' by special methods that they were German, English or other spies," he allowed this statement to stand without comment and in fact twice referred to Shelepin's speech with approval.[21]

Moreover it was Khrushchev himself, followed up by Shelepin, who raised the threat at the 22nd Congress that a new category of criminals might be added to "spies," "enemies of the state," "saboteurs," *etc.* Khrushchev's sharp attack on Soviet bureaucratism obviously paved the way for Shelepin's "suggestion" that certain bureaucratic acts and attitudes be punished as crimes:

> **. . . it seems to me that the time has come to make provision in the legislation for penal measures against displays of bureaucratism. Indeed, we prosecute a man for a theft of ten rubles. And that is just. But the bureaucrats through whose fault valuable rationalization-suggestions and inventions are laid aside for years, those who prevent and hinder the introduction into production of new techniques and technology, or those through whose fault the carrying out of the most important party and government decisions is undermined, are not brought to trial in our country. . . . Bureaucratism causes a serious prejudice to Communist education, creates among certain Soviet men an unhealthy attitude, weakens their will and their energy. This is why it is necessary to punish the bureaucrats with the utmost severity, to organize spectacular trials against them.[22]**

THE FACT THAT Soviet citizens are still vulnerable to prosecution and imprisonment on specious grounds for political reasons is politically demonstrated in two recent cases. The first concerns the prosecution in October 1961 of a leader of the Leningrad Jewish community and two of his assistants. In the first post-Stalin years this leader, by name Peshersky, had been active in seeking such concessions for the community as permission to reopen the synagogue and to reestablish Jewish butcher shops. Demoted and allowed to keep only a minor position at the synagogue after 1956, Pershersky—along with his two colleagues—was suddenly arrested in June 1961; all three were convicted in a trial in October on charges of being "agents of a foreign power," and sentenced respectively to twelve, nine, and seven years of imprisonment.[23] It was not made clear which specific articles of the penal code were invoked; on the basis of what Shelepin has said, however, it would not be acknowledged that these men are "political prisoners."

The second instance concerns the prosecution of Olga Ivinskaya, widely acknowledged as the woman after whom Boris Pasternak modeled the heroine of *Doctor Zhivago*. In a case which seems nothing more nor less than a flagrant act of political vengeance, Mme. Ivinskaya and her daughter were arrested less than three months after Pasternak's death, tried for "crimes against the state," and sentenced respectively to eight and three years' imprisonment in Siberia. Specifically, Mme. Ivinskaya was charged under Article 15 of the 1958 law on criminal liability, a section which pertains to smuggling.[24] Naturally the regime would again deny that she was a "political prisoner" (witness the remarks of Alexis Surkov, speaking for the Soviet Writers' Union: "We do not want to interfere in this affair because it has nothing to do with politics or with literature."[25]) It might be recalled that Pasternak's heroine disappeared into a concentration camp shortly after the death of Yuri Zhivago: in translating fiction into reality, the responsible Soviet authorities were not subtle enough to realize that they were giving a *post factum* message to the novel, in which the incident was a symbol of Stalinist terror.

Camps or Colonies?

As questionable as the claim that there are no longer any political prisoners in the USSR is the claim that the Soviet authorities have eliminated corrective labor camps, replacing them with corrective labor colonies. The latter, reserved in the past for persons serving sentences of less than three years, could hardly be called model penal institutions, but their regimen and conditions have been less harsh than those of the camps, and generally they have not been established in remote localities. Soviet sources have reported that the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decision to abolish the camps on October 25, 1956. The question, however, is whether the decision has been implemented to any significant degree. This issue has been met with contradictory or evasive answers.

Kudriavtsev, for instance, in his interview with Mr. Berman, made a statement at one point that two-thirds of the camps had been abolished in the years 1953-57. Yet repatriated ex-prisoners have testified that during the period in question (1953-57) none of the large concentration complexes was abolished. Moreover, Ku-

[21] Khrushchev's speech reported in *ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1961.
[22] Shelepin's speech, *ibid.*, Oct. 27, 1961.
[23] The trial was first reported in the press by D. Rousset in *Le Figaro*, Nov. 9, 1961, then confirmed by the Soviet news agency Tass. See *The New York Times*, Nov. 18, 1961, p. 4.
[24] See among other reports Robert Conquest, "The Fate of Olga Ivinskaya," *Encounter* (London), September 1961; Edward Crankshaw, "New Attack on Pasternak's Olga," *The Observer* (London), Oct. 1, 1961; and the account of Sergio D'Angelo (Pasternak's intermediary with his Italian publisher) in *The Sunday Telegraph* (London) May 7, 1961, and *Paris-Journal*, May 6-9, 1961.
[25] Reported in *L'Humanité* (Paris), Jan. 24, 1961.

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driavtsev invalidated his own assertion by adding that the law of October 25, 1956, had been enacted without an accompanying appropriation, that "not many" new labor colonies had been constructed, and that the old labor camps still had to be utilized.[26] Another Soviet official said to Mr. Berman: "We do not like to spend our money on building new places of detention for criminals." [27]

More recently, the 1960 manual on forced labor (hereafter credited to B. S. Utevski as editor) admitted that the camps continued in operation at least until the end of 1958; but with respect to their fate thereafter, the manual retreated to extremely equivocal language which —without actually saying so—created the impression that they have somehow ceased to exist.[28]

The contradictions apparent over this issue are not without precedent. The manual itself compares the alleged abolishment of the camp system to the abandonment many years ago of the so-called "special isolators," detention units which were authorized in 1924 for particularly dangerous political prisoners, but which in official parlance ceased to exist after the creation in 1930 of corrective labor camps. Abolition in this case meant a drastic reduction in the number of isolators—but not their total eradication. According to reports, such units for the solitary confinement of inmates still exist, for example, in the Vladimir Prison.[29] If the same "logic" is being applied in the case of the corrective labor camps, then the claim that they have gone out of existence may rest simply on the declared official intention to abolish them, supported by the undoubted fact that large numbers of prisoners have been released or transferred to other penal establishments, and by the assumption that further transfers will in fact reduce the camps to an insignificant factor in the penal system.

THERE IS, HOWEVER, a simpler explanation for the claim that the camps have ceased to be—and that is the strong indication that existing camps have been "transformed" into colonies by a mere change of name, or more precisely, by a revised and more flexible definition of what constitutes a "colony." This assumption is based mainly on information brought to light in the two 1960 publications on forced labor.

According to both Utevski's manual and the essay by N. A. Beliaev, the generic term "colony" is now applied to three types of penal establishments, practicing what are respectively referred to as a "general system," an "alleviated system," and a "severe system" of detention. Each colony uses only one of the three systems. The system to which a prisoner is to be assigned is determined immediately after he is sentenced, based on the degree of "social danger" he is felt to represent, the "nature of the crime he has committed," the length of his sentence, his previous record, his age, *etc.* After serving a part of his sentence, the prisoner may be transferred to a colony operating under a more lenient system if his conduct and work are considered satisfactory. Conversely he can be punished by transfer to an establishment operating under a more severe system.[30]

Significantly, the "general system" of the colonies consists of essentially the same regulations as those of the "general system" of corrective labor camps in the past.[31] The "alleviated system" is a relatively recent addition: it was introduced in the spring of 1954, presumably in an effort to quiet unrest among camp inmates following the strikes and riots of the previous year. Prisoners completing one-third of their sentences could be assigned to it, provided they could give proof of their satisfactory "rehabilitation." [32] The "severe system" corresponds very closely to the regulations long applied in labor camps to certain categories of convicts, particularly those sentenced for "crimes against the state": it is marked by rigid isolation of the detention unit; harsher conditions than in the other systems with regard to methods of surveillance and punishment for offenses committed by prisoners; inferior barracks and food; assignment of prisoners mainly to hard manual labor for long working hours, under stricter rules of work credit than in other "colonies" (on this see further); and restrictions on the way in which money earned by prisoners can be used.[33]

Given some of the similarities in the regulations governing colonies as compared to the supposedly "defunct" camps, and considering Mr. Kudriavtsev's statement that existing camps had to be utilized, it is a fair assumption that some camps have been transformed into colonies by a change of label.

[26] Berman, *op. cit.*
[27] *Ibid.*
[28] Utevski, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-83.
[29] See Serbet, *op. cit.*, pp. 372-80.
[30] See Utevski, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-101, 179-85; and Beliaev, *op. cit.*, pp. 36, 46.
[31] Compare these regulations as defined respectively in Utevski, *op. cit.*, 179-80, 183-85; and Barton, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-58.
[32] Utevski, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-81, and Barton, *op. cit.*, 359-60.
[33] On the "severe system," see Utevski, *op. cit.*, pp. 181, 185, 190, 216, 218, 224; Beliaev, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-49; also V. N. Roschin and V. N. Kalinin, "Nauchnaia konferentsia po sovetskomu ispravitelno-trudovomu pravu," (Scientific Conference on Soviet Corrective Labor Law) *Sovetskoe gossudarstvo i pravo*, No. 3, 1957. On similar regulations in the past see Barton, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-59.

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A word must be said here about Soviet prisons "proper," which on the scale of penal establishments represent the harshest and most restrictive institutions for the incarceration of offenders. Counterbalancing the supposed effort to replace camps with colonies, the authorities have acted to broaden the conditions under which offenders could be sentenced to prisons. Under the terms of the penal laws promulgated in December 1958, detention in prisons was made specifically applicable to "persons having committed serious crimes" and "particularly dangerous recidivists" (Article 23).[34] Soviet sources have described the purpose of this provision as "intensification of penal repression for serious crimes" and the establishment of "increased responsibility for the most serious crimes against the state and for crimes against the life or health of citizens."[35] Well in advance of this law, according to ex-prisoners, reports reached the camps that the prison system was being expanded, and some prisoners who had taken part in risings were transferred to prisons, frequently with additional sentences imposed for "offenses in the camp."[36] It is also interesting to note that whereas "corrective labor" was not a formal feature of the prisons in the past, since 1956 all inmates of prisons have been compelled to do hard labor, under harsher conditions than in the camps.[37] It would seem that the prisons, along with colonies under the "severe system" of detention, leave the authorities ample institutional means for dealing as strictly as they choose with so-called dangerous elements.

"Educational" Coercion

In the post-Stalin era, Soviet officials and party theoreticians have placed increasing emphasis on the concept that "persuasion" is to replace "coercion" as the basic mode of orienting Soviet society in its endeavors. This emphasis is reflected in criminal theory and policy by frequent assertions that punishment is now aimed chiefly at the re-education and rehabilitation of offenders. It is manifestly clear, of course, that the authorities have no intention of abandoning coercion; the issue is one of relative emphasis. Insofar as the field of penology is concerned, the theory is that coercive and punitive measures are not only compatible with the re-education of prisoners but in themselves can be "educational." This idea has been expressed by various Soviet spokesmen. For example, in an article that predated his manual, B. S. Utevski wrote: ". . . the task of re-educating convicted persons does not mean that the task of punishing disappears in the acivity of the corrective labor institutions. . . . Even believing that there is a conflict between punishment and education is an error."[38] At a conference on corrective labor law in Moscow in May 1957, a renowned jurist, B. S. Nikiforov, stated that "in the activity of corrective work establishments, there are always present, regardless of the character of the institutions, punitive elements that achieve the educational purpose only in the long run and particularly by means of coercion."[39] The 1960 manual expressed this idea: "Strict compulsory compliance with the imperatives of the system by prisoners of Soviet penal institutions and the application of disciplinary punishment to those who fail to obey them, have an educational value in that they make the prisoners used to discipline and self-discipline."[40]

The "educational value" of punishment and of penal servitude has always been asserted in Communist theory; witness the very term "corrective labor." Thus there is nothing really new in the current line of theorizing except the degree of stress on the educational aspect. The new emphasis on re-education and reform has, however, led to one major innovation in camp practice. So-called "prisoners' councils"—an institution established in the early Soviet years but long since fallen into disuse—were revived in 1954 and further reorganized in 1958. The council in each camp is recruited by the camp administration from among trusted prisoners: according to the Utevski manual's definition of its functions, the council "helps the administration solve the task of reforming and re-educating the prisoners and participates directly in developing socialist competition among them, [in] the struggle for a wholesome life and a beneficial use of leisure time, as well as in the uncovery of parasitic elements." The council meets in the presence of representatives of the administration; it may be asked to provide information on a prisoner when he is being considered for parole—"as well as in other circumstances when it is necessary to describe the personality of the prisoner, his attitude toward work, his conduct and his participation in social activity."

[34] *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR, supra.*

[35] See Utevski, *op. cit.*, p. 88; and Stenographic Report, fifth meeting (second session) of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (In Russian), Moscow, 1959, p. 488. See also Leon Lipson, "The Criminal Reconsidered," *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1961, pp. 58-60.

[36] Barton, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

[37] See *Izvestia,* Sept. 13, 1956; Utevski, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-202. See also an earlier article by Utevski, "Osnovnye voprosy sovetskoi nauki ispravitelno-trudovovo prava" (Fundamental Problems of the Soviet Theory of Corrective Labor Law), *Sovetskoe gossudarstvo i pravo,* No. 3, 1957.

[38] Utevski, "Osnovnye voprosy . . .," *loc. cit.*

[39] Quoted in Roshchin and Kalinin, *op. cit.*

[40] Utevski, *Sovetskoe ispravitelno-trudovoe pravo,* p. 97 (hereafter referred to as Utevski manual).

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The council is also authorized to examine offenses committed by prisoners and to impose certain penalties, or else to "submit a request to the administration when stricter measures must be applied." Since 1955 so-called "comrades' courts" have been established in the councils to help carry out this function. Moreover, the council is charged with recruiting other prisoners to serve on various specialized subordinate bodies, including since 1956 brigades or sections responsible for the "maintenance of order." Recruits for these positions must be approved by the camp administration.[41]

The most charitable interpretation of this list of the functions and powers of the prisoner's councils must lead one to conclude that their role of "re-educating and rehabilitating" prisoners is only secondary to their role of enforcing order in the camps, acting as informers for the administration, and establishing a network of collaborators to help them in these policing tasks. The job of recruiting lower-level informers is facilitated by the committee's authority to recommend either privileges or penalties for particular prisoners or for groups such as the brigades. Indications that such "trustee" elements have become the target of increasing resentment and retaliation on the part of other inmates will be discussed in another section.

Economic Problems of Forced Labor

As noted early in this paper, certain efforts were initiated in 1951 and thereafter aimed at making forced labor economically more rational and productive. From what evidence is available, these efforts were largely superficial, and little has been done since to make them more effective.

One such measure was the introduction of vocational training courses into the camps in 1953-54. At the same time it was stipulated that "insofar as possible," prisoners be assigned to work according to their occupational skills. The problem is that prisoners obviously are not arrested or sentenced with their skills in mind, and certain sentences imply assignment to a certain kind of work—for example, hard manual labor is an integral feature of the "severe system" of detention. The 1960 manual adds on this point: "If for some reason or other it is not possible to assign a prisoner to work according to his skill, the corrective labor institution assigns him to other kinds of work and allows him to acquire another specialization." It is clear that a primary function of the vocational training courses has been to turn professional and skilled manpower into semi-skilled workmen.[42]

The practice left over from Stalinist days of judging "occupational ability" in terms of the physical strength of prisoners apparently has not been abandoned. According to the 1960 manual, all new prisoners are classified by a medical committee as fit for "work under general conditions," for light work, for work suitable to disabled persons, or as unfit for work.

The organization of camp labor is seemingly not much different from what it was in the past. Prisoners continue to be divided into brigades, the members of which are grouped together not only while working but during meals and in the barracks. The brigade leader, who is selected by the administration, still exercises great power over the prisoners in his charge—a situation which ex-prisoners have testified was a constant source of abuse and injustice in the past. Prisoners' labor is still evaluated quantitatively in terms of "output norms," without taking into consideration the quality of work.

A number of steps were adopted during the years 1951-54 to encourage the output of convicts, but recent evidence indicates that at least some incentive measures have since been restricted. The wage earned by prisoners —a pittance that remains after various deductions are made—is no longer paid in cash: instead a system of coupons has been introduced to permit closer control over the prisoners' use of wages.[43] Moreover, the regulations under which convicts' labor can shorten prison terms (by counting a day's work as more than a day's imprisonment if the output norm is reached) have been revised along stricter lines. Previously, a day's work could be credited as up to three days of imprisonment for all camp inmates. As early as 1957 a report indicated that this maximum had been reduced and the system of credit revised on the basis of the criminal category of prisoners.[44] The 1960 manual specifies that in the case of prisoners sentenced for "dangerous crimes against the state and other serious crimes," a day's work can count henceforth as only a day and a half of detention at most; other prisoners can be credited with no more than two days' imprisonment.[45] A statement by a high Soviet official in 1958 further reveals that any such crediting of work is an optional matter granted on an individual basis by the camp authorities.[46]

[41] Information on the prisoners' committees is from the Utevski manual, pp. 212-14, and Beliaev, *op. cit.* pp. 41-42.

[42] See Utevski manual, pp. 189, 200-202, and Beliaev, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

[43] Utevski manual, pp. 186, 199-200, and Beliaev, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-47.

[44] Roshchin and Kalinin, *op. cit.*

[45] Utevski manual, p. 254.

[46] Address by Prosecutor General R. A. Rudenko, to the fifth meeting (second session) of the USSR Supreme Soviet, *supra.*

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In a broader context, one measure aimed at rationalizing prison labor was the transfer of enterprises connected with the camps to the jurisdiction of organs of the state economic administration. Such transfers were begun in 1953 but did not become general practice. According to the 1960 studies by Utevsky and Beliaev, the employment of prisoners in enterprises managed by the camp administration is the "basic type" of economic organization, as distinct from "work done under contract" by convicts hired out to enterprises under the direction of the economic administration.[47] While the proportion of production accomplished in each category is not indicated, Beliaev in a more recent article lays almost exclusive stress on the camp-administered enterprises.[48] Perhaps of all of the organizational measures aimed at making prison labor more efficient, the proposal to transfer camp enterprises to the management of organs independent of the police could have been the most fruitful in the economic sense. That it was only partially implemented may indicate the difficulties of reconciling practical economics with penal coercion.

THE HALF-HEARTEDNESS of efforts to eliminate the waste that has long characterized economic activities of the camps has aggravated other problems. One of these is the development of the remote regions that in the past have been populated chiefly by prisoners and by ex-prisoners denied permission to return to their homes. Initially it was hoped that the release of large numbers of prisoners from these areas would be offset by increasing the efficiency of camp labor. At the same time campaigns were launched to supplement the manpower in the concentration camp areas through an influx of workers from other areas, lured with offers of high pay and other inducements.[49] While on one hand these campaigns fell short of the recruitment goal, on the other the use of such "imported" high-paid labor created a further economic problem by raising production costs. An example cited in a Soviet source concerns the coal mines administered until 1953 by the Vorkuta concentration camp complex: hired miners brought in to supplement prison labor were in 1955 getting wages 50 percent higher than in the Donbass coal region, while overall production costs ran 17 percent higher than in the Donbass.[50]

It is against this background that one must view the revival of measures authorizing various bodies outside the regular courts to impose sentences of deportation and forced labor for certain offenses committed by Soviet citizens. The practice of extra-judicial sentencing was thought to have been abandoned for good with the abolition of the notorious "special conference" (*Osso*) of the Ministry of Interior in September 1953.[51] But in 1957 so-called "anti-parasite" laws were adopted by action of several Soviet republic governments authorizing groups of citizens, community committees, and village councils to sentence "physically fit, adult citizens" found to be leading an "antisocial, parasitic life" to deportation with forced labor for a period of from two to five years. Among other groups singled out were *kolkhoz* peasants neglecting work in the collective fields in order to tend their private plots.[52] Recently these laws have been amended by the republics along the lines of a decree first adopted in the RSFSR on May 4, 1961. Wordily titled a decree "on intensifying the struggle against those who avoid socially useful work and lead an antisocial and parasitic way of life," this measure specified as further targets any persons who "undermine the discipline of work," or who earn their living from use of a private automobile or from private plots adjoining their homes or farms. These people can be assigned to forced residence and work in a given district for two to five years. The sentence can be imposed by a people's court or by the personnel of an enterprise, institution, organization, collective farm or collective farm brigade.[53] Right after the measure was announced, a vigorous campaign was launched in the Soviet press against offenders as defined in the decree, indicating the importance attached by the regime to its prompt and forceful application. It is clear, then, that the Soviet authorities have resorted anew to the tactics of deportation and compulsory labor, in part to compensate for their failure to achieve economic rationality in the labor of the existing camp population.

The Price of Defiance

Among the most significant recent developments in the penal field is a decree adopted into national law on May 5, 1961, by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, extend-

[47] Utevski manual, pp. 187-88; Beliaev, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

[48] N. A. Beliaev, "Razvitie sistemy sovetskikh ispravitelno-trudovykh uchrezhdenii" (Development of the System of Soviet Corrective Labor Establishments), *Vestnik Leningradskovo universiteta*, No. 11, 1961.

[49] On this subject see Barton, *op. cit.*, pp. 367-73.

[50] As reported in Naum Jasny, "A Note on Rationality and Efficiency in the Soviet Economy," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), April 1961.

[51] See Leon Lipson, "The New Face of Socialist Legality," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1958, p. 24.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

[53] On the "anti-parasite" decrees see Lipson, "The Criminal Reconsidered," *loc. cit.*, p. 59.

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ing the capital punishment provisions of the criminal law promulgated in December 1958. The decree makes specific reference to offenses committed inside penal establishments, threatening the supreme punishment for "particularly dangerous recidivists and others sentenced for serious crimes," who "in places of detention terrorize prisoners who have chosen the path of rehabilitation," who "commit an act of aggression against the administration," or who "organize criminal groups for such purposes, who participate actively in such groups." [54]

The fact that such an amendment to the capital punishment provisions of the 1958 law was deemed necessary constitutes an unmistakable indication that prisoners continue to show resistance in the camps and other penal establishments. The terms of the decree imply that underground organizations of prisoners, which were very active in the early 1950's, continue to operate with effect against the authorities. It is also clear that accomplices af the authorities recruited from among the prisoners continue to be the target of retaliation. In this light the creation of prisoners' councils, comrades' courts and brigades for the "maintenance of order" can be seen in their proper perspective as efforts to control the camp population and to set up a network of informers to counter the underground groups. The invocation of the death penalty for retaliation against informers is analogous to action taken in the spring of 1953, on the eve of serious strikes, when the activity of underground groups was at its height: at that time the police administration circulated an order in the camps making the killing of a prisoner by a fellow-inmate punishable by death.[55] The provision in the new decree concerning "acts of aggression" against the camp authorities themselves seems to be a reference to strikes and rioting: one can only assume again that apprehension over such incidents was great enough to warrant enactment of the decree.

* * *

TOO SUM UP, the new measure on capital punishment along with various other developments discussed in this paper indicates a trend toward greater repressive discipline in Soviet penal institutions dating back to 1957—the year that large-scale releases of prisoners ceased. This trend cannot be judged in isolation: it is clearly related to the renewed insistence on disciplinary controls in the society at large, as represented by various provisions of the criminal law of 1958 and by the laws authorizing deportation of "parasitic elements." All of these developments came in the aftermath of the ferment that shook Soviet Russia in 1956 and can be viewed as part of the Khrushchev regime's decisive effort to reassert disicipline and authority.

These developments belie any claim that the Soviet system since the death of Stalin has moved in a straight line toward eliminating coercion and replacing it with persuasion. In point of fact, the methods of "coercion" and "persuasion" have always been considered to be complementary rather than contradictory. One can be intensified while the other is liberalized, depending on the circumstances, but the two remain mutually accommodating. What the Soviet authorities attempted after Stalin's death was to eliminate the blind terror that characterized his rule, and without question the excesses of mass terror vastly decreased: yet when it appeared, in the light of the 1956 events, that that process had gone too far, the pendulum swung back to some extent. If the public lives better and trembles less than in the past, it is still subject to certain imperative limitations on conduct. Indeed, a system of totalitarian one-party rule could not survive if it did not retain the power to enforce its will, however much it might ration and combine coercion with other methods of governance.

The changes instituted in Soviet penal law and administration have been made because some appeared to be useful, others necessary; their ultimate fate will depend on what seems possible, useful, or necessary in the future. "If it becomes necessary," the Assistant Prosecutor General of the USSR told Professor Berman, "we will restore the old methods." [56] While he hastened to add that in his opinion this would not be necessary, his statement reflects the naked fact that the Soviet leaders have not renounced the possibility of reversing their policy. As far as the concentration camps are concerned, the authorities have made some significant concessions toward reform, but at the same time they have tried, throughout the present period of crisis, to preserve the essential framework of the institution. The danger therefore remains that the camps might one day attain their former dimensions—if and when the Soviet leaders decide that the situation demands it.

[54] *Ibid.*

[55] See Barton, *op. cit.*, pp. 314-17, esp. 316.

[56] Berman, *op. cit.*

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That's No Lie, Comrade

By Ronald Hingley

IT WILL BE generally agreed that Soviet society has evolved a special style of public behavior which may be observed when Soviet citizens engage in diplomacy, "good will" contacts, political or cultural celebrations and the like. This style is highly original, but its creation has been assisted by many diverse influences. For example, one influence has been a tendency—natural in the members of an authoritarian society—to imitate the manner of the overall boss. Thus, under Stalin, the Russians whom one met tended to be as taciturn and inscrutable as their leader. After Stalin's death and Khrushchev's rise, they suddenly became bluff, bonhomous and clubby, reproducing the image of their new leader, homely proverbs and all.

Stalin, of course, was not a Russian at all, nor was he very much like a Russian. But in many ways Khrushchev is a typical Russian, so that his ascendancy has opened the door for elements in the Russian national character to influence the Soviet style of behavior to a greater degree than before. This style has spread to non-Russian areas whose inhabitants are often pathetic as they mechanically reproduce fashionable and required postures. To some extent the new manner has also affected Communists in the satellites and in the free world.

In the West sufficient attention has not yet been given to the important ways in which Soviet behavior has been conditioned by the Russian national character, perhaps because national character is such an elusive thing and so often provokes misleading and even offending generalizations. The assessment of a people is at best a crude and unscientific procedure, and in attempting it one must never trip into the pitfall of attributing national characteristics without discrimination to all representatives of a given nationality with whom one may come in contact. That this common fault is tactless and foolish need not, however, deter one from enquiry, and in the present instance the writer will try to rely as far as possible on the evidence of Russians about themselves.

Such an enquiry can all too easily give the impression of being "anti-Russian" when it is nothing of the sort. The fact is that humanity in the mass (on which conclusions about national character have to be based) is less prepossessing than in small doses. "Russians," "Germans" and "the British" considered in the lump are less pleasant than the Russians, Germans, and Englishmen whom one knows. Moreover, there appears to exist a law whereby, when national characteristics become institutionalized (as has happened in Soviet Russia), it is precisely the more absurd characteristics which push out the more dignified and attractive. Perhaps I can best put this in perspective by considering what might have happened if my own country, England, had undergone a Bolshevik Revolution, instead of Russia. If, as a consequence, the more famous English qualities had become features of the official Communist behavior-style, the results would obviously have been completely different from what we now find in Russia. But would they have been any less absurd? I doubt it. Yet to believe this is not necessarily to be anti-English.

The Fine Points of *"Vranyo"*

With these qualifications, we may now approach the subject at hand, which is the influence on Soviet behavior of a specific Russian characteristic—the tendency to indulge in what the Russians call *vranyo*. Just how untranslatable this is may be illustrated by reference to the two main Russian-English dictionaries, one of which renders the word as "lies, fibbing, nonsense, rot," and the other as "idle talk, twaddle." To these words may be added the Irish "blarney," which comes nearer than

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Mr. Hingley is University lecturer in Russian at Oxford University, Research Fellow of St. Antony's College, and author of several works on Soviet literature. This is his first contribution to Problems of Communism.

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any of the others, but still falls pretty wide of the mark.

Perhaps the word can best be understood by considering that *vranyo* is the more innocent of two quite distinct Russian words meaning "lies," the more serious term being *lozh*. Thus an accusation of indulging in *vranyo* is likely to be merely affectionate and adds up to little more than a charge of possessing a lively imagination ("You're kidding"). But to accuse someone of *lozh* is harsh ("You're a liar!"). The roots of both words are rich in derivatives (such as *zaviratsia,* crudely translated "to lie oneself into a condition of trance")—indeed, Russian may possess almost as big a stock of words for "lying" as Arabic has to describe different kinds of camel.

The distinction between the two main types of Russian lying is carefully drawn in one of the great prerevolutionary statements on the subject, the essay "Pan-Russian *Vranyo,*" by the short-story writer and dramatist Leonid Andreyev.[1] Andreyev claims, rather unfairly, that Russians have no talent for the more serious brand of lie (*lozh*). He says that this kind of lying is an "art, difficult and demanding intelligence, talent, character and stamina." An example of a good liar of the *lozh* type is Shakespeare's Iago, whose skill in this field—says Andreyev— is beyond the attainment of a Russian. He continues:

Yes, the Russian is incapable of telling lies (*lozh*), but he seems to be equally bereft of the capacity to tell the truth. The intermediate thing for which he feels the greatest love and tenderness resembles neither truth nor *lozh*. It is *vranyo*. Like our native aspen it pops up uninvited everywhere and chokes other varieties. Like the aspen it is completely useless both for firewood and carpentry, and also like the aspen it is sometimes beautiful.[2]

As his first example of Russian *vranyo,* Andreyev refers to a man who, after conversing normally for a long time, suddenly announces that his aunt has died. "He utters the *vranyo* and is amazed. Far from having died, his aunt is going to turn up in half an hour, and everybody knows it. He can't get any advantage out of his aunt's death, and why he uttered the *vranyo* is a mystery."

This is an example of *vranyo* at its simplest, and in this form it still seems to be flourishing. Some time ago the writer was present when a Soviet visitor began to speak to one of his British hosts about a Russian émigré known to both of them. According to the visitor, one of this émigré's sons had recently returned to the Soviet Union after a stay in Paris, had published a book (the exact title was given), had changed his name and undergone all sorts of other adventures. The host listened to this rigmarole with a straight face—thus preserving the conventions of *vranyo*—although he happened to be a close friend of the family concerned and knew that every word was untrue.

This, then, is the kind of fantasy in which Andreyev claims a national monopoly for the Russians. They are unable, according to him, to tell forceful and effective lies like Iago. Their true representative is Khlestakov, the ingenious hero of Gogol's *Inspector General,* whose skill lies in juggling with fantastic improvisations, and who, according to Andreyev, constitutes something uniquely Russian, "like a samovar."

Obviously *vranyo* is not in fact so uniquely Russian as Andreyev claims, but it certainly is an outstanding Russian characteristic and as such has been enshrined in many works of Russian literature. One of the most important 19th-century authorities on the phenomenon was Dostoyevsky, who has contributed a remarkable essay, "A Word or Two about *Vranyo.*"[3] Dostoyevsky does not draw the careful distinction made by Andreyev between *lozh* and *vranyo;* he uses the two words interchangeably—a reminder that they are at least juxtaposed if not overlapping concepts, and that one could be too pernickety in trying to draw a firm line between them. As befits his temperament, Dostoyevsky is even more scathing on the subject than Andreyev. He writes:

Not long ago I was suddenly struck by the thought that among our Russian intellectual classes the existence of a non-liar is an impossibility. The reason for this is that in Russia even completely honest people can lie. I am convinced that in other nations, for the great majority, it is only scoundrels who lie; they lie for practical advantage, *i.e.* with directly criminal aims.

Besides contributing to the theory of the subject, Dostoyevsky created some notable purveyors of *vranyo* in his novels, among whom General Ivolgin in *The Idiot* holds pride of place. Most readers will remember Ivolgin best for an experience which he recounts as having happened to him in a railway train. He tells how he was once sharing a compartment with a woman who was traveling with her lap-dog. Objecting to his cigar, she snatched it from him and threw it out of the window, upon which Ivolgin took his revenge by throwing the dog after the cigar. Unfortunately a member of Ivolgin's audience, unsympathetic to *vranyo,* breaks the conventions by pointing out that this incident had recently been reported in a Belgian newspaper, and that General Ivolgin was not concerned in it at all.

[1] "Vserossiiskoe vranyo," *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii,* St. Petersburg, 1913, Vol. V.

[2] *Ibid.,* pp. 225-26.

[3] "Nechto o vranye," *Diary of a Writer,* 1873, XV.

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The Russian lie is, accordingly, something very different from the non-Russian lie, and something much more attractive. At its best it is an art form and not at all a means of gaining personal advantage—at least this is true of *vranyo* as opposed to *lozh*.

THERE IS ANOTHER crucial point to be made about *vranyo*, and that is that in its proper form it is a two-way affair. It demands not only a purveyor of *vranyo* (the *vrun*) but also the physical presence of one or more recipients or Victims. This is one of the important respects in which *vranyo* differs from *lozh*, for *lozh* can operate perfectly well through radio broadcasts and diplomatic notes, no less than in the *tête-à-tête*. The true *vrun*, however, can only give his best in the presence of a Victim with whom he can communicate. The fact that *vranyo* is a two-way process is stressed again and again in the literature of the subject, and as the following key quotation from Dostoyevsky's essay shows, *facial expression* has an important part to play:

Have you never told an anecdote—an alleged personal experience—to the very same person who originally told that story to you about himself? Have you really forgotten how, halfway through the story, you suddenly . . . cottoned on to this fact, which was also confirmed by *the suffering glance of the listener, fixed firmly upon you (for in such cases for some reason people look into each other's eyes with tenfold intensity)*?[4]

As this passage illustrates, the relations between purveyor and Victim are of the essence of *vranyo*. Perhaps the greatest passage of *vranyo* in fiction is the scene, in Book Four of Dostoyevsky's *The Idiot*, where General Ivolgin relates to Prince Myshkin an entirely imaginary story about his supposed experiences during the Napoleonic Campaign of 1812. Ivolgin claims that Napoleon appointed him his page during the occupation of Moscow, and the high point of the *vranyo* is reached when Napoleon is described as having decided to order the French retreat on young Ivolgin's advice ("clear off home, General"). During the whole of this preposterous account, Ivolgin continues to study Myshkin's expression ("he squinted mistrustfully at the Prince," saying to him, "You are smiling, Prince—You are looking at my face. . . ," and so on.) After Ivolgin had left, the Victim "had a premonition that he [Ivolgin] belonged to that category of liars who, although they lie to the point of sensual self-indulgence and even to a condition of trance, nevertheless suspect that they are not being believed and cannot be believed." Myshkin had manfully contrived to listen to Ivolgin's absurdities with a fairly straight face, and thus (he hoped) had ministered to the General's self-respect. But he had not done well enough, for he received a note from the General that same evening breaking off all relations.

[4] Italics added.

A Trait in Evolution

Prince Myshkin's experience should serve as a warning to all Western citizens who take part in East-West contacts, if they wish to preserve the proprieties. When confronted with *vranyo*, they should assume a serious and slightly reverential expression and should at all costs avoid the errors of "face-crime"—that is, if they are to fulfill adequately their ordained role as Victim. Before examining just what this role entails, however, it is necessary to show the ways in which modern *vranyo* has departed from its prerevolutionary form, and the ways in which it has tended to become institutionalized as a feature in the behavior pattern of Soviet man.

It is only in recent years that *vranyo* has emerged as a standard element in Soviet public posture. We might with advantage grossly oversimplify here and call the age of Lenin the Age of Truth. This was so because it was also, comparatively, an age of faith. In Lenin's day when Soviet spokesmen promised the people that they faced a glorious future, that they would overtake America, and that a Communist revolution was just around the corner in Germany, they were speaking the truth, in the sense that on the whole they believed these promises to be true.

This was succeeded by the age of Stalin, the great era of *lozh*. Here was an age in which a sincere belief in anything—even in Stalin himself—could very often become a passport to the concentration camps. When Stalinist spokesmen referred to the Russian peasantry's voluntarily joining the collective farms *en masse*, this was in no sense a piece of *vranyo*. It was just a straight lie.

Only in the age of Khrushchev has Russian *vranyo* really come into its own as an influence on Soviet public behavior. This is due partly to the example of Mr. Khrushchev himself, whose statements on agriculture, catching up with America, *etc.*, often carry a strong whiff of *vranyo* (although rarely in its purest form as in General Ivolgin's story about the lap-dog). The spread of *vranyo* in the Khrushchev era derives less, however, from his personal example than from the relaxation of controls over which he has presided. As we all know, it is now possible for communication between individuals to take place on a less restricted scale than Stalin permitted, both internally (between Soviet

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citizens) and externally (between Soviet citizens and foreigners). This relaxation of controls has released a torrent of *vranyo* which had been dammed up for decades.

Vranyo has changed somewhat since Dostoyevsky's day, however. In the first place, it has been turned into much more of a ritual. The subject-matter of *vranyo* now runs in prescribed grooves, whereas in the palmy days of Dostoyevsky one could merrily improvise about whatever came into one's head. Many of the prescribed grooves will be only too familiar to readers of this journal and need not be described in detail. There are, of course, the various stock denials of Soviet propaganda: an example is the frequently-heard disclaimer that begging, tipping and prostitution exist in the Soviet Union. These, however, are only fields for "negative *vranyo*," an unimportant by-product of the genre, since it is hard for even the most experienced *vrun* to embellish the absence of something with what is a vital element in the exercise—elaborate embroidery—especially when that something does not happen to be absent at all.

For the purposes of embroidery, a positive *vranyo*-topic is needed. A good example is the fiction, widely propagated in recent years, that every summer tens of millions of Soviet workers may be seen driving their families along the main roads of the country toward some Black Sea resort "in their own cars." When listening to such a recital on one occasion, I must have been betrayed into face-crime, because the *vrun* (or rather *vrunya,* for the speaker was a woman) gave me a sharp look and quickly said: "of course there are some workers who don't yet have cars of their own."

This comment brings out a modern refinement of *vranyo* beyond the ken of Dostoyevsky's contemporaries —the "frank admission" of various Soviet "defects," which performs the function of underlining the reliability of the performance as a whole. The episode also illustrates another difference between present-day Soviet and 19th-century *vranyo*. Dostoyevsky claimed that *vranyo* was a monopoly of Russian men. Certainly this is no longer true, for here, as in other fields, the equality of the sexes has made itself felt.

The changes in *vranyo* since Dostoyevsky's day have not been all gain. In those days one got a much purer article, whereas nowadays the baffling practice has grown up of adulterating *vranyo* with large injections of truth. One finds this in the endless "building stories" which have become one of the staples of modern *vranyo,* and which no foreign visitor to Moscow can have escaped. The *vranyo* is unrolled with traditional ceremony, with stories about how there was "nothing here, nothing" except swamp and shacks a few months ago, whereas now there is a vast new suburb containing so many tens of thousands of square meters of living space. Such stories are told with all the traditional accompaniments of *vranyo*—the expansive gestures, the piercing glance, the swelling neck, and that curious constricted voice which suggests that the speaker is on the point of choking. But something is wrong, for the apartment blocks are actually there, as the Victim can see with his own eyes. In a way this is not playing fair, although of course *vranyo's* loss has been the Muscovite's gain. One is reminded that Potemkin organized his famous "villages" in a manner more strictly in accord with the canons of classical *vranyo.*

One should not, however, underestimate the element of *vranyo* in the traditional construction stories. Exactly the same stories, told with the same physical symptoms on the part of the narrators, were put out in earlier years when, as is now openly admitted, the building program was grossly inadequate. It could of course be argued that what we now find involves, not an adulteration of *vranyo,* but an even greater sophistication. In earlier times *vranyo* had to be untrue. But nowadays its connection with truth has become so obscure that it no longer really matters.

The writer is not sure, incidentally, that the aims of *vranyo* are best served by the air of utter surprise with which so many Soviet spokesmen dilate on Soviet achievements. At any rate it has never seemed unbelievable in a practical sense (as Soviet spokesmen often imply by their manner) that things like apartment blocks and factories can be built under the Soviet system, any more than it is unbelievable that they can be built under any other system. Another baffling Soviet practice is the habit of talking about such spectacular feats as the launching of sputniks and cosmonauts with exactly the same mannerisms and intonations as are traditionally associated with the delivery of *vranyo* in its purest form.

To Believe and Not to Believe

One important question arises at this stage: To what extent does the Soviet *vrun* believe his own *vranyo?* He obviously differs from the purveyor of *lozh,* who knows perfectly well that he is lying. He also differs from those among official Soviet contact-men,[5] espe-

[5] By "contact-men" I mean those Soviet citizens—interpreters, Intourist guides, delegates and the like—who are, as it were, officially licensed to communicate (or fail to communicate) with foreigners.

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cially numerous among the younger generation, who tell the truth in the sense that they themselves believe what they say. The *vrun* in this respect occupies an intermediate position. It would not be quite true to say that he simultaneously believes and does not believe the *vranyo* which he disseminates. Rather the case may often be that he does not believe it at all as he begins his harangue, but, as it were, suddenly becomes convinced by his own eloquence in mid-career, a phenomenon which we may term the "take-off." Here Dostoyevsky has more evidence to provide. One of his most remarkable prevaricators is Fyodor Pavlovich Karamazov in *The Brothers Karamazov*. Of such people Dostoyevsky comments:

Old liars, who have spent their whole lives acting, have moments when they put on such a performance that they genuinely shake and weep with emotion, despite the fact that at the same moment or only a second afterwards they might be able to whisper to themselves, "You're lying, you shameless old man."

Similarly, in his essay on *vranyo,* Dostoyevsky, addressing a typical Russian *vrun,* says:

You have told such fantastic things that, though you have actually started to believe in yourself halfway through your story (for one always does begin to believe in oneself halfway through a story), nevertheless when you go to bed at night and have enjoyable memories about the pleasant impression made on your listener, you suddenly pause and remark involuntarily, "Heavens, how I lied! [*vral*]"

It therefore seems likely that the typical *vrun* at any given moment either believes or does not believe wholeheartedly in what he is saying, and that he oscillates between these two conditions. Since the more distressing physical symptoms to which reference was made above, and which include the strained voice, bulging eyes and purple face, are associated with the period of "take-off" (during which the *vrun* comes to believe himself), it seems possible that the recurrent gusts of clear-headedness are nature's way of providing relief.

IN CONSIDERING this question, we are incidentally touching on a particularly elusive general problem—the nature of belief. This is a puzzle which is intractable enough in the context of Western democratic society. It is doubly so in a totalitarian context, for the simple reason that not enough is known about what happens to a man's brain when he is compelled year in and year out to repeat statements that he knows to be untrue.

Of course, we do know from the evidence of refugees from Communist countries that in many cases per-

A LITTLE *VRANYO* GOES A LONG WAY



— Как попасть на завод?
— Идите мимо бани, магазина, от пекарни сверните направо, там около клуба и увидите...

—" How do I get to the factory?"
—"You pass the public bath, then the store, after the bakery you turn right, over there, near the club, and you will see...."

(Signs read clockwise: Public Bath Construction, Bakery Construction, Club Construction, Construction, Laundry Construction. Store Construction.)

—From Krokodil *(Moscow), Jan. 20, 1962.*

sons of high intelligence have emerged from years of conditioning surprisingly unscathed. Some managed to adapt themselves to their environment—as one of them once told me —by developing a form of "controlled schizophrenia" whereby private thoughts and compulsory official lies were, so to speak, confined in separate compartments of the brain. (The fact that Rus-

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sians have had to perform this balancing trick in respect to two different brands of lie—*vranyo* and *lozh*—may perhaps have placed them under an added strain as compared to citizens of Communist countries recognizing only one kind of lie.)

In some cases, on the other hand, the repeated acting of a false part seems to wear a groove in the actor's brain, so that he eventually comes to believe things which he originally rejected. This may well be a dangerous process, as suggested—again by Leonid Andreyev—in *Thought* (*Mysl*), one of the most terrifying short stories ever written. The story tells of a man who makes up his mind to murder his wife. In order to avoid being punished as a criminal, he decides to provide himself with an alibi in advance, by faking insanity. He therefore indulges in a series of carefully planned eccentricities, none of them serious enough to get him confined in a mental home but sufficiently suggestive of an unbalanced mind to make it appear obvious, after the murder, that he had been mad all along. The trouble is that he acts his part as a madman so convincingly that he eventually becomes a real lunatic or something indistinguishable from one—an important point of the story being the impossibility of assessing his true mental state.

A lifelong addiction to *vranyo* may very well produce some similar kind of dislocation, a possibility which should remind one to be on guard against the natural temptation to regard the Soviet *vrun* as a wholly comic character. He might instead be a Pagliacci, increasingly ill at ease each time he dons the motley. General Ivolgin, perhaps the greatest *vrun* in Russian literature, is in many ways a tragic figure, but even Ivolgin was not compelled to indulge in *vranyo* by forces outside himself. Such a compulsion must, at least in a minority of cases, be an intolerable burden. In this connection I am reminded of a remark made by Mr. Peter Wiles in a talk given at Oxford shortly after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, of which he had been an eye-witness. On being asked to give the main reason why the Hungarians revolted, he replied simply: "They were fed up with telling lies."

The nature of belief in a Communist society is overlaid by an additional complicating factor. It seems to be an essential feature of human beliefs that they should be capable of being formulated in intelligible language. Yet here we are reminded that the most ferocious and sustained of all Soviet attacks has been mounted, not against *kulaks,* Trotskyites or Western imperialists, but against language itself as a means of communication. The Soviets have not merely turned language upside down but have atomized it with a 50-megaton bomb and run a harrow over the débris. In the destruction of language as a vehicle of thought, *vranyo* has obviously played a less important part than *lozh,* but its role should not be overlooked. And the destruction has been so complete that it must be difficult for many of the simpler-minded Soviet citizens, conditioned all their lives by the confusing verbal symbols fired at them almost from the cradle by Soviet propaganda organs, to possess anything which can seriously be termed belief of any kind. If many Russians do not know whether they are coming or going, this is by no means just because they happen to have only a single verb to cover both concepts. To some extent, therefore, the question of how far the Soviet *vrun* believes his own *vranyo* collapses before it can be answered.

Counterfeit *Vranyo*

One feature of modern *vranyo* that distinguishes it from the brand current in Dostoyevsky's day is the fact, already alluded to, that it has now become compulsory for wide sections of the community, whereas in the nineteenth century it was to a much greater extent a gratuitous and voluntary indulgence. If we combine this with another point made earlier—namely, that many a Soviet *vrun* must be irked or painfully distressed by the obligation to produce specified forms of *vranyo* on specified occasions—we shall be in a position to explain another aspect of Soviet *vranyo:* the element of extravagant exaggeration.

This can best be understood by trying to put oneself inside the skin of an internally protesting Soviet *vrun* who is disgusted or humiliated at being compelled to produce *vranyo* like a robot. He wants to protest somehow and to dissociate himself from the performance. Yet he is not prepared to face the political penalties for failing to produce *vranyo* at all or—still worse—substituting the truth in its place. But there is a kind of protest he can make with relative safety: by overdoing his *vranyo,* he can as it were, "guy" the whole absurd process, dissociate himself mentally from his humiliating position, and thus preserve a measure of self-respect. He is fairly safe in doing this because no one can be absolutely certain that the exaggeration is deliberate. Moreover, although interfering "activists" can easily make things difficult for someone who shows insufficiency of zeal, they are in a less favorable position when confronted by someone who shows zeal in excess, however synthetic. In attempting to embarrass him, they might easily get themselves into trouble.

Soviet literature provides many examples of such counterfeit displays of excessive zeal by way of pro-

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test—perhaps none more striking than that which takes place at the death-bed of Professor Skutarevsky's son in Leonid Leonov's novel *Skutarevsky*. The son, implicated in counterrevolutionary activity, has attempted to commit suicide by shooting himself in the stomach. As he lies in the hospital, dying and unable to speak, his father directs at him a long and zealous political harangue. It can be taken as certain that Leonov was not serious in writing this passage as well as many other similar passages in his works; rather he was indulging in satire against indoctrinational literature. This was daring in a way—for much of this material was published under Stalin—but it was still fairly safe: for what censor would dare accuse him of having written it with tongue in cheek?

Another example of counterfeit *vranyo* was recently passed on to me by a colleague, who had run across it in a 1946 issue of the publication *Sovetskaia Latviia*. A Russian circus had been visiting Latvia, and the Latvian reporter embellished his story about it with a contrast between the methods of Western and Soviet lion tamers. Whereas the Western lion tamer would only enter the cage bearing whips and guns, said the report, his Soviet counterpart needed none of these adjuncts since the moral superiority of Soviet man was quite enough to dominate the king of beasts unaided. Clearly the writer of this article was expressing a protest, and such protestive mimicry may well play a much bigger part in inspiring Soviet *vranyo* than one might at first imagine. It is not always so unquestionably present as in the two examples just given; in fact, it is only rarely possible to be absolutely certain that one has detected a real case of spurious *vranyo*. This very fact helps to boost the effectiveness of *vranyo* in what is, from the authorities' viewpoint, its main role—the destruction of language as a vehicle of communication.

The Role of the Listener

So much for the *vrun's* attitude toward his own *vranyo*. We must now examine further his attitude toward his Victim. It has already been noted that he expects to be listened to respectfully and seriously, and it seems to the writer that this much is his due. Many Soviet contact-men are decent enough people, and if it is part of their official duty to deluge the foreigner with *vranyo*, that is hardly sufficient reason for making them feel foolish by showing obvious signs of disbelief, still less by trying to catch them out and, as it were, rub their noses in their own romancings. It may be irritating to be told—as has often happened to foreign students in Russia—that Soviet readers in Moscow's Lenin Library can easily obtain access to any book they want, including the works of Trotsky, Zinoviev, and George Orwell. But this again is no excuse for behaving as some Victims have been known to do—quite naturally, but surely mistakenly—in making the offending *vrun* show them all the various catalogues in order to expose the whole story as an invention. Of course it was; but some things do not need disproving. And in attempting to demonstrate the falsehood of a given piece of *vranyo*, it is all too easy to insult some harmless *vrun* by implying that it was a piece of *lozh* all along.

Even accredited Western experts on the Soviet Union have not always avoided such tactlessness. They have been known to go to immense unnecessary pains in order to refute Soviet statements or handouts which everyone on both sides with a fraction of sense recognized all along as undiluted *vranyo*. It is as absurd to spend time and energy refuting many blatant forms of modern Soviet *vranyo* as it would be to delve into the archives of the 1812 Campaign in order to disprove General Ivolgin's claim to have served as Napoleon's page.

Soviet visitors abroad do not commit such errors of tactlessness by cruelly stripping the facade off a good piece of *vranyo* uttered by their Western hosts. Not that Western citizens usually have the talent or inclination to go in for *vranyo* on anything like the Russian scale, but the point here is that many Russians think they do. This is a product of the "mirror-image psychology" (of which the author has written elsewhere),[6] whereby the general run of less perceptive Soviet citizens, when traveling abroad, tend to miss the reality in what is around them and to see only an image of their own society. The process entails exaggerating the defects of certain Western societies (lack of freedom, the aggressiveness of leading statesmen, inequalities of income, *etc.*) to the point where they almost begin to reach Soviet levels in the visitor's mind. Mirror-image psychology can be carried to fantastic lengths, as when, for example, it is implied that the number of Negroes lynched in the United States exceeds the number of Soviet citizens killed by Stalin.

In view of this mirror-image psychology, it is not surprising that Soviet visitors to Western countries often imagine that they are being treated to an exhibition of Western *vranyo* when in fact they are not. The writer has often noticed this when conducting Soviet visitors around Oxford colleges. Sometimes one has only to make the most innocent remark of indisputable veracity (such as "this is a typical undergraduate's room") to see a change come over the visitor's face as he composes it in an attitude of respectful seriousness—which

[6] *Under Soviet Skins*, London, 1961, p. 174.

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does not, however, entirely conceal his complete disbelief. *The vranyo has begun,* he has concluded, and as one man of the world talking to another he proposes to receive it with due solemnity—after all, his own turn will come later. There has to be some give and take in these matters. For, as Dostoyevsky enunciated nearly a century ago, "A delicate reciprocity of *vranyo* is almost the first condition of Russian society—of all Russian meetings, parties, clubs, associations, *etc.*"

Tactful Tactics

While the Soviet *vrun* does not expect to be disproved or otherwise shown up and in my opinion is entitled to this courtesy, the question remains: Does he expect to be believed? Most certainly not. In fact, there could be no greater mistake than to imagine that *vranyo* is meant to be taken seriously: it is meant to be accepted with a serious and respectful countenance, but that is an entirely different thing. This may seem a surprising state of affairs, but a moment's thought will show why it is not quite so unnatural after all.

By believing literally a piece of *vranyo* (a phenomenon surprisingly common among the more gullible Western visitors to Russia), the Victim levels a deadly insult at his host's inventive powers, implying in effect that these have not been called into play at all. There is no fun in feeding *vranyo* to an innocent who happily swallows it all with an expression of beatific silliness on his face. For this reason most Soviet contact-men, when dealing with Western visitors, prefer having to contend with a tactful skeptic rather than with a dupe or fellow-traveler, both of which are types that have always aroused deep suspicion in the Soviet mind. There must be something wrong (it is felt) with someone who swallows the official Soviet line while under no compulsion whatever to do so.

If the Victim is expected to show neither belief nor disbelief when confronted with *vranyo,* then what *is* he supposed to show? This is perhaps the most interesting question raised by *vranyo,* and also the most difficult to answer. Roughly, what the Victim is called upon to do is to convey subtly, almost telepathically, that he is aware of what is going on, that he appreciates the performance and does not despise his Soviet host simply because the conditions of the latter's office obliged him to put it on.

The reward for such tact can be great, for it leads to that curious intimacy which can exist only between Soviet Russians, or between a Soviet Russian and a foreigner who has taken the trouble to instruct himself in the niceties of *vranyo.* The conversation ripples on about housing schemes, workers' pensions—even about hordes of Soviet holiday-makers converging on the Black Sea coast in their own cars. But, behind the trumpetings of *vranyo,* an elusive and scarcely audible counterpoint is being played and a genuine human relationship is being created. Exactly what is the substance of this almost subconscious communion I am not even sure. At times Russians seem to be projecting a certain skepticism about the Soviet system, for of course some Soviet contact-men are more or less disaffected beneath the public postures which they are compelled to assume. Yet such telepathic communication seems to be possible also with contact-men who appear entirely free from disaffection.

Since rules are meant to have exceptions, the author will perhaps be excused for proceeding to qualify the impression he may have given earlier that a piece of Soviet *vranyo* should under no circumstances be punctured by the Victim. If such puncturings are administered with a proper choice of timing and to a carefully selected *vrun,* they can sometimes lead to delightful rapprochements. This may even happen accidentally. An English visitor to Moscow once was asking an Intourist girl in my presence to direct him to a typical cafe used by ordinary Moscow workers. She was solemnly sending him off to the Ararat or the Aragve—a superb piece of off-the-cuff *vranyo* since this was like directing him to the Ritz or the Waldorf-Astoria. I do not know whether it was she or I who started laughing first, but it was clear we were laughing about the same thing.

Overheard in Moscow

A Russian peasant once went to a priest and asked him for a definition of dialectics. Said the priest: "If two men come to your house, one with dirty hands, one with clean hands, and you have only enough water for one of them to wash, to whom would you give the water?" To which the peasant replied: "To the one with dirty hands." "No," said the priest, "you'd give it to the man who cares the most about his cleanliness. Now the next day, if the same two men come to you and you have enough water for only one, would you give it to the man with the clean hands or to the man with the dirty hands?" The peasant replied confidently, "To the one with clean hands." "No," said the priest, "you would give it to the one with the dirty hands because his hands are dirty. Do you understand?" "No," said the peasant, thoroughly confused. "Well," said the priest, "that's dialectics."

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This also brings out another basic feature of *vranyo*. Although it may have become partly a tragic phenomenon under communism, it was, in its original form, meant to be enjoyed. At its best it still is a means of adding spice to life. Andreyev, in his article quoted earlier, makes this point well when he has one of his imaginary *vruni* say: "I don't care if people do find me out [in *vranyo*]. It's only right that truth should triumph. I value truth and respect it. But before one is found out, *one does seem to come to life for a moment.*" [7] Indeed, the fact that *vranyo* is still so much in vogue nowadays may well be precisely because it is a means of enlivening the drabness of Soviet life—a particularly appropriate means, since the official doctrine that life in the Soviet Union is somehow more lively and exhilarating than elsewhere is itself an extreme example of *vranyo*.

The Premier *Vrun*

So far we have examined modern Soviet *vranyo* primarily in the context of personal relations between Western citizens and Soviet representatives in cultural contacts, on delegations, and the like. But there is also, of course, the much wider field of Russian-to-Russian *vranyo*, as well as the intermediate situation in which a piece of Russian-to-Russian *vranyo* is staged in the presence of a foreigner. Many superb instances of the latter fell in the path of Mr. Richard Nixon when he made his eventful visit to Russia in 1959 as Vice-President of the United States. The visit had been preceded by some American agitation on behalf of the peoples "enslaved" under communism. This prelude provided a wonderful opening for Mr. Khrushchev, who, when his mind is not on more important things, yields to no one in his mastery of *vranyo*.

The Soviet Premier was more than equal to this occasion, conducting his distinguished guest along the Moscow River in a boat and halting wherever he saw a group of Soviet holiday-makers to ask them demonstratively whether or not they considered themselves "slaves." To this a laughing "No!" was everywhere the unanimous response. If my memory of the press reports serves me correctly, Mr. Nixon at one point complained to his host that this performance had been enacted no less than twelve times. But in drawing attention to this rich episode, I am not trying to imply that in fact these Soviet holiday-makers all considered themselves enslaved, for that would be to suggest too much of a direct connection (albeit an inverted one) between *vranyo* and the truth. Still less am I suggesting that the encounters had been rigged or rehearsed in advance. That would not have been necessary, for Mr. Khrushchev could rely on the Russian's instinctive feel for a *vranyo*-situation, combined with prudence and the Russian love of gulling the foreigner, to carry the demonstration through.

Similar demonstrations may be enacted on more domestic occasions. For instance, one took place at the opening of the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in Moscow on October 17, 1961. As *The Times* (London) delicately put it on the following day, Mr. Khrushchev "could allow himself the quaintly democratic gesture of peering into the vast hall as he asked whether there were any objections to the lists of names proposed for the conference Presidium. 'Help me,' he asked, 'Are there any objections? The hall is big.' "

A reference back to one of our 19th century authorities brings out another way in which traditional Russian *vranyo* has become institutionalized under Soviet conditions. Andreyev writes:

> **Pan-Russian fatuous *vranyo* has even instituted special festivals for itself. These are jubilees. No single Western European invention has taken hold so firmly amongst us, and none has received such a specifically Russian coloring.**

To jubilees Andreyev joins anniversary celebrations in honor of "a single wetting in the rain" and "ten-year anniversaries of the introduction of trouser-straps and of the abolition of high heels." Such anniversaries are now attached more specifically to cultural and political occasions, but they are certainly no less numerous, as reference to the Soviet press abundantly shows. Nor does the attendant atmosphere seem to have changed greatly from that which caused Andreyev to be bitterly offended in his national pride "by those who have made Baron Münchhausen the allegedly unapproachable ideal of the *vrun*."

In touching briefly on the wider political use of Soviet *vranyo*, the author has the feeling of leaving the narrow channel of this essay for the hazards of an uncharted ocean. But no attempt will be made here to do the charting. Let it suffice to note that Soviet agriculture and the perennial topic of catching up with America are two particularly rich fishing-grounds. But the richest ground of all is, of course, that which embraces the long-standing Soviet claims to the possession of freedom of elections, of speech and press, together with the associated presentation of Soviet society as an ideal kind of liberal, democratic community like something dreamed up by a celestial *troika* consisting of Pericles, George Washington, and John Stuart Mill.

[7] Italics added.

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Touchstone

The Jewish Problem in the Soviet Union,
by B. Z. Goldberg.
Crown Publishers, New York, 1961.

Reviewed by Robert Conquest

THE ISSUE OF Soviet anti-Semitism has recently been given great publicity both in the USSR and on this side of the Iron Curtain as a result of Yevgeni Yevtushenko's poem "Babi Yar." [1] It will be remembered that Babi Yar, near Kiev, was the scene of a massacre of Jews by the Nazis. Its present significance is the neglect of the place by the Soviet Government, which erected no monument to the 130,000 victims, allowing the area to become partly a refuse dump and partly a stretch scheduled for a football field. Yevtushenko's poem, as published, seems to have omitted some of the sharper phrases which occurred in his public reading of it. Even so, it is quite plainly a criticism not of the past but of present-day anti-Semitism in the USSR. Its first line, "There are no memorials over Babi Yar," sets the tone. The Soviet press attacked the poet for insulting by omission "the memory of Soviet people slain during the war."

The total suppression of Yiddish culture in the Soviet Union—starting in 1948 and culminating in 1952 with the execution of all the leading Yiddish writers, ostensibly for having conspired to turn the Crimea into a secessionist Jewish state—has not yet been remedied. In fact, Khrushchev has personally spoken against any revival of Yiddish, though a very limited amount of Yiddish printing is now again permitted—and that, as explained by Khrushchev, only as a concession to "our foreign friends." [2] Nor have the victims of the Crimean Affair, though admittedly innocent, ever been publicly rehabilitated. In the mid-1950's some of their books began to reappear—most of them not in the original Yiddish, but in Russian translations. I have before me a new edition of Feffer's poems. In the introduction no reference is made to his tragic fate, and it even speaks of "his biography—a natural one for a Soviet writer."

Soviet anti-Semitism may be thought of as combining two strands. The first is simply the old irrational hostility to Jews. Its persistence among the Russian people is a force which cynical rulers are as happy as ever to make use of. But it is part of their own make-up, too: the old writer Paustovsky, for instance, spoke openly during the "Thaw" about the "pogromist" jokes which were a staple of the conversation of officialdom, in his own personal experience.[3] Its second and more political component is the incompatibility between the Jews as a people and totalitarianism: to put it simply, a monolithic culture finds Jewry indigestible. Soviet anti-Semitism is not the "modern" pseudo-scientific race theory and *Blutgefühl;* rather, it is comparable to the anti-Semitism of the Middle Ages, which was characterized by aversion to a culture or a nation, not a "race." This has an advantage in that no justification could possibly be found for anything like the gas chambers. And it means that in theory a Jew who becomes completely *déraciné* can be forgiven, just as in the time of the Inquisition—even though in practice it is rare for a Jew to be truly accepted by the ruling elite.

The difficulty about Jews from the Soviet point of view is obvious enough. The Jewish cultural temperament is international, argumentative, and unimpressed by appeals to commit suicide. And so the Soviet authorities have the worst of both worlds in their attitude to

[1] *Literaturnaia gazeta,* September 19, 1961. For a review of the developments following the publication of Yevtushenko's poems, see William Korey, "A Soviet Poet as Rebel," *The New Republic* (Washington, D.C.), January 8, 1962.

[2] In September of last year a new Yiddish bi-monthly, *Sovyetish heymland,* made its appearance in Moscow. None of the other pre-1948 cultural institutions, such as theaters, schools, newspapers, etc., has been allowed to reopen.

[3] Referred to in *The Spectator* (London), April 26, 1957. The original speech was not printed in the Soviet Union, though denounced there in general terms.

British poet and specialist on the USSR, Mr. Conquest is author of The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities *(Macmillan, London, and St. Martin's Press, New York, 1960) and* Courage of Genius—The Pasternak Affair *(Collins and Harvill Press, London, 1961).*

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Jews. They press for assimilation, yet at the same time their general passport regulations make it necessary for Jews to be so identified in their passports.

Communities that really have trouble with a "Jewish" problem are those whose collective minds are too tidy. An ideology which cannot bear the existence of contradictions or loose ends finds itself seeking a "line"; and none such ever fits the facts. In Great Britain, for example, a Jew is not treated as, and is not, a worse citizen because he has a religion or traditions which mean nothing to the majority—any more than is, say, a Scotsman with his devotion to the genealogy and bagpipe calls of some Rosshire clan. It is a curious reflection that a Jew could be Conservative Prime Minister in 19th-century England and cannot be—as has been openly admitted (see Khrushchev quotation at the end of the review)—the leading figure in 20th-century "Marxist" Russia. The advantage Conservatism has over Soviet Marxism is not so much that it is truer, or more idealistic, or more modern, but simply that it is less committed to definite—that is limited—ideas. It would be incorrect to deduce from this that the reviewer is either a Conservative or a Jew.

MR. GOLDBERG'S *The Jewish Problem in the Soviet Union* has two main themes. The first is Stalin's destruction of Jewish culture, accompanied by the execution of the leading Yiddish writers. The second is the milder, but equally persistent, present-day persecution of Soviet Jewry as a whole. This involves not only discrimination against the Jew in all fields because of his origin, but also continuous campaigns against Jewish culture and restrictions on Jewish religion which are far harsher than similar actions against the other religions.

Mr. Goldberg shows the extraordinarily unfair position in which the Jews find themselves. As he says, a Gentile accused of corruption appears simply as an indi-

BABI YAR

by Yevgeni Yevtushenko

There are no memorials over Babi Yar—
The steep slope is the only gravestone.
I am afraid.
Today I am as old in years as the Jewish people.
It seems to me now that I am a Jew.
And now, crucified on the cross, I die
And to this very day I bear the marks of the nails.
It seems to me that I am Dreyfus.
The worthy citizenry denounces me and judges me.
I am behind prison bars.
I am trapped, hunted, spat upon, reviled!
And good ladies in dresses flounced with Brussels lace
Shrieking, poke umbrellas in my face.
It seems to me that I am a boy in Byelostok,
Blood flows and spreads across the floor.
Reeking of onion and vodka,
The leading lights of the saloon bar
Are on the rampage.
Kicked aside by a boot, I am helpless:
I plead with the pogrom thugs in vain.
To roars of "Beat the Yids, and save Russia"
A shopkeeper is beating up my mother.
O my Russian people!
I know that you are really international
But those with unclean hands
Have often loudly taken in vain
Your most pure name.
I know how good is my native land
And how vile it is that, without a quiver in their veins,
The antisemites styled themselves with pomp
"The union of the Russian people"!
It seems to me that I am Anna Frank,
As frail as a twig in April.
And I am full of love
And I have no need of empty phrases.
I want us to look at each other,
How little we can see or smell,
—Neither the leaves on the trees nor the sky.
But we can do a lot.
We can tenderly embrace in a dark room.
Someone is coming? Don't be afraid
—It is the noise of spring itself.
Come to me, give me your lips.
Someone is forcing the door?
—No, it is the breaking up of the ice . . .
Wild grasses rustle over Babi Yar.
The trees look down sternly, like judges.
Everything here shrieks silently
and, taking off my cap,
I feel how gradually I am turning grey.
And I myself am nothing but a silent shriek
Over the thousands of thousands buried in this place.
I am every old man who was shot here.
I am every boy who was shot here.
No part of me will ever forget any of this!
Let the "Internationale" ring out
When the last antisemite on earth is buried.
There is no Jewish blood in mine,
But I am hated by every antisemite as a Jew,
And for this reason,
I am a true Russian!

—Translated from the Russian by Max Hayward

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vidual, but when the culprit is of Jewish origin, special care is taken to so identify him in the press, thus by implication placing the blame on the Jewish people as a whole. The "Mingrelian Conspiracy" did not incriminate the entire Georgian nationality. The Crimean Affair and the Doctors' Plot, however, were used against the whole of Jewry.[4]

Another informative and interesting part of the book is that which describes the special persecution visited on the Jewish religion. Its physical necessities are made virtually unobtainable. And the extraordinary illiterateness of Soviet attacks on it is documented by dozens of quotations. It seems clear that the average Agitprop writer who is assigned to deal with these questions simply does not bother with the facts, as he would if Christianity were the target. On August 9, 1960, for example, the Dagestan newspaper *Kommunist*—the party organ of a republic of a million and a half inhabitants—asserted in an attack on Judaism that "a Jew who does not drink the blood of Muslims at least once a year is not considered a true believer." Retraction was obtained with great difficulty, a month later. Even then the editor and writer were absolved of "ill will" and allowed to plead "ignorance." This particular case is, of course, an extreme one, in which the party's representatives obviously and grossly put themselves in the wrong. Its real significance is that it illuminates the general atmosphere. It can only have been written in a general ambience of official anti-Semitism of the coarsest kind.

Mr. Goldberg, then, provides a great deal of information which is as illuminating as it is depressing. But in one important respect a strong reservation is in order. Mr. Goldberg was extremely friendly to the Soviet Union up to the late 1940's. He was in close contact with the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee during the war and the immediate post-war period. When the Committee was dissolved and its members arrested, and especially later on, when most of them were shot and he himself was named as their link with American espionage, he naturally underwent a certain revulsion. And here we come to a difficulty not uncommon among writers whose discovery that bad things go on in the Soviet Union is a little belated: he is inclined to reserve his deepest sympathy for the victims of the Crimean Affair —for the old Stalinist Lozovsky and the Yiddish writers like Itzik Feffer, who had been strong supporters of the old dictator till he turned on them. These men certainly deserve our sympathies. But I find it deplorable that Mr. Goldberg has not a word for those splendid Jewish libertarian socialists, Henrik Erlich and Viktor Alter, who were wrongfully executed only a few years previously. Things have come to a pretty pass if it is felt that the Russians can only be blamed for executing their loyal supporters and are fully justified in killing political opponents.[5]

IN A SENSE the most depressing part of Mr. Goldberg's book is where he quotes Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders in various conversations they had with foreign delegations in 1956. They were evidently going out of the way to demonstrate their "progressive" views on Jews. Mikoyan said:

There is no Jewish problem in the Soviet Union, and if there is no Jewish cultural life it is the fault of the Jews themselves. . . . In my country all peoples are absolutely free to develop their cultural activities, the Jews like the others. However, the Jews have integrated themselves into the Russians, and it is not our affair. The Jewish writers regard themselves as Russians and write in Russian. There is no Jewish problem in the Soviet Union. This problem has been invented by people who desire to stir up difficulties and hamper the establishment of cordial relations.

[4] The "Mingrelian conspiracy," as was revealed by Khrushchev in his "secret speech" to the 20th Party Congress (February 1956), was a frame-up case against a group of Georgian leaders accused in 1951 of forming a nationalist anti-Soviet organization. (See this author's *Power and Policy in the USSR*, Macmillan, New York, 1961, p. 140.) It should also be added that Mr. Goldberg is wrong in thinking that the deportation of the Volga Germans was not accompanied by similar measures against all the other Germans in the Soviet Union. Nor does the reinstatement of German cultural institutions of which he speaks so sanguinely amount to much. Nevertheless, at the present time the Germans are not subjected to anything like the onslaughts directed against the Jews.

It should be noted that, in general, outside his special knowledge, Mr. Goldberg falls into a good deal of dubious speculation. Thus he holds that the "plots" of the postwar period were concocted by an extreme anti-Western faction in the leadership, which convinced Stalin that the Americans were out to get him. Similarly, he claims that Kirov's murder was engineered by these sinister background figures, who persuaded Stalin that the opposition had gone terrorist. There is no reason whatever to believe this. All that is known of the Kirov affair shows that Stalin was the prime mover—even Khrushchev openly suggested this in his speech at the 22nd Party Congress. This revival of the notion of the fairly innocent "little white father" misled by wicked councillors is quite pointless.

[5] Erlich and Alter were leaders of the Jewish Socialist "Bund" in prewar Poland. Arrested in 1939 by the Soviet authorities on the ground of being "English spies," they were released after the Nazi attack on the USSR and charged with organizing what later became known as the Soviet Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. Within a short time, however, they were rearrested—this time as "German spies"—and executed.

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On the other hand, Furtseva said that it was necessary to restrict Jews in certain sectors "because they have formed too high a percentage in the personnel. . . ." And according to Khrushchev, "Should the Jews want to occupy the foremost positions in our republics now, it would, naturally, be taken amiss by the indigenous inhabitants. . . ." [6]

It will be seen at once that something is wrong. The Jew has been fully assimilated according to Mikoyan, yet he is still discriminated against for nationality reasons according to both the others. (It is an ironic commentary on Khrushchev's remark that "non-indigenous" inhabitants—i.e., Russians—are regularly appointed to high positions in the national republics, while many a non-Ukrainian is ruled by an "enko" from Khrushchev's old fief.)

To the Jewish reader, the interest of the book is obvious. To the rest of us it is only a little less so. For the attitude of a society to its Jewry—to that stubborn, particular culture, nation, tradition, or whatever one likes to call it—is a touchstone of that society's decency and humanity. On this test, as on so many others, the Soviet Union has, up to the present, failed disgracefully.

[6] Quoted remarks of Mikoyan, Furtseva, and Khrushchev as given in Mr. Goldberg's book.

The Chinese Puzzle

Red China—An Asian View,
by Sripati Chandra-sekhar.
F. A. Praeger, New York, 1961.

Awakened China,
by Felix Greene.
Doubleday & Co., New York, 1961.

Hurricane from China,
by Denis Warner.
Macmillan, New York, 1961.

Reviewed by Michael Lindsay

OF THE THREE books under review, Dr. Sripati Chandra-sekhar's *Red China—An Asian View* and Mr. Felix Greene's *Awakened China* are at least superficially similar in that both are largely reports of the authors' impressions of the domestic Chinese scene gained from rather brief visits to Communist China in recent years. The third, Mr. Denis Warner's *Hurricane from China,* is primarily concerned with the external impact of developments in Communist China and the threat which they pose to China's non-Communist Asian neighbors and the West.

Professor Lindsay, now on the staff of the American University, Washington, D.C., is the author of China and the Cold War (*Melbourne University Press, 1955*) *and* Is Peaceful Coexistence Possible? (*Michigan State University Press, 1960*).

Dr. Chandra-sekhar, an Indian sociologist and demographer, spent the winter of 1958-59 in Communist China, having once before visited the country in 1940, before the advent of Communist rule. Mr. Greene, a British-born correspondent now residing in the United States, twice visited China under communism, once in 1957 and again, for four months, in the summer of 1960. Neither of these two authors had appreciable background knowledge of China, and both were dependent on official interpreters and guides for their contacts and movements while in the country. Mr. Warner is an Australian journalist who has never visited mainland China but has worked and travelled extensively in the adjacent areas.

In some of their observations Dr. Chandra-sekhar and Mr. Greene concur. They agree in reporting rapid industrial progress and large-scale construction projects, remarkable improvement in such fields as public health, and a high degree of tidiness and discipline. But in many other important respects both their observations and their general conclusions are in direct contradiction. Dr. Chandra-sekhar only claims to present "an Asian view" of Chinese Communist life, and though one can find inaccuracies in his book—explicable by his lack of background knowledge—*Red China* appears to be a straightforward statement of the impressions and views of a man clearly sympathetic with liberal democracy.

Mr. Greene, on the other hand, claims that his own book "in all important respects . . . presents a fair

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and honest account of what is going on in China today" (p. 389); and his publisher, on the jacket, labels the book "a report in depth" about "The Country Americans Don't Know," giving "The TRUTH about what is really happening in China today." Such sweeping claims invite careful examination. And even though Americans cannot go to China and see for themselves whether Mr. Greene's observations are accurate, many of those observations can be tested against information available in the United States.

It is one of Mr. Greene's major contentions that those Western countries which allow their nationals to visit mainland China are far better informed than the United States about the Chinese People's Republic. (Cf. Chapter 16 on "Press Coverage.") The author says that he went to China in 1957 "totally unprepared," and he adds: "The reason is simple. Not only has the United States been cut off diplomatically from China but it is also cut off from any serious information about a country that is moving very quickly to the forefront of political and economic power. I am convinced that this ignorance is dangerous and detrimental to our interests" (p. 14).

UNLESS ONE assumes that "serious information" about Communist China can be obtained only through personal visits, this contention is simply untrue. Mr. Greene himself could easily have learned a great deal by reading in the very wide sample of articles from Chinese Communist newspapers and periodicals made available in English translation by the United States Consulate General at Hong Kong. This is a source widely used by serious students of China in other countries and certainly available in Palo Alto, California, where the author now lives and where the Hoover Library has one of the best collections of material on contemporary China outside that country itself. Also, Mr. Greene could easily have contacted some of the scholars engaged in serious studies of contemporary China from published Chinese material, of whom there are probably more in the United States than in any other country. If he had done so, he would have found that the major obstacles to obtaining serious information about China are created by Peking itself.

The bibliography which Mr. Greene provides at the end of his book might suggest to some readers that he had familiarized himself with the available information. In fact, however, it lists only a small sample of the serious studies that have been written about China under Communist rule, while including some books of very remote relevance, such as a history of the Mongol Empire. And if Mr. Greene actually read the books he does list, it is strange that he should give *Earthbound China* a wrong subtitle which completely misrepresents its contents, and put *China and the Cold War,* a book of nearly 300 pages, under the heading of "Periodicals, Pamphlets, and Documents."

Mr. Greene cites a considerable list of Western visitors to China but says nothing about the calculated restrictiveness of Peking's policy in deciding who shall be granted admission visas. The type of visitor most likely to obtain serious information is the experienced reporter, someone with background knowledge of China and the linguistic ability to make his own contacts, while those with little background knowledge, ignorant of the language, and wholly dependent on the government for their contacts, are least likely to obtain such information, especially in a totalitarian country. But it has been precisely the former type of visitor who has found it hardest to obtain a Chinese entry visa, particularly since 1957. One could agree with Mr. Greene that the United States should not have refused passports to American correspondents who sought to visit Communist China in 1956, when Peking's policy was more liberal. But the real case for discontinuing present US restrictions on travel to mainland China is that their preservation helps to conceal from the American public the bamboo curtain which the Peking regime maintains to keep out almost all Western visitors likely to return home with "serious information."

FURTHERMORE, Mr. Greene's use of published material is highly selective. For example, he quotes a Canadian visitor's observation that under the Chinese Communist legal system, "no inducement or compulsion may be used to secure a confession" (p. 196), but ignores the abundant contrary testimony of foreigners who were forced to make confessions in Chinese Communist prisons and were later expelled, as well as of Chinese ex-prisoners who have escaped the country. He also quotes the statement of an English visitor justifying the Peking regime's suppression of criticism in 1957 on the ground that the critics "showed that they had forgotten none of their western bourgeois prejudices" (p. 342), but ignores studies, based on Chinese publications, showing that the criticism came not merely from western-trained intellectuals but also from students and Communist Party members.

The author's on-the-spot reporting can be tested by what he says about Hong Kong. He asserts that "there is little necessity for people to sneak across the border 'at the risk of their lives' because the frontier is practically open . . . there is a constant flow of people from China to Hong Kong and from Hong Kong to

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China" (p. 334). This, however, evades the obvious question of whether or not it is easy to get in or out of China *without official permission* and ignores the frequent reports of risky escapes by refugees across a well-guarded frontier. Further, Mr. Greene estimates "an average inflow into Hong Kong *from all countries* of an average of about 70,000 [persons] a year" (p. 335), his italics seemingly calculated to suggest the quite false conclusion that an important part of this influx does *not* come from the Communist mainland. In fact, the "constant flow of people" into Hong Kong from the mainland—whether refugees from Communist rule or Chinese residents of Hong Kong returning from visits to relatives on the mainland—provides one of the best sources of information about conditions in Communist China, or at least in Kwangtung Province. Yet, Mr. Greene ignores the consensus of their reports, which is that conditions under Communist rule have been bad and steadily becoming worse, evidently because this would conflict with his opinions.

PEKING'S visa policy has been more liberal towards visitors from other Asian countries and many of these have been critical of what they found in Communist China. Indeed, the observations of Dr. Chandra-sekhar contrast sharply with those of Mr. Greene on many points. Both men visited rural communes. Mr. Greene says of them: "Life is tough; life is austere; yet I found it often lighted by a certain gaiety and enthusiasm, and above all by *hope for the future*" (p. 177). Dr. Chandra-sekhar writes: "Even the most casual observer could not have helped seeing that the average adult looked sullen and unhappy. He followed official directions and did his duty, but dejection and misery are impossible to conceal. We have incredible poverty in some of India's villages, but such poverty has never been a barrier to banter and humor, and even, oddly enough, gaiety. This I completely missed in the communes and in the countryside of China" (p. 119).

Again, Mr. Greene reports that, after consulting at least fifty trained observers, "I have yet to meet one who has seen any evidence of the forcible separation of husbands and wives; or of children being taken from mothers" (p. 142-43). Dr. Chandra-sekhar, on the other hand, writes of a commune he visited: "The adult population is distributed over 146 production teams. . . . The families are broken up, with the children separated from the parents and sometimes even husbands and wives separated from one another" (p. 48).

Mr. Greene accuses the American press of having "abandoned all attempts at any serious analysis of what is happening" in Communist China, and of explaining Chinese advances "by what one might call the 'slave-labor' theory"—that is, the argument that: "By driving the half-billion Chinese peasants into communes, by uprooting traditional family patterns and working the entire population fantastically long hours, enormous resources of manpower have been made available for agriculture and industry" (p. 145). He complains that this sort of treatment has given a "woefully inaccurate" picture. Yet, Dr. Chandra-sekhar's direct observations of conditions in Communist China lead him to conclude: "A life of fatigue and tension all the year round for all the peasants and workers in every commune so that China's production can beat Britain's. What more can a totalitarian state ask of its slave subjects?" (p. 44)

The gap of a year and a half between the visits of the two authors cannot explain these disagreements. During the winter of 1958-59, when Dr. Chandra-sekhar was in China, the Chinese Communist press was reporting universal enthusiasm for "The Great Leap Forward." On the contrary, by the summer of 1960 when Mr. Greene made his last visit, the press itself was acknowledging serious crop failures and economic difficulties.

This review has cited only a few of the points on which Mr. Greene's observations can be checked against other evidence, including evidence contained in the Chinese Communist press. In a very high proportion of cases such checking reveals the author guilty, whether wittingly or unwittingly, of suppressing and distorting the truth—and always in favor of the Chinese Communist regime. Rather than "a fair and honest account" of the "truth," therefore, *Awakened China* appears to be a work in the style of Anna Louise Strong or of Hewlett Johnson, Dean of Canterbury.

Indeed, a hostile critic might charge that Mr. Greene has written a piece of outright propaganda on behalf of the Chinese Communist regime, either because of pro-Communist sympathies or in return for such lucrative perquisites as his exclusive television interview with Premier Chou En-lai. This reviewer, however, would suggest a different hypothesis. Mr. Greene appears to be one of those people who base their judgments on feeling rather than on scientific reasoning, who consider that "reason is and ought to be a slave of the passions." He was no doubt deeply impressed by the enthusiasm he found among the party activists with whom he came in contact, and this apparently produced an identification with his official guides and interpreters, so that what his book really gives is a subjective picture of China seen through the eyes of young and enthusiastic Chinese Communists. This picture is not entirely

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false; but it selects and amplifies those aspects of the Chinese situation which fit the vision of attaining the ideal Communist society of the future, and it rejects or attenuates all aspects which conflict with this vision. For an understanding of political behavior, it is indeed important to comprehend the distorted pictures of society often entertained by enthusiastic supporters of any social system. Thus, much of Mr. Greene's material might have been valid and useful in a book presenting China as the Chinese Communists themselves see it. But, as it stands, *Awakened China* only contributes to ignorance and raises the noise level of confusion which serious studies of Communist China have to overcome.

MR. WARNER'S impression of Communist China is in complete disagreement with Mr. Greene's thesis of a peace-loving nation threatened by American imperialism. Warner maintains that "Mao, Marx and Chinese nationalism have combined to produce a militant evangelism of a type the world has not seen since the Crusades" (p. 2). He argues that the Chinese Communist leaders are dedicated to the cause of world revolution both from conviction and because external tension is necessary for the internal stability of their regime. Because of the leadership's refusal to face the population problem, writes the author, "the world will soon be faced in China with a nation that will rank with the industrial giants in terms of gross output while its people remain desperately poor. . . . For China there is only one possible escape from this dilemma and the tensions that the contradictions in industrial output and continuing poverty and population pressures will inevitably produce within its society: it must push on as rapidly as possible with the creation of its own internal power while channeling the emotions of its people against the external antagonisms, thereby forcing a breakthrough at the weakest point. The harder the internal struggle, the more bitter will the campaign to isolate and destroy the United States become" (p. 135).

Mr. Warner further maintains that the Chinese Communist leaders, having started out with localized attempts at subversion in Southeast Asia, now look to wider horizons and see themselves as authors of the best model for revolution in all underdeveloped countries and hence as the natural guide for the revolutionary movements in Africa and South America. The author supports this general thesis with quotations from Chinese Communist statements and illustrations of Chinese Communist activities in Southeast Asia and other areas, and he points to the impact of China's growing military power on the leaders of neighboring countries.

The major weakness of Warner's analysis is that the author seems far too ready to assume that the Chinese Communists' militancy springs from megalomania and justified confidence in their own strength rather than from persecution mania and frustration. One might surmise that this book, like Mr. Greene's, is primarily a reflection of the feelings of those with whom the author came in contact, in this case representatives of the non-Communist élites of adjacent Asian countries, who feel bewildered and insecure in the face of developments in China. (Interestingly enough, among the three authors whose books are under review, it is Dr. Chandra-sekhar who continues the tradition of critical reasoning and scientific analysis, originated in the West, while the two Western authors largely forsake it under the influence of philosophical relativism.)

One can point to several evidences of Mr. Warner's tendency to exaggerate Chinese Communist strength. It is strange, for instance, that a book which carries its narrative into 1961 should claim that "commune dwellers are certainly no worse off in material terms than they were before" (p. 49). The author does not reconcile this claim even with his own statements, and some of these are certainly wrong, such as the figure he gives for the reduced 1961 grain ration in Peking, which is much higher than the ration actually was even before an earlier reduction in 1959.

Again, to say that "whether we like it or not, the people of China are inevitably becoming more closely identified with the regime" (p. 123) is to make a far more definite claim for the effectiveness of Communist political indoctrination than the evidence justifies. After describing the ubiquity of this indoctrination the author says, "It is all a delusion; but it is the only reality many people in China know" (p. 124). This may seem plausible to people who view truth or falsehood as a matter of conventional opinion, but in reality there are serious long-term difficulties in fooling *all* the people *all* the time in matters they can test by personal experience. The Chinese Communist regime has been able to secure a considerable degree of support for a program of austerity and hard work by its promises of a better life in the future, but if these promises are never honored, it is almost certain that their persuasiveness will steadily depreciate. Indeed, there are some signs that this is already happening.

Mr. Warner's final conclusion is that the correct policy for the non-Communist powers lies in "putting real competition into competitive co-existence" (p. 203). No one would question this, and the chances of such a policy succeeding are in fact greater than would seem to follow from Mr. Warner's rather defeatist estimate of Chinese Communist strength.

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History in the Remaking

IN 1959, WHAT WAS described in its title as an "abridged" Russian translation of one of the principal volumes of the United States Army's official history of operations in World War II was published by the Ministry of Defense of the USSR and made available to the Soviet public. Entitled *The Supreme Command* and written for the US Army Historical Division by Forrest C. Pogue, the original volume had appeared in the United States in 1954 and dealt with the role of the Supreme Command, Allied Expeditionary Forces (under General Dwight D. Eisenhower) in planning and directing the invasion of Western Europe, from the landings in Normandy through the capitulation of Germany.[1]

That the Soviets should have taken particular interest in the official American record of the direction of the war on the western front is entirely natural inasmuch as this record complemented their own history of the Soviet Army's assault on Germany from the east. But it is also quite obvious that Mr. Pogue's account was bound to conflict on a great many points with the officially established Soviet historical interpretations of World War II. The scope of disagreement was, in fact, so great that the Russian edition of the book[2] was offered to Soviet readers only after its contents had been thoroughly purged by the translator-editors of all passages contradicting or casting doubt upon the Soviet version of Germany's defeat. The Soviet Defense Ministry also took the added precaution of prefacing the expurgated translation with a lengthy 33-page introduction by a Soviet military historian criticizing the American account for alleged falsifications and restating the standard positions in Soviet policy on certain basic issues.[3]

THE AUTHOR of the introduction, Colonel Kulish (described as a *kandidat* in historical science), terms the Allied Supreme Command record of interest to Soviet readers because of the information it provides on various aspects of the organization and functioning of the armed forces of the Western Allies. It was in the European theater of operations in World War II, states Kulish, that the US Army learned the art of modern warfare, and the experience it gained there still serves as a foundation of the United States' military buildup. Specifically, he notes, Mr. Pogue's study is a first-class source of information regarding the organizational structure of the Allied high command, inter-Allied military cooperation and relations between the Allied governments in connection with the campaign in Europe, the attitude of the Allied command concerning the political reorganization of liberated European countries, and Allied war propaganda policy.[4]

But Colonel Kulish goes on to assert that the American historian's account contains a great deal of deliberate distortion. Therefore, the purpose of his own introduction is to set the record straight and clarify some of the fundamental issues involved in the history of the war in Europe. In particular, he charges Mr. Pogue's book with falsely attempting to prove: (1) that the United States armed forces played a decisive role in the defeat of Germany; (2) that there were no disagreements among the Western Allies regarding the basic plan of operations in Europe; (3) that the Supreme Command, in its war propaganda policy, considered itself firmly committed to the principle of unconditional

[1] Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command,* Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1954. (In the series entitled *The U.S. Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations.*)
[2] F. S. Pogiu, *Verkhovnoe komandovanie: sokrashchenyi perevod s angliiskovo,* Izdatelstvo Ministerstva Oborony Soiuza, Moscow, 1959.
[3] Introduction to the Russian edition, *ibid.,* pp. 5-37.
[4] *Ibid.,* p. 5.

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German surrender; and (4) that the Western Allies loyally discharged their military obligations to the Soviet Union.

IN REGARD TO the first point, Colonel Kulish asserts that Mr. Pogue's account places the significance of the Allied operations on the West European front in distorted perspective by failing to give a true picture of the general strategic situation on the eve of the landing in Normandy. By that time, he argues, Germany's defeat had already been virtually achieved by the single-handed action of the Soviet armies in the east; the bulk of the German military forces were tied down on the eastern front, and the Soviet victories there had sounded a rallying cry to the forces of the European anti-Nazi underground. Italy's capitulation had broken the unity of the Axis, and Germany had been outstripped in the battle of war production. In this situation, says Kulish, the Nazi high command knew—well before Normandy—that the war was lost, and its sole aim in continuing military resistance was to secure, if possible, a negotiated peace instead of unconditional surrender. More specifically, he claims, the Nazi leaders hoped for a separate peace with the Western Allies, at Soviet expense.

In any event, according to the Soviet historian, the Normandy invasion and subsequent Allied operations in the west had a relatively minor effect on the general course of the war in Europe. The Soviet armies continued to bear the main burden of the assault on Germany, and even the Allied victories in the west were largely made possible by the coordinated Soviet offensives on the eastern front. In fact, asserts Colonel Kulish, Soviet countermeasures at times saved the Western Allies from certain military disaster, as for instance during the Germans' Ardennes offensive at the end of 1944.[5]

Turning to his second charge, Colonel Kulish claims that Mr. Pogue's study distorts the truth even more flagrantly in reducing Anglo-American disagreements during the war to the level of mere military strategy, whereas they actually reflected a struggle between the two Western Allies for postwar world predominance.[6] The situation created by World War I spurred the growth of American imperialistic ambitions, declares Kulish, and after the collapse of France in World War II the United States began maneuvering to win for itself the position of leading world power. Britain, weakened by the war, would be reduced to the role of mere junior partner of the United States, and at the same time Allied victory would ensure the elimination of Germany as an economic competitor of the US in world markets. Thus, according to Kulish, outward Anglo-American military cooperation against Germany went hand in hand with a hidden struggle between US and British imperialists.

This basic conflict, claims the Soviet historian, was at the root of inter-Allied differences over military strategy. The British, on the one hand, pressed for an offensive in the Balkans because they calculated that this would permit recoupment of Britain's losses in the Middle East and check a Soviet advance into the heart of Europe. The Americans, on the other hand, insisted, successfully, on launching the Allied offensive in Western Europe, considering this the best means of strengthening the postwar US position on the European continent, even if at Britain's expense.[7]

Colonel Kulish asserts that this hidden clash of imperialistic ambitions was responsible for recurrent British opposition to various aspects of the American-proposed plans for operations in Europe, and for constant bickering among the Allied military commanders and government leaders. Every move to secure better coordination of the Allied military effort, to change the disposition of Allied forces or the assignments of individual commanders, or to formulate new operational plans, he claims, invariably provided the occasion for a demonstration of mutual antagonism and suspicion.[8] Each of the two Allies sought to use the other to its own advantage by trying to shift the main burden of the fighting to the other's forces while reserving the role of top military leadership for its own commanders. Thus, asserts Kulish, the Allied campaign in Western Europe deteriorated into an Anglo-American rivalry for military prestige and imperialistic power, with adverse consequences for the prosecution of the war.[9]

THE SOVIET HISTORIAN also charges that imperialistic designs dictated the policy of the Western Allies regarding cooperation with the European Resistance movements, particularly the French underground. The Supreme Command, he alleges, rejected full utilization of the Resistance forces because it feared that the growing prestige and importance of these political-military movements—largely under Communist leadership—would prevent the realization of the Western Allies' selfish war aims. Hence, the Allied command sought to

[5] *Ibid.*
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 32 and *passim.*
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 28.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

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discourage armed participation by the underground forces in operations against the Germans on pretended humanitarian grounds. Kulish similarly charges the Western Allies with having deliberately avoided prompt steps to rebuild the national armies of the countries liberated by their forces, again out of fear that such action would strengthen the sovereignty of the liberated countries and thus thwart the Allies' imperialistic designs.[10]

With regard to psychological warfare policy, Colonel Kulish takes issue with the view, shown by Mr. Pogue to have gained prevalence among the Allied military, that the general ineffectiveness of the propaganda directed at Germany stemmed from adherence to the demand for unconditional German surrender. The Soviet historian argues, on the contrary, that the unconditional surrender principle was of great significance, not only because it enormously boosted the morale of the democratic forces fighting the Nazis, but also because it helped to frustrate the designs of the American and British imperialists disposed to seek a separate negotiated peace with Germany, made possible the trial of Nazi war criminals, and delayed Germany's postwar rearmament.

The real reason for the failure of the Western Allies' propaganda effort, Kulish asserts, was that it proclaimed war aims that were not just anti-Hitlerite but anti-German. It proclaimed, for example, the total economic destruction of Germany along the lines of the Morgenthau plan. In contrast to this Anglo-American line, the Soviet Union and other European countries interpreted the unconditional surrender principle as requiring the destruction of fascism, but also the reestablishment of a democratic German state.[11]

IN ORDER to back up the historical interpretations set forth in Colonel Kulish' introduction, the translated text of Mr. Pogue's volume omits all passages of the original containing embarrassing or contradictory information. The Russian title does indeed indicate that the translation is "abridged," but there is nothing in the published text to show readers where excisions have been made. On the contrary, it is evident that the Soviet editors deliberately tried to obliterate the traces of such excisions, at times even rewriting extensive passages so as to camouflage their tampering with the original and make Soviet readers believe that the translation faithfully presents the American account of Germany's defeat.

The excisions from the original text fall into two general categories, the first embracing simple omissions of an inconvenient fact or facts. A conspicuous illustration of this is the treatment given in the Russian text to the so-called "Patton incident." The incident arose from a remark made by Lt. General George S. Patton in Britain during the invasion preparations, to the effect that the postwar world would pretty much be run by the Americans and British. Patton, an able but rather outspoken combat officer, made the remark at an informal cocktail party, but it leaked to the press and caused considerable embarrassment to the government in Washington. The Russian text, while accurately reproducing Pogue's account of the incident itself, conveniently omits the accompanying description of the repercussions which ensued—the uproar in Congress, the severe reprimand administered to Patton, and the fact that even his dismissal was seriously considered. Through these omissions, the Soviet reader is led to take Patton's remark as reflecting the real official attitude in Washington and hence as evidence of American duplicity and imperialistic designs.[12]

Another example of the same sort is the Soviet editors' excision of the passage in Pogue's book (p. 407) relating to the timing of the Soviet offensive on the eastern front in early 1945. The passage in question gives facts and dates establishing that the Soviet offensive did not begin until some two weeks after the Germans' counterthrust in the Ardennes had been smashed, and that the Soviet drive therefore had no influence on the failure of the Nazis' last real effort to halt the Allied assault from the west. This information, of course, would have contradicted Colonel Kulish' reiteration of the claim that only timely Soviet intervention saved the Allied forces in the west from disaster. Hence, the offending passage was bodily omitted from the Russian text in order to avoid inviting Soviet readers to do some date-matching of their own.[13]

THE SECOND category of omissions is somewhat more broad and complex, involving the screening-out from the translated text of all material tending to counter the general impression created in the introduction with respect to the motivations of the Western Allies, their relations with each other, and their attitude towards the Soviet Union. Colonel Kulish, of course, hews to the standard Soviet version of the Western Allies' wartime objectives, picturing them as seeking to capitalize on the Soviet military effort against Germany in order to

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 33 ff.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 35-37.
[12] Pogue, *The Supreme Command, op. cit.*, pp. 164-68.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 407.

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strengthen their own positions in Western Europe and keep that area in the grip of their capitalist monopolies. The United States leaders, according to this version, were the arch-imperialists of the Western camp and shaped their military strategy on the continent solely with a view to eliminating future competition and depriving the Soviet Union of influence in liberated Europe. Anything in Mr. Pogue's original study that contradicted this general thesis naturally had to be eliminated from the Russian translation. The result is the almost complete suppression, in the published Soviet text, of the author's many references to inter-Allied military collaboration and relations between the Allied and Soviet high commands, including the numerous efforts of the Western Allies to effect closer coordination of military operations on the eastern and western fronts.

It would, indeed, have been unthinkable for the Soviet Defense Ministry to make Mr. Pogue's study available to Soviet readers in its entirety. For the excised passages just mentioned would have made it amply clear that the American position on questions of military strategy was guided wholly by military considerations, without regard for the political implications of a given course of action. Indeed, it would have emerged that British thinking on military strategy was influenced much more by political factors than was the American, and that some of the disagreements between the two Western Allies arose precisely from American refusal to consider operational strategy from any other point of view than one of strict military economy. Moreover, Soviet readers would have learned to their surprise that such disagreements never got beyond the planning stage and were always resolved in favor of the military argument.[14]

MR. POGUE'S ACCOUNT, without adulteration, would have been even more devastating to the official Soviet line imputing duplicity to the Western Allies in their military policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Contrary to the Soviet claims, the original study clearly shows that these policies, no less than the Western Allies' overall military strategy in Europe, were based on the principle that military considerations were paramount. This is evidenced by the efforts of the Allied Supreme Command, detailed by Mr. Pogue, to achieve more effective coordination of the military operations on the western and eastern fronts. Similarly, the original text shows that such problems as whether the armies of the Western Allies should push beyond the Elbe, occupy Berlin, or advance towards Prague were decided exclusively on the basis of whether these moves were militarily necessary or advantageous in order to accomplish the final defeat of Germany at the least possible cost. General Eisenhower as Allied Supreme Commander, backed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and government in Washington, consistently maintained that the war must be fought with the utmost economy in human lives.[15]

These passages, of course excised in the Russian edition, show also that the Western Allies' efforts to cooperate with the Russians met with little response from the Soviet side. Even the problem of maintaining efficient liaison between the respective high commands was never satisfactorily solved, causing not merely a great deal of inconvenience but even a needless waste of human lives. As emasculated by the Soviet editors, however, the Russian version of Mr. Pogue's book even seems to bear out the Soviet contention that the depth of the Soviet forces' penetration of Germany was solely the result of their own military effort. In their anxiety to erase all evidence of loyal Allied cooperation, the editors deleted from the Russian text a mass of important factual detail pertaining to the German surrender—the preliminary German peace feelers and overtures for a partial surrender, and the participation of Soviet representatives in all these events.

THE SAME motives obviously dictated the elimination of all material presented in the original study with reference to United States policy concerning the reestablishment of national governments in the liberated European countries. This material, showing that the US government scrupulously adhered to a hands-off policy of political non-interference—sometimes to the disadvantage of the Western Allies—at the same time that it shouldered the initial burden of assisting the economic and social rehabilitation of the liberated nations, would hardly have squared with the Soviet propaganda image of an imperialistic US leadership bent on replacing Nazi control of Western Europe by American domination.

In sum, the "abridgment" of Mr. Pogue's study that has been offered to the Soviet public is emasculated to such a degree that, in spite of the preservation of the original title, it no longer gives any real idea of the role and activities of the Allied Supreme Command in the conduct of the war in Europe. Indeed, the impression it conveys is that the Supreme Commander and his staff were merely an ornament without any concrete, significant function. Beyond the general purpose of utilizing

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 222, 224, 226, 292, 294.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 224.

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an ostensibly authentic American account to support the Soviets' own colored version of World War II history, the Russian edition of Mr. Pogue's work appears to have two specific propaganda objectives from the military standpoint. First, it seems calculated to foster the idea that the capitalist countries of the West are intrinsically incapable of any high degree of military cooperation; and second, since the Allied Supreme Commander in World War II was an American, it evidently seeks to cast doubt on the caliber of American military leadership. Such notions may perhaps be of some comfort to Soviet citizens when they contemplate the possibility of World War III.

Kazimierz Grzybowski

(Mr. Grzybowski is an American specialist on Soviet and East European law and government.)

Correspondence

EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to send communications dealing with matters discussed in *Problems of Communism.* Comments should be addressed to the Editors, *Problems of Communism,* U.S. Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington 25, D.C.

COMMUNISM IN AFRICA

TO THE EDITORS: In his thoughtful and informative article in your November-December 1961 issue, Mr. Walter Kolarz corrects some mistaken impressions about Communist strength in Sub-Saharan Africa. I wonder, however, if he isn't guilty of a few sins of omission.

Throughout what was French West Africa there is—overt in some states, covert in others—a French Communist-inspired cadre of indigenous political and trade union leaders. To some degree its survival is dependent upon support from Guinea, but neither now nor at any time since President Sékou Touré's break (subsequently partially patched up) with the French Communist-dominated Confédération Générale du Travail (GGT) has it been too clear which of these leftist leaders were African first and which Communist first.

Since the Guinean Marxist-led teachers' strike, which took place after Mr. Kolarz wrote his article, and which provoked President Touré's dismissal of Soviet Ambassador Solod and Mr. Mikoyan's conciliatory visit, loyalties and friendships may well have become further confused, but one cannot assume that the *enragés* have ceased to be Communists of one sort or another.

Guinea has also provided inspiration and sanctuary to refugees from several Portuguese colonies. In contrast to the older anti-Portuguese movements headquartered in Dakar and Leopoldville, the Guinea-supported groups seem to look wistfully to Moscow.

If Guinea is the ideological fatherland, once removed, for the Communist-oriented opposition in Portuguese as well as ex-French Africa, Ghana plays a similar role, as Mr. Kolarz knows, in what was British West Africa. The extent of directly pro-Communist as well as pro-Ghana sentiment in the Nigerian Trade Union Congress is considerably greater than Mr. Kolarz implies. Mr. W. O. Goodluck, its assistant general secretary in charge of external affairs, goes much further than does Ghana's trade union chief John Tettagh in proclaiming his friendship for "the socialist world" and his enmity towards "the imperialists and their ICFTU lackeys." One cannot be sure whether or not the Nigerian Federal Government will succeed in bringing about the unification of the NTUC and the ICFTU-affiliated Trade Union Congress (Nigeria), or what the international policies of a unified body would be.

East and Central Africa were understandably outside the scope of Mr. Kolarz' article. I have no doubt that he is aware of renewed Soviet and Ghanaian activities in both politics and trade unionism in Kenya and Northern Rhodesia.

To sum up: if, as Mr. Kolarz says, Communist strength in what used to be French West Africa is less than it once appeared to be, in British and formerly British Africa it may turn out to be greater than one thought.

WILLIAM C. GAUSMANN
Washington, D.C.

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CUBA AND SPAIN

TO THE EDITORS: I refer to Victor Alba's review of *The Grand Camouflage,* by Burnett Bolloten, in your November-December 1961 issue.

I know that all reviewing is of necessity subjective, but nevertheless I do feel that editorial vigilance should be devoted to the common tendency among reviewers to treat the book under review almost with disdain and to use the opportunity to give their pet hobby-horses a run. I feel quite sure that if Mr. Alba had been reviewing books on the sex life of an ant, or the Jewish problem in the USSR, he would have worked in his reference to Cuba.

I think this is an enormous pity in this particular instance, because I found Bolloten's book most illuminating. I am convinced it will be source material long after Thomas' book (reviewed in the same article), with its glossy finish but pedestrian content, is forgotten.

I am sure that there is no other source in English on the agrarian and urban revolution of 1936 and the vital role played in subsequent events by the frantic efforts on one side to consolidate it, and on the other to "camouflage" and destroy it. I also found most interesting the middle-class support gained by the Communists through their counter-revolutionary activities. These are only two of the many aspects treated by Mr. Bolloten and supported by documentation which I feel must be unique in its scope.

I have no axe to grind but that of disappointment in what I consider to be a lapse from your usual high standard of reviewing.

MELVIN M. J. DURDEN
Ilford, Essex, England

MR. ALBA REPLIES: All the reasons which Mr. Durden adduces for attributing importance to Mr. Bolloten's book were covered by my comments on it, even though not in the detail which Mr. Durden would have liked me to give them and which the subject certainly deserved if only I had been permitted enough space for a more extensive treatment.

I take satisfaction in noting that my remark about the relevance of the book to recent developments in Cuba is supported not only by the publishers' comment to the same effect on the jacket of the volume, but also by the fact that even Mr. Durden, in his letter, cannot help making reference to Castro's island.

TITO'S CLIMB TO POWER

TO THE EDITORS: Mr. Richard Lowenthal ("Schism Among the Faithful," January-February 1962, p. 4) is not on very strong ground when he writes that the Yugoslav Communist leaders "had gained power on their own." Aside from the massive aid which Tito received in the form of British arms and air support after the capitulation of Italy, he benefited enormously from the operations of the Soviet Army in northeastern Yugoslavia in the autumn of 1944. In the battles which preceded the withdrawal of the German forces from Belgrade the Soviet army employed 19 infantry divisions, 500 tanks and 2,000 planes (*Novaia i noveishaia istoriia,* Moscow, no. 5, 1960, p. 133). In addition, the Royal Bulgarian Army, which for more than three years had acted as Hitler's auxiliary in Serbia and Macedonia, went over to the Soviet side and supplied nine infantry divisions which fought against the Germans in many parts of Yugoslavia. What Tito's partisans were capable of "on their own" can best be gauged by the fact that they only succeeded in entering the capitals of Croatia and Slovenia a full week after Hitler's suicide.

IVAN AVAKUMOVIC
University of Manitoba
Winnipeg, Canada

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